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The Eurasian Politician - March 2005
By: Assistant Professor Gamze Güngörmüş KONA,
Yeditepe University - Department of
Political Science and International
Relations, İstanbul - TURKEY
3.3.2005
Since the establishment of modern Turkish Republic, by a distinguished soldier and leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in 1923, following a four-year War of Independence (1918-1922) against the occupation forces of the victors of the World War I, until now, Turkish security policy has been shaped according to the security concerns which have changed parallel to the new risks and threats in the new security environment. In Turkey, as in all parliamentary political systems, the government is the highest authority that decides on security policy. The National Security Council, established 9.11.1983 dated and 2945 numbered law, is the key organ (mandated by the mentioned constitution) to deliberate and make recommendations to the government on the precautions to be taken regarding the existence, independence, unity of the state, the well-being and the security of the society.[1] As Çevik Bir, former deputy chief of Turkish General Staff, noted Turkish Security Council coordinates the nation's security policy toward outside threats.[2] The Turkish Security Council is chaired by the President and includes the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Ministers of National Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, and the commanders of the three armed services and of the Gendarmerie.
9.11.1983 dated and 2945 numbered law, National security refers to the preservation of the state's constitutional order, national existence, unity and political, social, cultural, economic interests in international platforms, and the preservation of the legal rights.[3] According to the same law, security policy is defined as the policy which covers the basic components related with internal, external and defense strategies determined by the government taking the National Security Council's recommendations into consideration. The essence of that security policy is to provide national security and materialize national interests. The interests; suh as the preservation of the state's constitutional order, national existence, unity and political, social, cultural, economic benefits in international platforms, and the preservation of the legal rights; constitute the legitimate parametres of Turkish national security policy.[4]
Just after the World War I Turkish security policy depended on two basic elements: a. Protection of territorial/national integrity and defense of sovereignty, and b. Preservation of the righ to self determination. Following the appearance of the new systemic factors in international order after the World War II, the Soviet Union became the most important security concern for Turkey, and the disputes with Greece over Cyprus Island and the Aegean-related issues particulary after 1960s led the increase in security concerns of Turkey, and Turkish security policy started to be determined by those concerns at the very begining of the Cold War period. So, Turkey directed its interest towards integrating with the Western security organization, Nato. On the one hand, this preference, which was regarded as unavoidable by Turkish officials under the Cold War parametres, helped them deter Soviet aggression and solve problems with Greece, on the other hand, prevented Turkey from developing relations with the states beyond the members of this organization, and Turkey through adopting uni-polar/Western-oriented policy, limited herself to create her own sphere of influence both in its own region and international platforms.[5] So, during the Cold War period, Turkey developed her security policy, based upon only defending the borders, deterring Soviet threat and coping with political problems with Greece and tried to evaluate international order with in that rather narrow-minded approach.
The period after the Cold War brought about both international and regional chaos and Turkey, suddenly and unexpectedly, found herself in this political mess. Along with the nationalist, religious and ethnic confrontations in the Balkan, Caucasus and Central Asian regions and with the changes in the Gulf, Turkey had to recall its security concerns and security policy in the new international environment.[6] Unlike the Cold War period, Turkey has to determine its security policy from a wider perspective. Since the begining of the post-Cold War period, far from being a 'defensive' process, the conceptualization of Turkish national security has involved political, economic and cultural factors all together. So, since 1990s Turkey has to make its security arrangements not only according to Russian threat, defence of its borders and attempts of Greece as in the Cold War period but also according to multi-dimentional changes in the balance of power in international system.
In this article, we will examine the security concerns (known to be the drivers of national strategy)[7] of Turkish governments/officials in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods and we will be aware of the fact that Turkish security concerns and security policy have both changed from static stand in the Cold War period to flexible and multi-dimentional stand in the post-Cold War period.
Although security concerns of Turkey represent differences in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, there are some basic factors which never affect the structure of Turkey's security perception and security policy whatever the threat is and the risk areas are in any security environment. So, we can claim that while Turkish governments decide on Turkish security policy according to the newly emerged risks and threat areas paralel to the developments in international system, they take some geographic and ideological realities as a given, and never attempt to change while deciding on Turkish security policy. Under this title, before explaining security concerns in the Cold War period, we will first mention the 'constant security concerns' that shape Turkey's security policy and security perception in general since the establishment of Republic of Turkey.
Unlike other Middle Eastern states Turkey gained its independence as the result of a four-year War of Independence against the occupation forces, and also establihed its territorial borders (except for the borders with Iraq and Syria) as a result of this War. Along with the establishment of Turkish Republic, three factors appeared as the most important: -National integration -Territorial integration and -preservation of independence, and from then on any attempt aiming to destroy all or one of those factors has been regarded as a threat towards the independence of Turkish Republic. Both political elite and citizens in Turkey agree upon this point of view.
So, since the year 1923, the assesment of protection of territorial/national integrity and defence of sovereignty have remained unchanged while preferences, goals and instruments of Turkish security policy have been subject to change depending on the changes in Turkey's security environment.
Turkish Republic, founded on the land of the former Otoman Empire in 1923, not only realised transformation in political regime but transformations in societal, religious and legal areas.[8] In terms of political regime, the Republic replaced monarchy and secularism replaced theocracy, the bill abolishing the Caliphate was passed in 1924. Following the abolition of the Caliphate, two more important bills were passed. Those bills abolished Ministries of Şeriat and Evkaf (religious endowments), all religious orders (tarikats) and their convents. Şeriat courts were closed and the Swiss Civil Code was adopted. After the adoption of Latin script Arabic alphabet was prohibited in schools. All education came under the authority of the Ministry of Education. Along with the 'hat law', all symbols in appearance started to be eliminated step by step. In 1928, Article 2, which stated that Islam was the religion of the state, was removed from the Constitution. With the amendement of the 1937; the principle of secularism was incorporated into the Constitution, the Law of Associations were prohibited the formation of associations based on the sect or order (tarikat), political parties and associations were prohibited from religious support and Penal Code prohibited anti-secularist attacks on the Republican regime and legal system. While all those social, legal and religious reforms intended to build up a modern Turkish state, a way from traditionalism and religious trends; the principles 'solidarity' and 'nationalism' expressed anti-emperialist, anti-communist and anti-liberalist stand of Turkish modernization movement.
