next - main - previous
The Eurasian Politician - Issue 3 (February 2001)
By: Dr. Samuel Vaknin
In her book "The Culture of Lies", University of Pennsylvania, 1998, the Croatian writer Dubravka Ugresic says: "The Yugoslav war is a dispiriting tale about human solidarity. Very few people sympathized with the Slovenes, when the war began, just as the Slovenes themselves unanimously closed the doors of their new state immediately after the war. The Croats showed no solidarity to anyone, just as few showed any to the Croats. The Serbs had no sympathy for anyone at all, and no one showed any understanding for the Serbs. Few people had ever shown solidarity with the Albanians, just as Albanians were deaf to other people's troubles."
"Your land is here. Here are your houses, your fields, your gardens,
your memories. You are not hoping to leave them, are you, because life is
hard and because you are subjected to injustice and humiliation? It was
never in the spirit of the Serb and the Montenegrin peoples to succumb
before obstacles, to quit when one has to fight, to be demoralized in the
face of hardship."
(Milosevic, Kosovo, 1987)
Serb general who wanted to shame conscripts into fighting in Croatia: "All those who are not prepared to 'defend the glory of the Serbian nation' had better lay down their arms and take off their uniforms, the general told them. And, incredibly, they all did, including their commanding officer.... They were standing there and I got furious and shouted at them to remove everything including their underpants, and with the exception of one man they all removed their military issue underpants and marched off completely naked. I was still hoping that they would change their mind, but they didn't." ("Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant", Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Free Press, 1999)
"NATO IN THE SKY, MILOSEVIC ON THE GROUND," a graffito in Belgrade.
"We oppose all those who want to divide your country because we are on the side of good and against evil," Iraqi President Saddam Hussein ensuring Serbian envoy Dragan Tomic that Iraq is prepared to send troops to Serbia.
"The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the
other bastard die for his."
US Army 4 star General George Patton.
"Given the number of sins committed in the course of 20 centuries, [reference to them] must necessarily be rather summary." Vatican official Bishop Piero Marini justifying the brevity of Pope John Paul II's plea for forgiveness of sins committed in the name of the Catholic church In a Lenten Mass on March 12, 2000.
"Politicians, ugly buildings, and whores all get respectable, if
they last long enough."
Film director and actor John Huston as Noah Cross, the corrupt magnate at
the root of the scandal in 1974's "Chinatown."
* * *
I have spent the last decade reading books and articles written about Yugoslavia by luminaries from East and West alike. I wonder if there ever was a subject so enshrouded by myths and inexactitudes, platitudes and wrongs, errors and omissions, lies and distortions. This is a list of the more common of these, organized in chronological order.
The Byzantine Empire was a well organized, highly structured and intricate urban bureaucracy which gradually diverged from Rome. The latter - the Western remnant of the former unified empire - did, indeed, crumble under the weight of internecine warfare, nepotism, cronyism, corruption and capriciously murderous dictatorships. But Byzantium continued to flourish for yet another millennium.
In any case, only a part of the Balkans was incorporated into the Byzantine reign. The border between Byzantium and Rome still exists today - it is the contemporary line demarcating Serbia from Croatia.
The Balkans were organized in a strictly feudal system. The Slavic tribes who descended from the north during the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries AD - fit nicely into this hierarchical scheme. Still, feudalism was much less rigid than it was made out to be. Certain regions - such as Dalmatia and Slavonia in Croatia and Herzegovina in Bosnia maintained a degree of autonomy comparable to that of Kosovo under the Tito era constitution. Balkan feudalism, in other words, was not a replica of the Western variant. It was rather a "federal" approach, a compact between indigenous lords and their nominal superiors.
When Rome imploded, it left a black hole of stupendous proportions. Both Croatia and Slovenia hurried to declare their independence and to assume a growing degree of sovereignty. "Croatia" and "Slovenia" of that time were not the modern nation-states they are today. They were the rough equivalents of fiefdoms, extended estates of local (and imported) aristocracy, feudal lots. The sovereignty of that era is the equivalent of the autonomy enjoyed today by states within the United States.
