

# Entropic Optimal Planning

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# Stochastic control of interacting dynamics

Agents  $i = 1, \dots, N$

Each agent  $i$  controls the state processes

$$dX_t^i = \alpha_t^i dt + dW_t^i, \quad W^i \text{ indep Brownian motions}$$

Denote  $\alpha^{(-i)} := (\alpha^1, \dots, \alpha^{i-1}, \alpha^{i+1}, \dots, \alpha^N)$



## Nash Equilibrium

- Agent  $i$ 's individual optimization :

$$V^i(\alpha^{(-i)}) := \inf_{\alpha^i} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T \left\{ \frac{1}{2} |\alpha_t^i|^2 - f \left( X_t^i, \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \delta_{X_t^j} \right) \right\} dt + g(X_T^i) \right]$$

$\implies$  optimal response  $\hat{\alpha}^i(\alpha^{(-i)})$

- A Nash equilibrium is  $(\alpha^{*,1}, \dots, \alpha^{*,N})$  such that  $\alpha^{*,i} \in \hat{\alpha}^i(\alpha^{*,(-i)})$

# Coupled system of HJB equations

Value function of Agent  $i$  characterized by means of HJB equation

$$\partial_t v^i + \frac{1}{2} \Delta v^i + \sum_{j \neq i} \alpha^j \partial_{x_j} v^i + \underbrace{\inf_{\alpha^i} \left\{ \alpha^i \partial_{x_i} v^i + \frac{1}{2} |\alpha^i|^2 \right\}}_{= -\frac{1}{2} |\partial_{x_i} v^i|^2} = f(x^i, \bar{\mu}_N(x))$$

$$v^i(T, \cdot) = g$$

with optimal control  $\hat{\alpha}^i(\alpha^{(-i)}) = -\partial_{x_i} v^i$ , where  $v^i = v^i(t, x; \alpha^{(-i)})$

Nash equilibrium :  $\alpha^* = (\alpha^{*,1}, \dots, \alpha^{*,N})$  such that

$$\alpha^{*,i} = -\partial_{x_i} v^i(t, x; \alpha^{*,(-i)}) \quad \text{for all } i = 1, \dots, N$$

... raises many technical difficulties!

# SDE and Focker-Planck equation

To simplify, send  $N \rightarrow \infty \implies$  interaction through marginal distribution

$$\bar{\mu}_N(X_t) := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \delta_{X_t^i} \longrightarrow \text{Law of } X_t$$

If  $X$  solution of SDE  $dX_t = b(t, X_t)dt + \sigma(t, X_t)dW_t$ , its marginal law  $m(t, dx) := \mathbb{P} \circ X_t^{-1}$  characterized by the Fokker-Planck equation

$$\partial_t m + \operatorname{div}[bm] - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i,j} \partial_{i,j}^2 \{ (\sigma \sigma^\top)_{ij} m \} = 0, \quad m|_{t=0} = \delta_{\{x_0\}}$$

SDE at Nash equilibrium is

$$dX_t = -\partial_x v(t, X_t, m(t, X_t))dt + dW_t$$

and the corresponding density characterized by the FP equation

$$\partial_t m + \operatorname{div}[-\partial_x v m] - \frac{1}{2} \Delta m = 0, \quad m|_{t=0} = \mu_0$$

# Mean Field Games

MFG, Huang, Malhamé & Caines '06 and Lasry & Lions '06

Lasry & Lions' formulation  $\partial_t v + \frac{1}{2} \Delta v - \frac{1}{2} |Dv|^2 = f(x, m), v|_{t=T} = g \quad (HJB)$

$$\partial_t m - \frac{1}{2} \Delta m - \operatorname{div}[Dv m] = 0, m|_{t=0} = \mu_0 \quad (FP)$$

(HJB) : Representative agent optimization problem, parametrized by  $m$

$$\inf_{\alpha} \mathbb{E} \left[ \int_0^T \left\{ \frac{1}{2} |\alpha_t|^2 - f(X_t, m(t, X_t)) \right\} dt + g(X_T) \right], \quad dX_t = \alpha_t dt + dW_t$$