Currently, preservation and continuity of the reforms realised at the very begining of Republican regime is closely related with the preservation and continuity of Turkish Republic.[9] So, since the begining of the establishment of the mentioned bills, amendments and prohibitions, incorporated into Turkish Constitution; any internal or external initiatives using religious, ideological and political motives have been regarded as the attempts designed to destroy secular, laic and modern structure of the state and society, and to weaken Republican regime. So, those all integrated themselves into the main security concerns of Turkish Republic.
All of Turkey's current neighbours were either fully or partly under the Ottoman rule, except Iran, for long years. Although the peoples of the current neighbours of Turkey enjoyed the privileged status under the Ottoman rule, they feel different doses of resentment against Turkey, which was founded on the former Otoman land. The relations with the Middle Easterns Arabs have been shaped by historical experiences and prejudices. For example, Arabs believe that the people who destroyed the Abbaside Empire in the middle of XIIIth century were ethnic Turks.[10] They also put the blame on Turks for their backwardness. Furthermore, the Arabs claim that Turkey has been willing to continue the emperialist aims which are believed to be inherited by the Otoman Empire.[11] Besides those arguments, some territorial, boundary, ethnic and property matters inherited from the Otoman rule have had an impact on the establishment of problematic relation between the Arabs and the Turks currently.
Taking those points into consideration it is reasonable to support the idea that some Arab states which were under Otoman rule in the past have caused security concern among Turkish officials and this region has been one of the most important regions in the conceptualisation of Turkish security policy since the begining of the establishment of Turkish Republic.
It is a well known fact that geography has been an important determinant in arranging a state's national security policy. If this state is Turkey, geography becomes more determinative. Turkey occupies a central position at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, the land lines of communication from Southern Russia through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and thence Gibraltar, and the world. This unique location might alone assures central prominence, and serve Turkish political elite to influence regional and global power balances. However, when we take the fact into consideration that Turkey is surrounded by many problematic regions like Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus, and by different regimes with different perceptions, cultural and national aspirations in those regions, this geographic advantage might turn out to be a disadvantage for a nation's security. Those peculiarities of Turkish geography have forced Turkish decision-makers to determine Turkey's security interests and security policy depending on multi-regional security environment character.
Geography has been one of the factors which determines Turkey's security policy whatever the regional or global power balances are in different periods.
According to Most and Starr; a state sharing borders with different and some powerful states has been subjected to be threatened or attacked by some of those neighbours, and this state usually faces uncertainty due to the need to defend itself.[12] The states that Turkey shares borders represent differences in different periods. In the first years, Turkish Republic had borders with Soviet Union, Greece, Bulgaria, England (mandate state in Iraq), France (mandate state in Syria) and Italy (the then hegemon on Dodecanese Islands) and Iran. Following the World War II, Soviet Union, Greece, Bulgaria, Iraq, Syria and Iran became the neighbours of Turkey, and in the post-Cold War period, Turkey has no border with the Soviet Union. Although the quality (powerful-weak) and the quantity (number) of the states that Turkey shares borders change from time to time, the fact that Turkey has had to arrange its foreign policy behaviour and security policy regarding those neighbouring states has never changed. Boundary issues (as such with Iran and Syria), water controversy (water systems in Euphrates and Tigris with Iraq and Syria), Islamist provocation (with Iran), Kurdish issue (with Iraq and Syria), Straits (with the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation), Cyprus and Aegean-related problems (with Greece) have always occupied the top priority in Turkey's security concerns.
So, the simple corrolation between the number of the borders that a state has and the degree of security concern that a state develops can easily be established and it can be claimed that security concern of a state raises depending on the number of borders. Turkey might be presented as one of the best examples for the validity of this assumption since from the begining of the establishment of Turkish Republic until that time, Turkish officials has had to determine Turkey's security policy regarding those boundaries.
Turkey, through geographically taking place in the Middle East region and inevitably having Middle Eastern neigbours, has felt rather insecure and uncertain. This is partly due to negative historical experiences and partly due to prevailing realities. Unsettled political structure of Iraq, conflicts with Iran and Syria, potential in Islamic fundamentalism/radicalism in Iran, tendency for augmenting terror and housing terrorists in Iran and Syria, water contraversy over transboundary water systems (Jordan river, Euphrates and Tigris), Arab-Israel conflict, Syrian irredentism over Lebanon, regionalization of Kurdish issue, weapons of mass destruction, authoritarian political regimes in the region, unequal distribution of wealth, problems caused by Sunnism and Shi'ism and inter-ethnic disputes in Middle Eastern societies have had the potential of infuencing Turkey's domestic balance directly or indirectly though Turkey has prefered to keep the relations with the Middle Eastern states at distant since 1923.
So, the Middle East region, which refers to negative notions such as complexity and uncertainty, has been one of the security concern and one of the important determinant in Turkish security policy.