Still, the unilateral actions of Croatia and Slovenia were at least
evolutionary, if, indeed, not revolutionary. They constituted a loosening
and new exegesis of the feudal code. Asserting their new standing among
other political units, both Croatia and Slovenia fought off numerous
invasions and attempted invasions by Magyar (Hungarian) tribes.
It is only when the pressure became unsustainable and unbearable and
further defense of the realms untenable - that they resorted - very
reluctantly - to the Germans (Charlemagne's Franks, at that time).
The Serbs - the contemporary epitome of ultra-nationalism - were the ones
who, quiescently, accepted Byzantine rule.
So did Bulgaria (which included today's Macedonia), Montenegro and
Dalmatia. A few enclaves remained independent - but this was encouraged by
the Byzantine rulers mainly for economic and trade reasons. Thus, Ragusa
(later renamed Dubrovnik) continued to trade with Italy uninterrupted by
the tectonic political shifts around it. Ragusa was the Balkans Hong Kong
for centuries to come.
Inevitably, Slovenia and Croatia became Roman Catholic, while Serbia,
Montenegro and Macedonia became Eastern Orthodox.
Religion in the Balkans is often a matter of expediency, as we shall see.
Religious convictions were the result of granted concessions, economic
prowess, brutal repression or political calculations. The right religion -
like the right party affiliation years henceforth - guaranteed speedy
access to the bureaucracy, a decent living, education and tolerable
safety.
Being political-economic juggernauts, all religions in the region were
zealously missionary. They all proselytized in rich Dalmatia, for
instance.
Bosnia was always considered to be a lowly and primitive place by the other inhabitants of the Balkans - sort of the poor, always needy relative. Tucked between Croatia and Serbia, mountainous and endowed with a prilapsarian nature - Bosnia was almost psychedelic or surrealistic. One of the doctrinally most severe heresies developed among its Christians - Bogomilism. It engulfed the entire destitute and illiterate populace in no time. It was a powerful, populist and rebellious rhetoric. Its subversive messages threatened both the church and the (feudal) state. It bore uncanny resemblance to both the Reformation and to Communism. It looked ominously unstoppable. Thus, all Bosnians were officially branded "heretics" and catholic powers were encouraged to exterminate them on sight.
The Bogomils were largely the ones who later converted to Islam - mostly
willingly and for reasons of convenience (they could buy land and obtain
positions in the Ottoman administration). The rest of the population -
having remained catholic - joined the Croats (also Catholics). As
centuries passed, these Bosniaks came to regard themselves as perfect
Croats. Orthodox Bosniaks identified themselves as Serbs. They were
neither Croats, nor Serbs to begin with.
During the 12th century, Rome was forced to collaborate with Hungary
against the Bogomils. This enhanced Hungary's stature considerably. Rome
repaid Hungary its kindness with the territories of Croatia and
Bosnia.
Thus, Christian heretics in Bosnia "helped" introduce Hungary into the
region as its uncontested superpower (though not for long). The Hungarians
even supported a rump Serb kingdom following the apocalyptic defeat of the
Serbs at the hands of the Turks in Kosovo in 1389. Only 70 years later,
did this Serb kingdom surrender to the Ottomans.
The only ones to constantly, consistently and continuously rebel against
the Hungarian occupation were Bosnian peasants (mostly Bogomils). The
Ottomans assisted them in this worthy endeavour (from the Turkish point of
view) and later - the Bosnian forces having been depleted - annexed the
territory itself.
The first seeds of conflict were sown. The Bosnians welcomed the Turks,
converted to Islam, joined their administration and owned land. True, they
were Slavs but their religious heresy (Bogomilism and then Islam) was
further compounded by their national betrayal. The Serbs hated the Turks.
They had no intention of remaining Turkish subjects for long.