Hamiltonian  $H(z) = \inf_a \left\{ az - \frac{|a|^2}{2} \right\} = \frac{|z|^2}{2} \implies \text{opt. cont. } \alpha_t^* = Dv(t, X_t)$

(FP) :  $m$  = marginal distribution of diffusion with transport coefficient given by optimal control of the HJB :  $dX_t = Dv(t, X_t)dt + dW_t$

$\implies$  **Nash equilibrium**

# P.L. Lions' Planning Problem

## Planning Problem

$\mu_0, \mu_T$  given probability measures on  $\mathbb{R}^d$ , solve

$$\partial_t v + \frac{1}{2} \Delta v - \frac{1}{2} |Dv|^2 = f(x, m)$$

$$\partial_t m - \frac{1}{2} \Delta m - \text{Div}[Dv m] = 0 \quad m|_{t=0} = \mu_0 \quad \text{and} \quad m|_{t=T} = \mu_T$$

(in particular  $g = v|_{t=T}$  to be determined)

Unique solution exists for any pair  $(m_0, m_T)$ ...


Lions '10, Achdou, Camilli & Capuzzo Dolcetta '12

Porretta '14, Orrieri, Porretta & Savaré '18

Graber, Mészáros & Tonon '18, Benamou

Carlier, Di Marino & Nena '18

Figure 1: EU energy mix evolution [55 percent lower emissions in 2030 compared to 1990 and climate neutrality in 2050]



# Path-dependent stochastic control

$\Omega = C^0(\mathbb{R}_+, \mathbb{R}^d)$ , canonical process  $X_t(\omega) = \omega(t)$ ,  $t \geq 0$   
 $\mathbb{P}_0$  : Wiener measure on  $\Omega$

**Croud of agents** defined by **probability distribution**  $m$

for **fixed**  $m$ , solve the representative Agent problem :

$$V_0(m, \xi) := \sup_{\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[ \xi(X) - \int_0^T c_t(m(t), \nu_t) dt \right]$$

where, for some control  $\nu$  valued in  $U$ ,  $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}$  is weak solution of  $\mathbb{P} \circ (X_0)^{-1} = m_0$ , and  $dX_t = \sigma_t(X, \nu_t) [\lambda_t(X, \nu_t) dt + dW_t^{\mathbb{P}}]$ ,  $\mathbb{P}$ -a.s.

Two additional features :

- control affects both drift (transport) and diffusion
- all coefficients are possibly path dependent
- **path dependence of  $\xi = \xi(X_{\cdot \wedge T})$  is crucial !**

# Agents in (Path-dependent) mean field Nash equilibrium

Denote  $\hat{\mathcal{P}}(m, \xi) := \{\text{solutions of } V_0(m, \xi)\}$

**Definition** (Mean field game equilibrium)

$\hat{m}$  is a MFG equilibrium if there exists

$$\hat{\mathbb{P}} \in \hat{\mathcal{P}}(\hat{m}, \xi) \text{ such that } \hat{\mathbb{P}} \circ (X_t)^{-1} = \hat{m}(t), \text{ for all } t \leq T$$

Denote  $\text{MFG}(\xi) = \{\text{solutions of MFG equilibrium}\}$





# Path-dependent formulation of the Planning Problem

## Path-dependent Planning Problem

Given  $\mu_0, \mu_T$  probability measures on  $\mathbb{R}^d$ ,

find  $\xi \in \mathbb{L}^0(\mathcal{F}_T)$  and  $\hat{m} \in \text{MFG}(\xi)$  such that  $\hat{m}(0) = \mu_0$ ,  $\hat{m}(T) = \mu_T$