Dardanelles and İstanbul Straits have been two important waterways, which led power rivalry in the past and which has the power of influencing regional and global balances at the moment. Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria were the states which were profoundly interested in Turkish Straits until 1991. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union; besides Romania and Bulgaria; Moldovia, Georgia, Ukrain and the Russian Federation have become the states which have borders with the Black Sea. Although Armenia and Azerbaijan have have no boundaries with the Black Sea, they are also interested in the Black Sea. Furthermore, to integrate with the world community through the sea line for the five Central Asian states is usually possible via the Black Sea. So, currently the number of the states interested in the Black Sea and Turkish Straits, which are the only passage to the the Black Sea has increased from 3 to 13 since 1991. Despite the increase in the number of the interested states might be taken as the measurement for the importance of Turkish Straits for Turkey, the determination of the status of the Straits have always presented much more importance for Turkey's national security. Two principles have played a crucial role in the establishment of the present status of the Straits: 'Openness of the Straits' and 'Closeness of the Straits'.[13] The date 1484, bears importance for the history of the Turkish Straits as the Ottoman Sultan Beyazıt II had established the Ottoman rule in the Black Sea at that time. However, the full hegemony over the Straits was realised with Fatih Sultan Mehmet in 1452 (October 26, 1452). From the begining of this date, either Turkish rule over the Straits was limited (1774), the principle of closeness of the Straits was violated (1798), the international status was established over the Straits (1841), the control of the Straits was taken by the foreign states (1918) or the status based on the international control under the leadership of Turkey was built (Lausanne Treaty-1923). The reestablishment of Turkish rule over the Straits was realised with the Montreux Convention of 20 July 1936.
Those all indicate that Turkey's rule over the Straits has been closely watched by the states which benefit from those Straits, and that either Turkey has been urged to adopt one of the mentioned principles or the struggle has been given to apply both of those principles in harmony in international platforms since 15th century. In the history of the Straits, both in the Ottoman and Turkish Republic periods, Soviet Union (after 1991-Russian Federation) has been the state, interested in Turkish Straits most and demanded the change in the status of the Straits very often. When the Soviet Union politically and economically weak in international order, it supported the principle of closeness of the Straits, on the contrary, when this state felt the power of enlarging its ideological sphere of influence, it was in favour of the principle of the openness of the Straits. Despite Russian attempts the Montreux Convention of 1936, which brought Turkey's entire control over the Straits, preserved its validity until present time.
The Straits matter, presenting the top priority in Turkish security and foreign policies for a long time, is an issue closely related with Turkish national security and remains unchanged in different periods in which Turkish officials were to concentrate on other security concerns, emerged depending on the changes in regional and global power balances in time.
The seven items explained above shortly constitute the main (constant) security concerns in the establishment of Turkish national security and Turkish security policy. However, this does not mean that Turkish officials determine Turkey's security policy based on only those security concerns, it means that they determine Turkey's security policy paralel to the developments in international system, the newly emerged risks and threat areas and the strategic priorities of the time while regarding the mentioned factors as the principles of Turkish national security. In the following part, we will explain the security concerns of Turkey, which became more distinguished along with the realities of the Cold War period.
The struggle given in the Cold War period is still fresh in the memories of the states, which were directly or indirectly affected by the developments during the Cold War period. Different point of views might be presented in regard to the start and the development of the Cold War.[14] According to an approach, the sources of the Cold War started with the 'Iron Curtain' talk given by Churchill in 1946, developed with the military aid given to Turkey and Greece in 1947, became severe with the Marshall Plan and Berlin Blockade dated 1948, and arrived the zenith with the establishment of Nato and Warsaw military pacts. Nuclear armament and space rivalry followed this period. To another view, the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West dates to 19th century, in which the West rejected Russia as a member of the Western club. A different approach evaluates the Cold War from ideological perspective and claims that Long Cold War period begins with the Bolshevic Revolution (1917) and finishes along with the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991). This approach emphasized the importance of the conflict between capitalist and communist ideologies. Some other analysts divided the Cold War period into two: The first Cold War period was Herry Truman and Joseph Stalin period (1944-1962). In this period, both of the states felt nuclear danger on their lands with the Cuban Missile Crisis. The second Cold War period was Ronald Reagan and Leonid Breznev period (1979-1987). In this period, the actions and the speeches of those leaders provocated the threat of war again. That second period ended with begining of Gorbachev rule in the Soviet Union.
In the Cold War period, threat perceptions were fairly clear for both sides. Threat perceptions of the blocks were based on two basic security concerns. The U.S-led Western block was usually concentrated on the Eastern block in general, and on the Soviet Union in particular. The major security concern for the West was the geographical and ideological expansion of Soviet Russia. As for the Soviet Union, the capitalist West should have been prevented from enlarging its cultural and political sphere of influence. Armament rivalry constituted the second major security concern for the Western and Eastern blocks. Both the U.S and the USSR emphasized the danger of nuclear attack threat. So, the Cold War period can well be charaterized through geopolitical and ideological rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocks.
In that period, the basic rivalry between the U.S and the USSR was in the military area. Parallel to this very limited rivalry area, threat perception was usually developed regarding the 'defense of the state' as the most important. As the result of this assumption, the conceptualisation of security policies of the states became conventional, which could be determined easily.[15] So, it is highly possible to find out a kind of relation between the source of threat and the target in that period. Since the states in the blocks could predict where and in what capacity the threat would appear, the stability in the area of defense was relevant during the Cold War period. However, the Cold War concept put forward an entire and continuous clash between the sides. The establishment of the blocks employed the credibility of that concept. The Cold War motto 'allied or enemy' in a way helped the foundation of the blocks. In other words, the founding concept of the blocks urged their supporters (the states) to adopt the way of life, different in the Eastern and Western blocks. By doing so, the block leaders could reinforce the values which provide the continuity of the blocks and solidarity among block supporters.[16]
Depending on the mentioned threat perception concept and block structures in the Cold War realities, Turkish officials developed security policies shaped by the newly-emerged security concerns at the very begining of 1950s. First of all, Turkey prefered to be a member of the Nato to preserve its territorial integrity and the right to self-determination against the Soviet Union. In the following years of the Cold War period, Turkish officials, in order to cover Turkey's economic and security needs, and to realise Westernization ideals, did their utmost to integrate with the security, military and economic organizations of the West. Although the Soviet Union was the most important determinant of Turkish security policy and the most alarming factor among Turkish security concerns, it can not be claimed that there were no other security concerns of Turkey in the same period. In the following part, we will explain security concerns of Turkish officials in the Cold War period.