There were almost no Serbs in Croatia until the Austrian occupation. The Austrians and the local Croat population were terrified by the possibility of a renewed Turkish invasion. To fend off Turkish troops, Croatia called upon Serbs (mortal enemies of the Ottomans) to come and settle its border zones (today's Krajina). The Serbs did. They formed paramilitary, well armed and rather ferocious militias and declared their settlements "(martial) camps or zones", autonomous, though within Croatia. Their role was not only passive. They joined the Austrian army in its invasion of Ottoman-controlled regions in 1689 (including Macedonia). When the Austrians were defeated, the Serbs throughout the Ottoman empire - by now considered traitors - fled. A sizeable group of Serbs emigrated from the heartland of the ancient Serb Kingdom, a wind swept plateau called "Kosovo". The Albanians hurried back (they were relegated to Albania's mountains by superior Serb forces three centuries earlier). The Turks encouraged them to convert to Islam and they became close allies of the Ottoman administration (see The Myth of Great Albania").
It goes deeper than that. The Greeks, Russians, Bulgarians and Serbs collaborated in two Balkan Wars against the Ottoman Empire in an effort to re-carve the map of the Balkans. The idea in 1912 was to "liberate" Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania and to punish the collaborationist and separatist Albanians in Kosovo and Western Macedonia. This the invading Serbs did with a vengeance, burning villages and crops, looting and killing.
This precipitated a nationalist movement in Albania proper. Fearful of
being conquered and annexed by Serbia and Greece, the Albanians declared
independence. The leaders of the independence movement were, inevitably,
Moslem.
In the meantime, everyone ganged up on Bulgaria and in the skirmish that
ensued Serbia won both Macedonia and Kosovo.
With the Sick Man of Europe thoroughly defeated, the Serbs a regional
superpower once again and Russian influence ever growing - the only
remaining imperial power (the Habsburgs) became the next logical target.
The First World War pitted the most unlikely enemies against one another. Austria, Turkey's most avowed enemy, attacked Turkey's other mortal foe, Serbia. Bulgaria, which collaborated with Serbia, Russian and Greece against the Ottomans in the First Balkan War - joined the Turks against its former allies. The Albanians collaborated enthusiastically with Turkey's adversary, Austria, against the Serbs. They were rewarded handsomely. The Austrians made Albanian an official language and integrated Albanian nationals in their administration. The United Kingdom and France supported Russia against the Ottoman Empire which, hitherto, they did everything they could to heal and stabilize. The Croats and the Slovenes fought their Slav brethren, the Serbs, as conscripts in an Austrian army they regarded as occupier.
Actually, American forces joined Britain and France and landed in Greece
to aid the Serb army against the Axis Germany-Austria-Bulgaria-Turkey. The
seeds of the second world war were sown and the USA was inextricably
intertwined in this intractable region.
American intervened a second time in the Balkans when it sent troops to
back up an Italian claim for the small enclave of Zara on the Dalmatian
coast in Croatia in 1919.
The rich and fertile region of Vojvodina did, indeed form an administrative unit with Hungary. Yet, it always maintained a unique status. It was a duchy. It was always Serb. And it was granted autonomy by the Habsburg emperor himself (or herself). Thus, it answered directly to Vienna.
There is a very tenuous connection between the blatantly pro-Serb and anti-everyone-else dictatorship of King Alexandar and the Tito Federation. The first federation was a toned down version of the Serb Empire of yore. The national entities within Yugoslavia were abolished a decade after it was established and the internal borders were re-drawn to shatter the contiguity of other nationalities and to cohere Serb domination. The "First Yugoslavia" existed on paper until 1941. In reality, it ceased to function at least a decade before. The King was murdered by an Ustash (member of the Croatian nationalist organization, the Ustashe) in 1934. Mussolini's Italy was in cahoots with the Ustashe. It had more influence in Croatia than Belgrade itself. The Regency council that replaced the assassinated monarch merely formalized reality by granting Croatia an extensive autonomy. When they signed a Stalinesque pact with Hitler, all hell broke loose in the form of a British sponsored coup. The Nazis invaded, bombed Belgrade and pacified the country. It was the death certificate of a long festering corpse.
