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The Eurasian Politician - Issue 4 (August 2001)

IS IT POSSIBLE TO STOP MONTENEGRIN AND KOSOVAR INDEPENDENCE?

By: Fabian Schmidt
Source: RFE/RL Balkan Report, 1 May 2001, Volume 5, Number 32

A similar view came through in a commentary by well-known Kosovar journalist Shkelzen Maliqi in "Koha Ditore" on 28 April. Maliqi, who is the head of RFE/RL’s Prishtina bureau, argued that Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic’s drive for independence from Yugoslavia suffered a setback when the governing coalition gained only a narrow victory in the recent election (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 24 April 2001). Maliqi suggests that the status quo both in Montenegro and in Kosova may continue for the near future. But he predicts that in the long run, nobody will be able to stop Montenegro from gaining independence, which will then also mean independence for Kosova.

The pro-Yugoslav Montenegrin parties, he argues, consider it their victory that Djukanovic’s majority is not convincing enough to launch a referendum on independence. But those pro-Yugoslav parties are not satisfied with even such results and challenged them in order to "prepare the ground for an internal crisis in Montenegro, with the intention of undermining the legitimacy of Djukanovic’s drive for independence."

Maliqi believes, however, that the supporters of a union with Belgrade will not be able to undermine Djukanovic’s credibility with the broader Montenegrin public. Their campaign to discredit the president as "a criminal and Mafia-type who steals votes" will appeal only to "pro-Yugoslav fanatics." Against this background, Maliqi adds, Belgrade is indirectly threatening an open rebellion by its militant supporters in case Montenegro nonetheless chooses to hold a referendum.

But the elections served to underscore the legitimacy of Djukanovic’s government and undercut that of Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica. Maliqi recalls that "the institutions of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were built on a coalition between Kostunica and the pro-Yugoslav forces in Montenegro." They thus do not enjoy legitimacy among the Montenegrin people as a whole.

He explains: "Also after the federal elections of December 2000, it was clear that this was a phony [federation] that does not have the support of the majority in Montenegro."

Maliqi warns that "the legalist Kostunica will make use of the rules [set down by] former dictator Slobodan Milosevic by creating a government of yes-men and by appointing puppets ... such as Sejdo Bajramovic, a man who currently represents Kosova" in the Yugoslav government but who has no backing from the Kosovar electorate.

Therefore, Maliqi believes, Djukanovic will insist on the removal of Kostunica, who represents "a Yugoslav federation that does not exist in practice." Instead, he predicts, Djukanovic will seek to regulate bilateral relations with Serbia through direct negotiations with Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, who is a legitimate elected representative of Serbia.

Maliqi concludes: "It is clear that the last chapter in the [dissolution] of the former Yugoslavia has begun. This crisis must end, sooner or later, with the independence of Montenegro, and consequently with a redefinition of Serbia’s entire ‘Yugoslav’ project."

When this comes to pass, Maliqi envisages "favorable conditions for solving the Kosova question." He argues that UN resolution 1244 defines Kosova as part of Yugoslavia. If Yugoslavia ceases to exist, consequently, there will be no legal reason for denying independence to Kosova.

Maliqi disagrees with commentators who argue that the ongoing dissolution of Yugoslavia need not automatically lead to an independent state of Kosova, and who call for bilateral negotiations with Belgrade. Such commentators base their argument on a fear that Kosovar independence would set a precedent for Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a similar dissolution of the state could follow, with Serbs and Croats each demanding their own mini-states.

Maliqi counters this argument by stressing that the question of Kosova cannot be linked to the aspirations of Croats and Serbs in other countries. He argues: "The sovereignty of the former Yugoslav Federation has been defunct for some time. This has led to a situation in which five of its successor states are now members of the UN... With the international recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the fall of last year, the decisions of the [EU’s] Badinter Commission [which set the rules for recognizing new states] have finally been put into practice. All the successor states now recognize each other."

The ongoing dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will thus be "a dissolution of a new sovereign state and it will not have any repercussions on the sovereignty of other states that have emerged out of the former Yugoslavia in the past. Each of these states is now a case in itself. In terms of international law, the relations between the Yugoslav federation and Bosnia are the same as with any other sovereign state."

Maliqi adds that the Dayton agreement protects the sovereignty of Bosnia. Montenegro is a different case, however, because it enjoyed sovereignty in the 19th and 20th centuries and has a right to leave the federation if it chooses.

Kosova, according to Maliqi, enjoys the right to secede from Yugoslavia on two grounds. The first is because it was a unit of the Yugoslav federation and enjoyed territorial and political self-government under the 1974 constitution. The second reason is because the Belgrade government threatened its inhabitants with genocide, which only the NATO intervention of 1999 stopped.

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Copyright (c) 2000. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org


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