Turkey, geographically located as the neighbour of the Soviet Union, was considered as the most important strategic state by the West, particularly by the US, but the most sensitive in terms of security before the Soviet actions by Turkish officials under Cold War realities. It can be claimed that the Soviet Union was the core factor which directed the course of Turkish foreign and security policies, and which constituted Turkish security concerns during the Cold War period. Nato membership, close relations with the US, obsession with EU integration might all be identified with the perception of Russia as the enemy by Turkish officials in the Cold War years. Although the disputes between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the Cold War period marks the begining of hostility in the near history, the clashes between those states dates back to the 17th century, in other words, between the Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Since it is beyond the purpose of this article to explain the struggle given by those states against each other, we will only point out how Turkish governments in power in the Cold War years perceived the Soviet Union, and accordingly depending on which factors Turkey regarded the Soviet Union as a real threat.
From Turkish point of view;
First of all, in March 1945, the Soviet political élite proved the Soviets' expansionist aims over Turkish land to be true through declaring that they would not renew the Treaty of Nonaggression and Neutrality dated December 17, 1925. The then Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov expressed that the new treaty would bring the alteration of the Russo-Turkish borders of Moscow Treaty in 1921. Russian side also expressed its wish to have bases on Turkish Straits for the joint defense and to revise the Montreux Convention of 1936.
Seconly, the Soviet Communist Party members, reinforced their power by communist ideology, sought the ways for enlarging the influence of communism in the eastern Europe and the Balkans. Those were regarded by Turkey as the Russian attempts of the revival of Great Russia.
Thirdly, for Turkish Officials, Russia never gave up extending its borders to Turkish territory, and having Turkish Straits since Turkey and Turkish Straits seemed to be the most attractive alternatives for the land-locked Russia to reach high seas. This caused a direct threat for Turkish security during the Cold War period.
Fourthly, the Soviets did not hesitate to provide military and financial support for the states such as Iran and Syria which represent potential threat for Turkey.
Fifthly, the Soviet political élite did not refrain from developing strategic partnership with the states which Turkey has had deep-rooted conflicts such as Armenia, Greece, Syria and Iran whenever Turkey was politically and economically weak.
The reasons explained above were quite satisfactory for Turkish officials to perceive the Soviet Union as a 'threat'. Accordingly, following the establishment of the blocks just after the World War II, Turkey began to arrange its security policy upon that basic threat perception, and fully identified its own security needs with the Nato's for its own security and defense against the Soviet Union.
The attempts of the Greek governments during the Cold War period have constituted one of the security concerns of Turkey in the same period. The problems with Greece have been multi-faceted, and should better be divided into two groups: Cyprus Matter and Aegean-related Issues. However, since it is beyond the purpose of this article to explain the problems between Turkey and Greece in details, we will indicate the problems in the Cold War period between those states, and largely concentrate on the question 'in what ways those problems caused security concerns in terms of Turkey?'. Before explaining how the problems with Greece affected Turkish security concerns in the Cold War period, it sould be mentioned that the very same problems that affected Turkish national security in the Cold War period are still among Turkish security concerns in the post-Cold War period.
Since Turkey intervened on the island of Cyprus in 1974, against Greek attempts to unite Cyprus with Greece and to eliminate Turks on that island, "it has not proven possible to reach a modus vivendi that recognises the Turkish part of Cyprus as a fully equal component of a united Cyprus".[17] EU attempts to integrate Cyprus, disregarding Turkish part and considering the Greek Cypriots as the only representative of the island, into the European Union, has served to heighten security concerns of Turkey presently. In other words, "internalisation of the Cyprus problem has hindered rather than helped the settlement".[18] It might sound rather surprising to witness the struggle given for this small island by Greece and Turkey for years. However, when we examine the geo-strategic importance of the island of Cyprus, we will uderstand the content of this struggle. Cyprus bears strategic value for Turkey in many ways. It provides a kind of treshold for the invasion of Anatolia from the South. It can control the transportation traffic at Mersin and İskenderun bays, and naval transportation in eastern Mediterranean. Opening of Suez Canal and Turkish Straits to the eastern Mediterranean serves Cyprus to become more important. Besides those, Cyprus is also important for the control of Middle Eastern oil and oil transportation.[19]
Aegean-related problems with Greece represent much more comlexity for Turkey, each problem has the potential of affecting Turkish threat perception and security policy in different ways. Territorial waters, delimitation of the continental shelf, militarization of the eastern Aegean islands, Aegean air space dispute have been the issues which constitute the Aegean-related problems.
The Aegean is a semi-enclosed Sea between the Turkish and Greek mainlands, dotted by hundreds of islands. The status quo in the Aegean was established by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and since then the main problem between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean has been the Greek attempts to change the status quo established in 1923. For example, Greek territorial waters were determined as six nautical miles from the Greek coast line by the Law of Sea Convention in 1936. However, Greece attempts to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles, claiming that Turkey limits Greek rights in the Aegean Sea. On the other hand, Turkey, insisting on the the six-mile limit, argues that as the result of any change in status quo Turkey would be locked out of the Aegean, confined to its own territorial waters and its access to the high seas would be blocked; would not be able to carry out any military training and exercises in the Aegean,[20] and that along with the extend of six-mile limit to twelve-mile, Greece would be able to settle other Aegean-related issues according to her security interests and Turkey would have no right on the Aegean Sea.