The truth, alas, is much less heroic. Pro-Nazi governments were installed in Serbia and Croatia. The Serb government was supported by the ancien regime and by a sizeable part of the population. Fond stories of the Nazi occupation still abound in many of the republic of former Yugoslavia. The Nazis were Germans, the living emblems of civilization, the blond, Aryan chocolate and gum-dispensing gods. In Croatia they were positively adored. Macedonians were patiently amused with them and with their Bulgarian proxies (though growing impatient with their Albanian collaborators). Serbs collaborated, ever the pragmatic. Vojvodina was happily re-united with Hungary. Kosovars acted cruelly against their own in a Great Albania in the framework of an Italian installed government with the ever menacing Deva, the Minister of the Interior. The Albanians were sufficiently grateful, though, to form militias and to join the military effort - on behalf of the Axis, of course. So did the Bosnians who even yielded an SS division of their own. Death camps operated in Croatia in which Serbs, Jews and Roma were indiscriminately maltreated.
Serbs, Bulgarians and Croats deported Jews, mostly to Auschwitz. Serb
military of independent views, were sent, by their own government to
German lagers.
Two isolated resistance movements operated in the areas of the First
Yugoslavia. The Croat Partisans (a communist guerilla force) wanted to
restore Yugoslavia to its former glory. The Serb Chetniks wanted nothing
to do with other Yugoslavs. With the exception of a few months during
1941-2, everyone supported the communists. The Chetniks, therefore, joined
forces with the Nazi and Fascist occupation forces against their
"comrades", the partisans. Thus, the end result was that Croat Ustashe and
Serb Chetniks fought - in the name of post war separatism and
self-definition - against communist partisans. History records that the
latter emerged from the war so strengthened and victorious that they tried
to annex Trieste from Italy. Only an intervention by the West prevented
it.
But it didn't take long before Tito turned on his Soviet benefactors.
Yugoslavia was the first country in the Soviet bloc which encouraged
foreign knowledge and foreign investment in some of its industries,
including its strategic defence industries. It was the first to implement
an IMF austerity plan following years of IMF lending in the 60s. It was
the only one to keep its borders open, its people free to come and go and
a functioning market mechanism through the hybrid known as "social
ownership" and "self management". No wonder Stalin issued a hit contract
on Tito's head. Albania also went its own way with the reclusive and
paranoid Hoxha - but Tito's strategy was not the result of a clear mental
disorder.
A pillar of Tito's strategy was to dismantle project nationalism
ruthlessly and to replace it with viable multi-ethnic alternatives. Bosnia
was the laboratory in which inter-ethnic marriage and economic
collaboration were tested. In Kosovo, Tito encouraged the Albanian
population to stay put or to move in. In Croatia he devolved power to Serb
municipalities.
Statistically, Serbs dominated the two most important power structures in
Yugoslavia: the Communist Party and the JNA (Yugoslav National Army). The
latter was Tito's only guarantee against Russian (and perhaps Western)
invasion as well as against the kind of disintegration that took place a
decade after his death.
Bosnia became the largest defence industry centre in former Yugoslavia
(quite contrary to its rustic image).
Slovenia and Croatia were transformed into civil industrial centres and
concentrations of heavy industry.
Yugoslavs were the only one in the East Bloc to carry their own passports and to travel abroad freely. Yet, freedom of expression (especially concerning nationalistic matters) was very restricted. Social unrest and nationalistic stirrings were very prevalent. The decade of the 60s saw brutally suppressed demonstrations in both Belgrade and Pristina. The early 70s witnessed the "Croat Spring" which led to mass detentions and the opening up of Stalinist gulag camps throughout the country.
The pressure was so intense, that, in 1974 - clearly fearing
disintegration - Tito purged the old guard, his comrades in arms and
unveiled a new constitution. It granted limited autonomy to the republics
and to Vojvodina and Kosovo. A posthumous rotating federal presidency was
supposed to assuage any feelings of bias and discrimination at the top.
This evidently was too little and too late. Kosovo continued to erupt
periodically. In 1981, the police killed 11 students and arrested
thousands in one day of demonstrations.
But the truth is that Yugoslavia was held together by the oldest glue of
all - money. It borrowed 20 billion US dollars to finance its improbable
transition from an agrarian society to an industrial one. It was among the
IMF's heaviest borrowers during the 1960s. When the IMF called its loans -
Yugoslavia was exposed for what it was: a basket-case.
