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The Eurasian Politician - Issue 4 (August 2001)
By: Anssi Kullberg, June 2001, Tartu
The struggle between Russia and her southern neighbours is again becoming dangerously strained, as Russia has failed to fulfil her promises and obligation to the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, to remove two out of her four military bases in Georgia. The deadline was on 1st July.
On Sunday 1st July, Russia seemed to be handing over to Georgian control only the Vaziani base near Tbilisi. The other base from which Russia was obliged to remove is Gudauta, located in the Russian-backed separatist republic of Abkhazia. Gudauta is especially sensitive an issue, for its Russian troops participated in 1992-1994 the bloody civil war against Georgia, in which the country lost control over Abkhazia and most of Abkhazia’s Georgian population were driven as refugees to Georgia proper.
Besides Vaziani and Gudauta, Russia would still hold two bases in Georgia. One of them is situated in Batumi, the capital of the strategically important autonomous republic of Adjaria on the Georgian-Turkish border. The other one is in Akhalkalaki, in the province of Dzhavakheti, where the Armenian minority of Georgia is concentrated. Russia demands the extravagant 14 years extension to maintaining these bases. Georgia finds this inacceptable, promising Russia three years at most.
Georgia is biggest of the Caucasian countries and its has historical background as a regional great power. Georgia has also been traditionally the most pro-independence oriented, and in times of history it has served to unite different religions into a common resistance against the invader empires dividing the Caucasus – Russia, Turkey and Persia. Azerbaijan possesses the richest natural resources, and it is only the only Trancaucasian state that has got rid of Russian troops in its territory (excluding Karabagh).
Georgia used to be an age-old kingdom, governed by the Bagration royal family, who nowadays live in exile in Spain. When Russia annexed Georgia in 1800, Prince Alexander Batonishvili led long Pan-Caucasian resistance against the Russian czar, uniting Christian Georgians and surrounding Muslims behind the common cause. Later the resistance concentrated in the North Caucasus and was characterised by the Islamic Murids. Their most legendary leader was Imam Shamil, an ethnic Avar but respected as a national hero by Chechens, Ingush and several Dagestani peoples alike.
Georgians are predominantly Christians, and the theological difference to Russian Orthodox is considerably smaller than that of the Armenians, who are Monophysites. Political alignment is quite the opposite. Georgia also has remarkable Muslim minorities; for instance the Adjarians are Georgian Muslims.
Also linguistically Georgia is not monolithic. Besides the main language, Kartulian, according to which the country’s native name is Sakartvelo, the Georgian or South Caucasian languages include i.a. Megrelian and Svanetian. Kartulian and Megrelian differ from each other more than German from Dutch or Finnish from Estonian. Besides Georgians, Caucasian languages are spoken by Chechens, Ingush, Avars, Circassians and Abkhazians, to mention only some of the numerous North Caucasian nations. Majority of North Caucasians are Muslims by faith.
The Azerbaijanis are linguistically Turks, but differ from the Sunnite Turks of Anatolia by being Shi’ites. Still the Shi’ite Iran has supported Armenia and not Azerbaijan in the Karabagh conflict. Armenians and Ossetians are linguistically closer to Iranic languages, but they are also traditional allies of Russia in the Caucasus.
Like many other mountainous regions of the world, for example the Balkans and Afghanistan, also the Caucasus is ethnically very diverse. It has not, however, prevented co-operation in the context of shared Caucasian cultural heritage. Policies adopted by Georgia represent a good example of that.
Georgia likes to see herself as a bridge – a part of the Great Silk Road between East and West, between Christianity and Islam. Georgia serves as a transit route for Azerbaijani oil to be transported to Turkey and the West. An even more important role Georgia could have as a mediator, as Tbilisi has remained impartial both in the Karabagh and in the Chechen conflicts. Russia has repeatedly interpreted this as support for the Chechens, threatened and pressured Georgia, and latest near Girevi in March, even bombed targets on Georgian territory.
Georgians in general do feel quite large sympathies for the Chechens. Demonstrations against Russian aggression have been regular in Georgia, and the Chechen ambassador in Tbilisi, Hizir Aldamov, told how he can move around in the city without guards unlike the Russian ambassador. Despite sympathies, the Georgians do not want to get drawn into the Chechen War.
Georgia’s own Chechen minority is concentrated in the Pankisi Gorge near the Chechen border. There are also lots of Chechen refugees who have fled the fighting from north. Russia regularly claims that food, equipment and weapons are been supplied for the Chechens through this route. Georgia has rejected these claims. Dimitri Bit-Suleiman of the EurasiaNet wrote about Russia’s newest demands that the troops leaving Vaziani should be moved through the Pankisi Gorge. The Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze was terrified of such demands and said this would lead to "a huge bloodshed" and that Russia is trying to draw Georgia into the Chechen War by all means.
It is not surprising that Georgians have started to consider the idea of neutrality "too hard for geographic reasons", as Shevardnadze told the AFP. Instead, he found Georgia’s membership in NATO as a more probable goal. During the two previous weeks Georgia first time hosted NATO military practise. The Western orientation is also manifested by the fact that since last year, Turkey has replaced Russia as the most important trading partner for Georgia.
Russia’s reply has been blackmailing: a visa regime imposed on Georgians and a new customs law have damaged trade relations with Russia. Besides, Moscow has threatened with "interventions", and incidents in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and in the vicinity of the Chechen border have been repeated throughout the year. Georgians have accused Russia for infiltrating Kurdish PKK fighters into Georgia, and agitating instability among the Armenians of Dzhavakheti and the Lezghins of the Dagestani borderlands.
From the point of view of Russian superpower ambitions it may be hard for Moscow to give up its foothold in Georgia, which it can use to block Western countries from the Caspian oil benefits, but in the explosive area of the Caucasus, Georgia could be more valuable for Russia, too, as an independent and strong buffer and bridge builder than as an unstable quarrel partner.