Delimitation of the continental shelf is another dispute in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece. The source of the problem is that firstly, Greek governments claim that the Aegean islands, located opposite Greece, must be recognised as the part of Greece, secondly, the Aegean islands are to have continental shelf breadth equal to the continental shelf breadth of their mainland (Greece), thirdly, the boundaries of continental shelf between Turkey and Greek islands in the Aegean must be fixed according to the equal distance principle which assumes the delimitation of continental shelf of the Greek islands are to be parallel to the distance of those islands to the nearest coast of Turkey.[21] Turkish officials, opposing the Greek arguments through The UN Law of Sea Convention of 1982 and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, consider that Greek governments delimitation of continental shelf attempts are basically for delimitation of Turkish legitimate rights in the Aegean Sea, and detoriate national Turkish security.
Attempts of militarization of eastern Aegean islands by Greek governments has been an issue which serves the increase in Turkish security concerns in regard to Greece. Turkish officials have been very sensitive toward those militarization attempts since eastern Aegean islands are located in the middle of the Aegean Sea, close to the Anatolian peninsula, in other words, very close to Turkey's Aegean coast. It means that eastern Aegean Islands, stretching from Dardanelles (Lemnos located just before Dardanelles) to İskenderun bay, connects Turkey's southern and northern coasts with Mediterranean and they provide the control over the logistic routes of Anatolia. Despite the demilitarized status of the eastern Aegean islands, determined by several international agreements such as London Treaty in 1913, Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Montreux Convention in 1936 and Paris Peace Treaty in 1947, the Greek governments have been militarizing those islands since 1960, claiming that Turkish governments have expansionist aims..
Air space dispute is the last security concern of Turkey caused by Greece. The source of the problem related with air space issue depends on the Greek governments' claim about the breadth of Greek air space in the Aegean. While the territorial sea boundary is six nautical miles Greek officials insist on controlling ten nautical mile of air space, and regards this issue as the sovereignty of Greek state over the whole Aegean international air space. Greece emphasises its insistence on ten nautical miles breadth in the Aegean air space through violating Flight Information Region (FIR) responsibility. According to this civil aviation term, determined by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to provide security for civil arcrafts, national air space of the states (air space zones) is the air space over those states' land and territorial waters. Civil and military aircrafts are to get permission to enter national air space zones and obey the commands given by flight control authorities of the states. Since Greece "considers FIR as a national boundary line .and as the recognition of sovereignty of that state over the international air space"[22] indirectly violates six nautical miles air space breadth through directly violatining FIR responsibilities. The mentioned insistence on ten nautical miles air space and ten nautical miles breadth command and control responsibility of Greece in the Aegean causes problems particularly in the Nato exercises between Turkey and Greece and the Nato allies.
Depending on the explanations above, it can be said that the attempts of Greece to change the status quo of the island of Cyprus, extend its territorial waters up to twelve nautical miles, delimitate of continental shelf, militarize eastern Aegean islands, and violate its FIR responsibility have been considered as security threats caused by the Greek governments for Turkey. As mentioned before, such disputes with Greece appeared in the Cold War period did not only cause security concerns in terms of Turkey in that period, those disputes, remained unsettled in the Cold War process, still have different impact on Turkish threat perception and security policy in the post-Cold War period.
It seems reasonable to begin explaining Kurdish issue through explaining the terms 'Kurds of Turkey' and 'PKK' ('Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan'- 'Kurdistan Workers Party'), which convey completely different notions. By doing so, we will also enlighten the complexity whether the Kurds of Turkey or the PKK causes security concern in terms of Turkish officials for years.
The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 recognised the Greeks, the Armenians and the Jews (non-Muslim communities) as the only minorities of Turkey, but the Kurds as one element of Muslim community, not as minority. The chapter III of Lausanne Treaty conveying the articles from 37 to 45, which refer to the preservation of the right of minorities living in Turkey, define the Kurds as the part of Turkish community living in Turkey.[23] The article 39 of Lausanne Treaty expresses that all the citizens of Turkey will be equal before the law and enjoy the same rights. During the War of National Independence, the Kurds played a crucial role, through backing Turkey for liberating the invaded lands of Anatolia against the invading powers. However, following the establishment of Turkish Republic Kurdish ethnicity was eliminated by the help of the policy of assimilation. Following the western borders of Turkey were drawn, Kurds appeared in different states such as Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and ! the Soviet Union, each Kurdish group claiming its own identity. At that point it should be mentioned that Kurds, divided into those five states, have experienced various historical developments under different political traditions adopted by those states. In this process, the demand for autonomy of the Kurds in Turkey was rejected by the founders of Turkish Republic and this resulted in the Kurdish revolts in the 1920s and 1930s. In the following years, the policy of Turkey as regard the Kurds were mainly based on eliminating the Kurds, banning Kurdish language, denying Kurdish ethnicity and identity.
The policy of Turkish governments as regard the Kurds in Turkey should be explained through refering the principle of 'nationalism', which is one of the six arrows of Kemalism, and which is based on co-opting all Muslim communities, in other words, Turkification of Muslim communities in Turkey in order to preserve Turkish territorial integrity and unity. Upon the developments, the majority of the Kurds in Turkey began to seek for political, cultural and linguistic rights.[24]
The point is that Kurds of Turkey demanding their fundemental rights before Turkish governments' policies should be respected and that granting more political, cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurds of Turkey should be considered as one of the most important necessities of parliamentary democracy. The requirements of the Kurds of Turkey did not cause any security concern, except for the Kurdish revolts in the 1920s and 1930s, in terms of Turkish officials at least up to 1980s. So, we should make a distinction between the majority of Kurds living in Turkey, requiring more rights from Turkish governments and the separatists Kurdish movements which targeted at gaining those rights through dividing Turkey and establishing an independent Kurdistan.