As long as all the republics shared the loot, there was little incentive
for them to disengage. But the structural imbalances of contributions
versus rewards pitted affluent Croatia and positively rich Slovenia
against dirt poor Macedonia and relatively poor Serbia and Montenegro.
They simply refused to cough up the money anymore. At its beginning,
protest was channelled to "safer" venues: an anti-nuclear movement in
Slovenia and a pacifist movement in Croatia, for instance. But not much
later on, the masks fell and the true nationalist faces underneath were
exposed. The JNA was there to tackle precisely such a situation. Composed
of all nationalities, but commanded by Serbs, it intervened.
Milosevic came to power (1987-9) on waves of popular support for his rabid nationalism and fake anti-establishment credentials. His first actions were directed at the Kosovo Albanians. He revoked their autonomy by altering the constitution. He demolished the educational and legal infrastructure of the region. And he applied bloody force to suppress street protests.
Combined with the IMF's pressure to repay maturing loans - the other
republic watched the phoenix of Serb dominion with horror and indignation.
Kosovo was the undoing of Yugoslavia a few times over its long history -
and it proved up to its historical reputation. Hitherto fringe nationalist
parties emerged as viable alternatives in both Slovenia and Croatia as a
direct result of the suppression of Kosovo. The 1990 "shock therapy"
(composed of a wage freeze and a hike in the general price level), the
cutoff of American aid pending republic-specific elections and the
populist, grievances-orientated electoral campaigns that ensued - sealed
Yugoslavia's fate.
When Franjo Tudjman won the elections and a May 1991 plebiscite on a
neo-Ustashe platform and symbols, with a two thirds majority, the Serbs
prepared for war. They cordoned off their regions and refused to allow
ballot boxes in. They began to arm (the JNA was helpful in this) and they
teamed up with Milosevic who had his own Great Serbia (and even greater
personal profit) in mind.
The US - as it is wont to do - inadvertently stoked the flames but
pleading with all parties to maintain "territorial integrity". This
conflicted directly with both German views on the matter and with weighty
German investments in the region. It urged the EU to recognize the
breakaway republics. It would not be the last time the West spoke in (at
least) two voices.
Technically, the Serbs started the war everywhere.
The JNA invaded Slovenia immediately after it declared its independence (only to suffer heavy and disgracing losses at the hand of hastily organized militias). The Serbs in Krajina expelled their Croat neighbours having declared independence. The JNA invaded eastern Croatia. Serb artillery demolished Vukovar. These were undoubtedly the first acts of war.
But atrocities against both warriors and civilians were committed by all
parties involved. Serbs, Croats and Moslem Bosnians all engaged in mass
expulsions, slaughter, rape and mass executions with fervour, zeal and
glee. The Serb did so more visibly and, perhaps, more numerously. But the
guilt is shared. The demonization of the Serbs only served to alienate
them further and enhanced their paranoiac siege mentality. It was not
conducive to making peace and it might have prolonged the war
unnecessarily.
The West may have acted ignorantly - but definitely not too late or too hesitatingly once the war started. The European Community held a peace conference in the Hague as early as September 1991. It failed because Milosevic insisted on a Greater Serbia dream. With the entire might of the JNA behind him ,he might have felt invincible. Then, between October 1991 and February 1992, international mediators, both European and American secured 15 (!) cease-fires, none of them too effective, admittedly. The last one, organized by the eminence grise Cyrus Vance involved UN troops.
Unfortunately, these valiant efforts were coupled with some pretty dumb
moves such as recognizing Croatia in December 1991 and thus incensing
Serbia to insanity. This was German finesse at its apex. In June 1992 this
insult was coupled to the injury of a UN imposed unilateral embargo on
Serbia (though an arms embargo applied to all parties equally - thus
preserving Serb superiority in weapons).