- $\xi$  may be interpreted as the incentive regulation so as to optimally move the population from  $\mu_0$  to  $\mu_T$
- More freedom than the original Lions' planning problem where  $\xi(X) = g(X_T)$
- Multiple solutions, in general...
- Relation with contract theory : 1 Principal facing a crowd of Agents in Nash equilibrium

# Forward description of MFG equilibria

Hamiltonian of the representative agent problem (with  $b := \sigma \lambda$ ) :

$$H_t(z, \gamma, \mu) := \sup_{u \in U} \left\{ b_t(u) \cdot z + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_t(u)^2 : \gamma - c_t(\mu, u) \right\}$$

## Proposition (Ren, Tan & NT '21)

Let  $p > 1$  and  $\xi \in \mathcal{L}^p(\mathcal{P})$  be such that  $\text{MFG}(\xi) \neq \emptyset$ . Then, we may find  $Y_0 \in \mathbb{R}$ ,  $Z \in \mathcal{H}^p(\mathcal{P})$ , and  $\mathbb{F}$ -prog.meas.  $\Gamma$  such that

$$\text{MFG}(\xi) = \text{MFG}(Y_T^{Z, \Gamma}), \quad \text{where}$$

- $Y_T^{Z, \Gamma} := \int_0^T Z_t \cdot dX_t + \frac{1}{2} \Gamma_t : d\langle X \rangle_t - H_t(Z_t, \Gamma_t, \mu(t)) dt$ ,  $\mathcal{P}$ -q.s.
- $\mu(t) = \mathbb{P} \circ X_t^{-1}$  is defined by the McKean-Vlasov controlled dynamics

$$dX_t = \nabla_z H_t(Z_t, \Gamma_t, \mu(t)) dt + \sqrt{2 \nabla_\gamma H_t(Z_t, \Gamma_t, \mu(t))} dW_t, \quad X_0 \sim \mu_0$$

2nd order backward SDEs : Soner, NT & Zhang, Possamaï, Tan & Zhou  
 Principal-Agent problem : Cvitanic, Passamaï & NT and Elie & Possamaï

Here, we extend to the quadratic setting

# Intuitions

- Uncontrolled diffusion case : solve the representative Agent problem

$$V_0(\mathbf{m}, \xi) := \sup_{\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[ \xi(X) - \int_0^T c_t(\mathbf{m}(t), \nu_t) dt \right]$$

where, for some control  $\nu$  valued in  $U$ ,  $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}$  is weak solution of

$$\mathbb{P} \circ (X_0)^{-1} = \mathbf{m}_0, \text{ and } dX_t = \sigma_t(X) [\lambda_t(X, \nu_t) dt + dW_t^{\mathbb{P}}], \mathbb{P} - \text{a.s.}$$

Then the dynamic version of the problems satisfies the BSDE with final  $Y_T = \xi$  (El Karoui, Peng & Quenez '97). Notice  $\mathbf{m}$  is fixed!

- With diffusion control
  - same type of representation for all fixed diffusion, martingale optimality principle induces an non-decreasing process  $A$
  - $A$  vanishes on the support of optimal measure
  - our representation follows by approximating  $A$  by an appropriate sequence of a.c. nondecreasing processes

# Implication for the Lions planning problem

## Definition

Given  $\mu_0, \mu_T$ ,  $\text{Plan}(\mu_0, \mu_T)$  is the set of all processes  $Z, \Gamma$  such that

- There is a solution to the McKean-Vlasov SDE

$$dX_t = \nabla_Z H_t(Z_t, \Gamma_t, \mu(t)) dt + \sqrt{2 \nabla_\Gamma H_t(Z_t, \Gamma_t, \mu(t))} dW_t, \quad X_t \sim \mu(t)$$