Three different elements can be observed in the rise of PKK movement. Provocations by foreign powers, economic underdevelopment, and the neglect in granting fundamental rights. First of all, it should be noted that the Kurdish issue in Turkey should not be evaluated by itself, disregarding the impact of foreign powers on that issue. Those usually prefer the continuity of national Kurdish movement for their own interests rather than settling the conflict[25] since they are aware of the fact that as long as those movements continue they obtain the chance of intervention on that issue. By doing so, they can also enlarge their sphere of influence in Turkish domestic politics, and affect the Kurdish issue in favour of their own national interests. Accordingly, the PKK separatists, encouraged by the foreign powers intensify their terrorist actions particularly in South Eastern Anatolia. Secondly, it can be claimed that economic underdevelopment in the mentioned region, where the Kurds are heavily populated, has had a direct influence on the awakening and the rise in those kind of separatist movements by PKK. Although, the policies of Turkish governments as regard the Kurds were fairly tolerated by the Kurds of Turkey until the end of 1970s, the internal anarchy and bottleneck in Turkish economy became more effective on Kurdish population. Unbalanced distribution of wealth, neglect in the allocation of budget as regard the South Eastern Anatolian region made the Kurds living in that region alienated with the political system of Turkey and directed some of them to gain their rights through terrorism. Thirdly, as noted under the title 'Kurds of Turkey', Turkish governments, without any exception, considered that granting political, cultural and linguistic rights to the Muslim communities living in Turkey would cause the emergence of separatist tendencies, which would result in the damage in Turkish territorial integrity. Deprived of those fundamental ! rights, some of the Kurds began to seek for gaining those rights through terrorism.
Aggravated by the elements noted above, Turkish governments have had to struggle against terrorist actions of PKK since 1984. Until 1991 PKK used both terrorist and guerilla-type tactics, and determined the Syrian control Bekaa Valley in Lebanon as the training center. Between 1984 and 1991, PKK realised its terrorist activities in Turkey through passing South Eastern Anatolian border of Turkey.[26]
The PKK activities since 1984 have caused profound and multi-dimentional security concerns in terms of Turkey. The concrete results of those security concerns can be summarized as follows:[27]
So, the Kurds of Turkey and PKK are not the same, and should be separated from each other. In Turkey, not the Kurds, largely populated in South Eastern and Eastern Anatolia regions of Turkey but the PKK causes security concern for Turkish governments. In that part of the article we only explained security concern of Turkey led by the PKK in the late Cold War period. In the last part, we will give the details about the change in the structure of PKK and the change in the content of PKK activities and in what ways those developments affected Turkish security concern in regard the Kurdish issue.
So as to understand Turkish officials'anxiety in regard the potential security threat to be led by radical Islamist movements, we should first explain 'modernization' and the terms 'nationalism' and 'laicism', which take place among six arrows of Kemalism, and which have been cosidered to be preserved strictly for the existence of Turkish Republic. According to the Kemalist ideology, which modern Turkey was founded on, the millet (nation), which reflects itself on the 'nationalism' principle of Kemalism, is the concept, separated from its religious content. In his view, nation is the political and social unity constituted by the citizens who have been connected with each other through the solidarity of language, culture and ideal. Kemalist ideology was aimed at defining the principle of 'nationalism' as a 'system of values', separated from Islam religion. In other words, Kemalism intended to present an alternative identity in order to change the behaviour pattern that Turkish people define themselves.[28] With in that new type of identity definition, religious elements were excluded from the millet definition and religion was replaced by nationalism. The very same determination can be fitted into the principle of 'laicism'. Laicism, which is among the six arrows of Kemalism, means the separation of religious affairs from state. Laicism creates a kind of legitimacy for the status of the Republican regime and the actions of the governments in power with in this regime. That is the political dimension of laicism. In addition to that political dimension, laicism has also a cultural content, which is as important as political one. The 'ideological revolution', concentrated on changing the system of values having religious motives, becomes meaningful by the help of the principle of laicism.[29] So, Those two important arrows of Kemalism; the principle of 'nationalism' designed by the millet concept, which was not defined by the religious elements,! and the principle of 'laicism' which means the separation of religion and state; were both formulated through excluding religion. Modernization was the other important ideal in Kemal's view. According to Kemalist ideology, modernization means to reach the level of the West by benefiting from the instruments 'science and technology', which provided the superiority of Western societies, and to integrate with the developed states in harmony. Paralel to this view, positivism is the most important feature, and religious ideology should be replaced by positivist ideology.
However, despite those two important principles, 'nationalism' and 'laicism', and that remarkable ideal 'modernization', which have been perceived as the founding principles of modern Turkey, Islamist movements appeared after 1940s. Partially, inflamed by some of the political parties in power, and partially by foreign powers, radical Islam became a security concern for Turkish officials. While Islam, used as an instrument in domestic politics by the political parties for gaining votes in elections, did only result in the emergence of small-scale Islamic activities; Islam, toyed by some foreign players for enlarging their influence on Turkey or for weakening Turkish Republic in its own region, resulted in the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism which is "an aggressive revolutionary movement as militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, and Nazi movements of the past", and which is "authoritarian, anti-democratic, anti-secular".[30]
With those features, Islamic fundamentalism is more complex and much more harmful for Turkish national security.