When it all began, the Bosnians actually opted to remain within a Yugoslav Federation. They were the only ones - together with Macedonia - who seemed to have no design on independence. Negotiations commenced between Belgrade, the local Serbs, the Muslims and the Croats. These negotiations were interrupted by a referendum in which Muslim and Croat Bosnians voted for secession while the Serbs abstained en masse. The leadership of Bosnia did not want to hold the plebiscite. It was forced to do in emulation of Croatia and Slovenia and in response to the growing rumble of street protest. The lines of the emerging war coalitions have emerged clearly. Izetbegovic's first post election government actually included Serbs. But Milosevic was fanning the flames. He regarded Bosnia as easy prey and an integral part of Serbia and he intended to use the local Serb populace as pawns on his ever more bloodied board. Izetbegovic's Muslim-nationalist past did not help.
The Serbs clearly won the ensuing war. They controlled an ethnically
cleansed swathe of Bosnia equal to 70% of its surface area. Moreover, they
linked to Serb-dominated zones in Croatia. And the West (notably,
President Bush) seemed to acquiesce despite Serb atrocities committed in
dedicated rape camps and execution sites. The army of the emerging
Republika Srpska incorporated JNA units, replete with their heavy armour.
They were supported with food and supplies from Belgrade.
Even Mate Boban's Croat forces did not succeed to reverse this
uninterrupted streak of luck and success. They fought a few successful but
rather meaningless battles before the imposition of the Vance-Owen
partition Peace Plan was introduced and accepted by them and by the
Muslims. The Serbs rejected it in their makeshift parliament.
And then the Croats turned on their Muslim collaborators in places like
Mostar. They hoped to secure a larger Croat space and the Serbs seemed to
comply by standing aside. Conspiracy theories abounded among the Muslims
but the reality was a division of Bosnia between Serbs and Croats, even as
fighting broke out between the compatriots of these new-found allies on
Croatian soil.
Milosevic was not the most radical Serb politician. He was very often criticized by the likes of Vojislav Seselj for betraying the Serb cause. Extremist parties won handsomely in Serb elections and held many seats in the national parliament of Serbia. The same can be said about Croatia. Franjo Tudjman - while an authoritarian Ustashe sympathizer - was nowhere near the neo-Nazi nostalgia of Dobroslav Paraga. Both Seselj and Paraga had their own paramilitary formations which fought each other in Bosnia.
Izetbegovic did publish an "Islamic Declaration" (for which he was jailed
in 1983) - but he also was no Moslem fanatic or fundamentalist.
All sides were bound by shady dealings in drugs and weapons. The real
conviction and vocation of all the leaders of the region was - and still
is - crime.
In general, this is true. The Albanian population - especially the young and the educated - felt at a dead-end. But the direct trigger was the fact that the Dayton accord which regulated the relationship between Yugoslavia (Serbia), Croatia and Bosnia - failed to mention Kosovo even once, let alone relate to its specific problems. Pacifists and pro-Westerners like Ibrahim Rugova lost their clout and authority overnight. The resulting vacuum was filled by the KLA - a guerilla cum drugs group which embarked upon the path of armed resistance by killing policemen and blowing up their police stations all over Kosovo. There is no doubt who started the Kosovo ball rolling, technically speaking. But one must never forget that it Serb oppression that led to the formation of the KLA in the first place. The Serbs retaliated by torturing and "disappearing" Albanian prisoners. Following an attack by the KLA in February 1998 (in which 4 officers died) - the Serbs embarked on a scorched earth and ethnic cleansing policy. The rest is history.
Not a myth this time. It called for Serb capitulation on various issues including free passage in Serbia of foreign soldiers and airborne vehicles and a referendum to decide the secession of Kosovo in three years time. Milosevic could have never accepted this. The West knew it but believed that he will surrender to a threat of force - the same force used in Bosnia in 1994-5. The West was wrong.
* * *
Sam Vaknin is the author of "Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited" and "After the Rain - How the West Lost the East". He is a columnist in "Central Europe Review" and InternetContent.net and the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory, Suite101, Go.com and searcheurope.com. He is the Economic Advisor to the Government of Macedonia. His web site: http://samvak.tripod.com/guide.html
The opinions mentioned in this article are those of the author. Published with the author’s permission.