- $\mu(0) = \mu_0$  and  $\mu(T) = \mu_T$

$\xi$  is a solution of the Lions' (path dependent) planning problem **iff**

$$\xi := Y_T^{Z, \Gamma} := \int_0^T Z_t \cdot dX_t + \frac{1}{2} \Gamma_t : d\langle X \rangle_t - H_t(Z_t, \Gamma_t, \mu(t)) dt$$

for some  $(Z, \Gamma) \in \text{Plan}(\mu_0, \mu_T)$

# Extensions

- Multi-marginal planning problem
- Discount factor in the control problem  $\implies H$  depends on  $Y \implies$  Solve a McKean-Vlasov SDE for  $(X, Y)$
- Elliptic setting  $\implies$  random horizon backward SDEs

## Optimal planning

Select a solution of the planning problem

$$\sup_{(Z, \Gamma) \in \text{Plan}(\mu_0, \mu_T)} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}^{Z, \Gamma}} \left[ \int_0^T \ell(X_t, \mathbb{P} \circ X_t^{-1}) dt + L(X_T, \mathbb{P} \circ X_T^{-1}, Y_T) \right]$$

## Back to the Lions purely quadratic setting

Representative agent problem :

$$\inf_{\alpha} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}^{\alpha}} \left[ \int_0^T \left\{ \frac{1}{2} |\alpha_t|^2 - f(X_t, m(t, X_t)) \right\} dt + \xi \right], \quad dX_t = \alpha_t dt + dW_t, \quad \mathbb{P}^{\alpha} - \text{a.s.}$$

Let  $H(x, z, \gamma, m) = H^0(x, z, m) + \frac{1}{2} \text{Tr}[\gamma]$ , where

$$H^0(x, z, m) := \inf_a \left\{ az + \frac{1}{2} a^2 - f(x, m) \right\} = -\frac{1}{2} z^2 - f(x, m)$$

As  $\nabla_z H = -z$  and  $2\nabla_{\gamma} H = I_d$  (independent of  $m$ ), we have

All solutions of the Lions planning problem are of the form

$$\xi := \int_0^T Z_t dX_t - H^0(X_t, Z_t, m(t)) dt$$

for some  $Z \in \text{Plan}(\mu_0, \mu_T)$ , i.e.  $Z \in \mathbb{H}^0$  and

$$dX_t = -Z_t dt + dW_t, \quad \mathbb{P}^{-Z} - \text{a.s.} \quad \mathbb{P}^{-Z} \circ X_0^{-1} = \mu_0, \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}^{-Z} \circ X_T^{-1} = \mu_T$$

# Entropic optimal planning in the purely quadratic MFG

$\mathbf{Q}, \mathbf{R} \in \text{Prob}(\Omega)$ , **entropy** of  $\mathbf{Q}$  wrt  $\mathbf{R}$  :

$$H(\mathbf{Q}|\mathbf{R}) := \mathbb{E}^{\mathbf{Q}} \left[ \ln \frac{d\mathbf{Q}}{d\mathbf{R}} \right] = \int \ln \frac{d\mathbf{Q}}{d\mathbf{R}} d\mathbf{Q}, \quad \text{for all } \mathbf{Q} \ll \mathbf{R}, (\infty, \text{otherwise})$$

For  $Z \in \text{Plan}(\mu_0, \mu_T)$ , denote  $\mathbb{P}^Z$  the probability on  $\Omega$  defined by

$$dX_t = -Z_t dt + dW_t, \quad X_0 \sim \mu_0, \quad \text{and} \quad X_T \sim \mu_T$$

## Minimum entropy optimal planning

Given  $\mu_0, \mu_T$  probability measure on  $dbR^d$ , solve

$$\min_{Z \in \text{Plan}(\mu_0, \mu_T)} H(\mathbb{P}^Z | \mathbb{P}_0)$$

If  $Z^*$  is a solution, then  $\mathbb{P}^* := \mathbb{P}^{Z^*}$  is a minimum entropy optimal planning from  $\mu_0$  to  $\mu_T$

# Explicit solution of the minimum entropy planning problem

## Proposition

Denote  $m_T := \mu_0 * \mathcal{N}(0, TId)$ , and assume

$$\mu_T \sim \text{Leb}_{\mathbb{R}^d}, \quad \text{and} \quad \int \ln \left( \frac{d\mu_T}{dm_T} \right)^- dm_T + \int \left( \frac{d\mu_T}{dm_T} \right)^2 dm_T < \infty$$