Although the relations of Turkey with the Middle Eastern states have never been steady in history, Turkish officials never felt to be threatened by those except Iran, Iraq and Syria. Those three states have always occupied the top priority in Turkish foreign and security policies in the Cold War period. The source of the problems with the mentioned states can be grouped into four; water controversy, Kurdish issue, radical Islam, and weaponry of mass destruction. The source and the increase in terrorism based on Kurdish nationalism and radical Islam were all considered as inter-related with those states by Turkish officials.
The possibility of facing with the water-origin political disputes seems critical for the Middle Eastern states. It is generally accepted view that the prevailing water contraversy among Turkey-Syria-Iraq, Syria-Israel-Jordan, Egypt-Sudan would occupy the most important issue of the Middle East in the near future.[31]
Rather fragile and sensitive security balance in that region hinders the development of advantageous solution for the water controversy, on the contrary, this encourages the development of new dispute circles related with that issue. Arbitrarily drawn borders has been the main determinant in water resources as in many other issues, and several Middle Eastern states concentrate on inequal sharing of water resources. The lack of water resources in the region makes the available severe conditions tense. As such, "Serious disaggreements among Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia in regard to the sharing of water resources of river Nile. Şeria River, which bears vital importance for Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, is under Israeli control currently. It has been a constant debate among Turkey-Syria and Iraq over the sharing of water resources of Euphrates and Tigris, which is an important water basin in the Middle East region.[32] Particularly after 1980s, Syria wanted to realise its demands regarding Euphrates through hampering the South Eastern Anatolia Project (Güney Doğu Anadolu Projesi - GAP). In order to break Turkish governments' resistance on that water Project, Syrian officials preferred to motivate separatist Kurdish movements in Turkey and house PKK terrorists in Syria. Along with the escape of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to Syria, the relations between those two states became more tense. Although Iraq was suffering from Kurdish movements on its own territory deeply, Iraqi officials did not hesitate to support the activities of separatist Kurdish groups in Turkey to have a share on the water resources of Euphrates and Tigris. So, it can be said that Iraq and Syria, which usually provoked the Kurdish issue during the Cold War period, were aimed at destroying the GAP and preventing Turkey from being a regional power in the Middle East region.
While Iraq and Syria were influential in water controversy and Kurdish issue, Iran was regarded as the main external force which had a large impact on the development of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. Partially, depending on the influence of Shi'ism, which is rather more nationalist expression of Islam religion compared to Sunnism, and partially depending on Iranian governments' desire to become a regional power after Iran Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iranian officials attempted to house PKK terrorists on its own territory and transfer its Islamic state model to Turkey by illegal groups like Hezbollah. In the late Cold War period, Iranian governments were accused of supporting Hezbollah activities in Turkey by Turkish officials.
The fourth security concern of Turkey as regard those three Middle Eastern states is weaponary of mass destruction. In the Middle East region it is hardly possible to refer any treaty or to determine any power struggling against the militarization attempts, which makes the established Middle East order much more dilemmatic. Since the states which provoke and control the militarization have been the same for years, it becomes difficult to take any decision beyond the interests of those states.[33] However, it is quite obvious that USA and the Soviet Union were two big powers which enabled Iran, Iraq and Syria to appear as nuclear and military powers in the Middle East region either through transfering expertise of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons or selling those weapons directly to those states. Among those three Iran is seems to be the most dangerous in regard to weaponary of mass destruction. According to the CIA reports Iran manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons including blister, blood, choking, nevre agents, bombs and the artillery shells for delivering them. In addition to chemical weapons, Iran is currently seeking dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise - possibly for civilian use, but with potential biological warfare applications, and might have small quantities of biological agents and perhaps a few weapons. Iran also received ballistic missiles and technology from North Korea and China. Furthermore, Iran enlisted the aid of Russian scientists for its ballistic missile program.[34]
Under those five subtitles we tried to explain the basic security concerns of Turkey during the Cold War period. In the following part we will analyse the newly-emerged security concerns and make it clear that how the center of threat perception has shifted from north to south.
The Cold War period is said to have ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Just after that sudden change Turkey had become risk free for a short time. However, after a while parametres of security began to change radically. Non-traditional threat elements such as terrorism, drug smuggling, arms transfer, mass migration, religious fundamentalism, ethnic nationalism, weaponary of mass destruction replaced traditional threat elements such as military and nuclear threats which had determined the security perception of the states during the Cold War period.[35] Those mentioned new threat elements appeared usually in the regions, such as Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East, which surround Turkey. Collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), dissolution of Yugoslavia Socialist Federal Republic along with the civil war in the Balkans, war in Chechneya, Georgia-Abkhazia/Georgia-Ossetia matters and Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict over Nagorna-Karabagh in the Caucasus, Gulf War I upon the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the Middle East all appeared as the new risks in the first half of 1990s just around Turkey, and without doubt affected Turkish security and threat perceptions profoundly.
While Turkey had made contributions to the conflicts emerged in the Balkans and Caucasus through actively participating in peace-keeping operations, Turkish officials adopted a different security stand in the Middle East region before the conditions appeared in the Northern Iraq following the Gulf War I. The defense concept designed according to the Soviet Union and Greece in the Cold War period was replaced by internal threat evaluation parallel to the developments in the separatist Kurdish movements led by the PKK following the authority gap emerged in the Northern Iraq after the Gulf War, and Syria, Iran, Iraq were determined as the source of threat in the National Security Policy Document of 1992. In 1997, depending on the developments in domestic politics, religious fundamentalism was assessed as the most important security threat in Turkish National Security Policy Document prepared by National Security Council.[36]
Volatile status of northern Iraq after the Gulf War II and its impact on separatist Kurdish movements; the future status of Cypriot Turks in the island of Cyprus following EU attempts to integrate Cyprus, disregarding Turkish part and considering the Greek Cypriots as the only representative of the island, into the European Union in 2004 and its possible impact on Turkish security in the Mediterranean both occupy the top priority in Turkish security agenda in the 2000s. However, it should be kept in mind that although Kurdish and Cyprus issues are seen as the main security concerns by Turkish officials, the security concerns which occupied Turkish national security agenda in the Cold War period still bear importance for Turkey in the post-Cold War period. In the following part we will explain the most crucial security concerns of Turkish officials in the post-Cold War period.
