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The Eurasian Politician - Issue 3 (February 2001)
By Vladimir Socor
Source:
Jamestown Foundation, Monitor
February 23-24, 2001
International Commentary
The approaching moment of decision in NATO on Baltic membership has produced fresh Euroqualms about the alliance’s enlargement in that newly-free part of the continent. Even as older misgivings are being laid to rest—among other things, by Baltic progress in meeting qualification goals—another set enters the discussion.
The basic qualm line now runs as follows: First, the entry of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would hurt NATO’s relations with Russia because the latter would feel threatened and offended by such a move. We must—this argument goes on—take seriously Moscow’s loud, blanket opposition to NATO membership of "former Soviet republics." And after all, the Baltic states include sizeable ethnic Russian minorities. Second, the Baltic states’ size and location might make them "indefensible" in a crunch. Finally, why not entrust the Baltic states’ security to the European Union, or instruct the Balts to follow Finland’s and Sweden’s neutrality models? The first is essentially the "defer-to-Moscow" argument. It would implicitly accept in the Baltic case the neo-Soviet phobia in Moscow about NATO "reaching Russia’s borders." Yet the alliance rightly and successfully refuted that same Russian objection when Poland joined NATO two years ago. Today, in fact, Moscow itself recognizes that its protests were misplaced, and it seeks to mend relations with Poland.
It’s also worth noting that, unlike Russia, Ukraine always welcomed the accession of her neighbors Poland and Hungary to NATO because that move stabilized Ukraine’s own environment and enhanced her security. And then there’s Norway, which has been a NATO member "on Russia’s border" for 50 years with beneficial, stabilizing effects in that region. Norway, by the way, is among the convinced supporters of inviting the Balts to join the alliance.
Another aspect of the "defer-to-Moscow" argument would keep the Balts out of NATO because they were once annexed by the USSR. That notion would tacitly renounce one of the fundamental principles of the post-Cold War international order—namely, that every country has an inherent right to choose its security arrangements and allies. That formula is even enshrined in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations and was again subscribed to by Moscow in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 1999 Charter for European Security. There’s a compelling case now for holding Russia to its word and signature on those pacts. Bringing the Balts into NATO would not only be a natural corollary of the West’s 50-year policy of not recognizing Moscow’s occupation of the Baltic states. It would conclusively preclude bullying and any idea of restoring control over "former Soviet territories" in the future. Moreover, there is no empirical basis whatsoever for assuming that local ethnic Russian minorities as such would oppose the Baltic states’ entry into NATO. If anything, the evolution of political attitudes among those population groups indicates a growing acceptance of the Baltic states’ independence and integration with the West.
The next objection to the Balts’ membership in NATO—"they’re militarily indefensible"—suggests that these three small states would only play the role of security consumers, without being able to perform the complementary role of security producers. In truth, Baltic membership would actually boost the allied air defense, surveillance and monitoring capabilities for the avoidance of conflict. NATO already unites large, medium-sized and small countries—a mix which represents one of its chief virtues as an alliance of democracies, and which underlies NATO’s political attractiveness.
The Balts would certainly be no "freeloaders" as allies. In terms of military spending, Lithuania and Estonia are set to attain NATO’s benchmark level of 2% GDP in 2002, with Latvia scheduled to do so in 2003. Far from all of NATO’s current members can boast that defense-spending level. Baltic military forces are of course small, but they are rapidly developing with Western assistance, and are backed up by nationwide paramilitary defense organizations. With international support, the Baltic states are already capable of imposing high costs on an aggressor; though only NATO membership can perform the function of full deterrence.
The third argument would indefinitely postpone NATO’s enlargement in the Baltic region. Inasmuch as the three Baltic states are likely to join the EU within the next few years, they would be asked to accept the EU’s implicit or "back-door" security guarantees as a substitute for NATO’s actual guarantees. Never mind that the EU’s own defense organization will take a long time to develop fully and that it lacks a credible deterrent capability, without which any security guarantees can not credibly be sustained.
European Union membership is no substitute for NATO membership. If it were—as one Baltic minister recently remarked—EU countries might as well drop out of NATO. But none does because all regard NATO as the only existing and real guarantee of their security.
Nor are the Swedish or the Finnish neutrality models applicable to the Baltic states. Disproportions of size and of wealth preclude that analogy from the outset. But an equally important reason stems from Moscow’s perception of Sweden and Finland as parts of the "far abroad," and thus practically immune to Russian domination. The Balts, meanwhile, are deemed parts of the "near abroad," in which Russia claims a substantial say on the foreign policies and defense alignments, the internal politics and the economies of "former Soviet republics." Only the admission of the Balts into NATO can move them into the "far abroad" and thus guarantee the peace in the Baltic region.
Ultimately, it must be said, Moscow is not simply or even mainly against NATO’s Baltic enlargement. It is opposed to NATO itself. As Russia’s new ambassador to Estonia, Konstantin Provalov, emphasized on arrival at his post last month: "NATO’s present political and military views ignore and in some cases clash with Russia’s security interests. The accession of the Baltic states, Russia’s close neighbors, to an alliance of such views would amount to a challenge to Russia’s security."
Moscow seeks not merely to talk NATO out of Baltic enlargement, but to talk NATO into becoming something else than it is and must be. Stopping NATO’s Baltic enlargement would create in Europe a zone of friction and of lesser security. And it would leave post-Cold War Europe neither whole nor wholly free.
Mr. Socor is a senior analyst for the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation, publishers of the Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States.
Published here with the author’s permission.