Then the minimum entropy planning problem has a unique solution  $Z^* = -\theta$  defined by

$$\frac{d\mu_T}{dm_T}(X_T) = e^{\int_0^T \theta_t \cdot dX_t - \frac{1}{2} \int_0^T |\theta_t|^2 dt}, \mathbb{P}_0 - a.s.$$

Consequently,  $\xi^* := \int_0^T Z_t^* dX_t - H^0(X_t, Z_t^*, m(t))dt$  is a (path-dependent) solution of the Lions optimal planning problem



# Hamiltonian with superlinear growth in the gradient

## Proposition

Assume that

$$\frac{\nabla_z H_t^0(\omega, y, z, m)}{f(|z|)} = O(1) \quad \text{as } |z| \rightarrow \infty$$

for some continuous  $f$  with  $f(0) = 0$

Then, under the conditions of the previous theorem, the minimum entropy planning problem has a unique solution  $Z^*$  defined by

$$\nabla_z H_t^0(Y_t, Z_t^*, \mu_t) = \theta_t, \mathbb{P}_0 - \text{a.s.}$$

# Diffusion control, uncontrolled drift

for fixed  $m$ , solve the representative Agent problem :

$$V_0(m, \xi) := \sup_{\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[ \xi(X) - \int_0^T c_t(m(t), \nu_t) dt \right]$$

where, for some control  $\nu$  valued in  $U$ ,  $\mathbb{P} \in \mathcal{P}$  is weak solution of

$$\mathbb{P} \circ (X_0)^{-1} = m_0, \text{ and } dX_t = \sigma_t(X, \nu_t) dW_t^{\mathbb{P}}, \mathbb{P} - \text{a.s.}$$

Marginal distributions are in convex order :

$$t \longmapsto \int f(x) \mu_t(dx) \text{ nondecreasing}$$

Hamiltonian of the representative agent problem :

$$H_t(\gamma, \mu) := \sup_{u \in U} \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \sigma_t^2 : \gamma - c_t(\mu, u) \right\}$$

# Hamiltonian with superlinear growth in the Hessian

Ongoing work...

## Main result

Let  $\mu_T \in \text{Prob}(\mathbb{R})$  with  $\mu_0 \preceq \mu_T$  in convex order, and assume that

- $\nabla_z H \equiv 0$ , i.e. uncontrolled drift
- $\sigma_t(x, U) = \mathbb{S}_d^+$  and ... as  $|\gamma| \rightarrow \infty$

Then, there exists an MFG equilibrium transporting  $\mu_0$  to  $\mu_T$

**Idea of proof :** Start from a solution of the Skorohod Embedding problem

$$\implies dX_t = \sigma_t(X) dW_t$$

- $d = 1$  :  $\tau$  stopp time s.t.  $B_0 \sim \mu$  and  $B_\tau \sim \mu_T$ , then  $X_t := X_0 + B_{\frac{t}{T-t} \wedge \tau}$  defines a continuous martingale that we may represent as above by the Dubins-Schwarz theorem
- $d \geq 2$ ...

# Hamiltonian with superlinear growth in the Hessian

Denote  $\mu(t) := \mathbb{P} \circ X_t^{-1}$  and define  $\Gamma_t^*$  by

$$\sqrt{2\nabla_\gamma H_t(X, \Gamma_t^*, \mu(t))} = \sigma_t(X)$$

A solution of the Lions' (path dependent) planning problem is given by

$$\xi^* := \frac{1}{2} \Gamma_t : d\langle X \rangle_t - H_t(\Gamma_t^*, \mu(t)) dt$$

for some  $(Z, \Gamma) \in \text{Plan}(\mu_0, \mu_T)$

- Any solution of the Skorohod embedding problem induces a solution of the optimal planning problem
- Optimality ??