Iran-Iraq War between 1980-1988 and the Gulf Operations in 1991 and 2003 stimulated the changes in PKK activities in Turkey in the post-Cold War period. Iran-Iraq War ended with the Iraqi side partial superiority over Iran through being backed by the west in 1988. Just after that war Saddam Hussein launched an operation in northern Iraq on the Kurdish groups. Saddam was aimed at punishing those Kurdish groups which cooperated with Iran during Iran-Iraq War. The Kurdish people, attempted to escape from Iraq army, rushed into Turkish, Iran and Syrian borders and took shelters in those countries. PKK terrorists settled in the areas left by Kurdish groups upon Saddam attacks. In Saddam's view, PKK would be used to break the influence of Kurdish groups in northern Iraq and Iraq government would support PKK existence in northern Iraq. After PKK had established a kind of semi-authority in northern Iraq in 1988, it reinforced its structure and began to organise attacks in Turkey from northern Iraq.[37] The establishment of semi-authority of PKK in the northern Iraq and the transfer of PKK armed forces from Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley to the northern Iraq made Turkish forces struggle with PKK much more difficult. From then on Turkish forces had to deal with PKK activities not only in Turkey but also on Turkish-Iraq boundaries.
The Gulf War I in 1991 should be regarded as the second development which led the reincorcement and increase in PKK activities. The first Gulf War also helped two main Kurdish parties in northern Iraq led by Mesut Barzani and Celal Talabani develop anti-Turkish stand. On April 5, 1991, along with the 688 numbered decision of the UN, 'Comfort Provide Operation' was initiated in order to prevent Saddam's probable operation against Iraq Kurds, and to provide security and humanitarian aid for thousands of Kurds, rushed into Turkey's northern Iraq border from Saddam's possible attack as in 1988. The coalition forces settled in northern Iraq and created a security zone in the north of 36. parallel. That first operation terminated in July 1991 and the second 'Provide Comfort Operation' began. By the help of coalition military forces, most of the Iraq refugees came back to their homes voluntarily, and the number of military forces of 'Provide Comfort Operation' decreased, and reorganised as 'Rapid Deployment Force' in order to deter Iraq army probable attacks in northern Iraq. Despite land forces of 'Rapid Deployment Force' withdrew in September 1991, air forces settled in İncirlik base, which is in the south of Turkey.[38] It can be said that the then Özal government fully supported the formation of 'Rapid Deployment Force' to help Kurdish refugees go back to their homes, and to motivate international humanitarian aid for those people.
However, after the settlement of 'Rapid Deployment Force' in the south of Turkey, the so-called Force began to contact with two main Kurdish parties in northern Iraq and with PKK. In 1992, Kurdish leaders, backed by the USA, began to work for a new formation in northern Iraq through by-passing Saddam and Baghdat government. In May, elections were realised, a parliament, including two main Kurdish parties and Christian groups, was set up, in July 1992 Kurdish government was established, and on October 4, 1992 Kurdish parliament declared Kurdistan Federated Kurdish State, which was regarded by the same parliament as the part of a federal state.[39] So, Turkish government undeliberately paved the way for the mentioned new formation in northern Iraq through backing the 'Rapid Deployment Force'. Parallel to the developments, both PKK and two Kurdish Parties in northern Iraq concentrated more on anti-Turkish discourse and activities since those believe that Turkish governments evaluate Kurdistan Federated Kurdish State and PKK activities as one of the most important security threat for Turkish national security.
After the Gulf War in 1991, and the establishment of Kurdish State in 1992, PKK had succeeded to penetrate into Turkish borders and continued its activities directly in Turkey. While doing that PKK largely benefited from the Kurdish-controlled bases in northern Iraq and from the support of foreign powers. Although US officials declared that "The US has no strategic interest in any form of 'Kurdistan'"[40] very often and defined PKK as the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world in the annual terror report[41], they have never refrained from using PKK and two main Kurdish parties in northern Iraq to detoriate Saddam regime for years.
The Gulf War II in 2003 launched by the coalition powers to collapse Saddam regime in Iraq has prepared a suitable milieu for Kurdish Party leaders Celal Talabani and Mesut Barzani, and the PKK for gaining authority in northern Iraq, and for deactivating Turkey in Kurdish issue. Turkish government's limited support for the USA at the begining of the Gulf operation has directed US officials their interest towards cooperating with those Kurdish parties against Saddam and developing relations for the formation of a new order in Iraq. Accordingly, Mesut Barzani declared Kirkuk as the capital of Kurdistan and Celal Talabani said that "If Turkey attempts to focus on Kirkuk matter, Kurds will concentrate more on Diyarbakır and other areas of Turkey"[42] Furthermore, PKK has claimed that along with the collapse of Saddam regime the concept of 'nation state' has lost its validity and the status quo has been demolished, so, from now on the states in the region should settle the Kurdish issue based on 'democratic unity'. According to this explanation it seems obvious that PKK leaders have the objective that the region will be restructured politically and de facto and de jure the Kurds, including PKK, should be recognised in the region.[43] In order to materialise those objectives PKK has been trying to gain the support of both the local Kurdish powers and USA - Britain, which have the authority over the region currently.
On the other hand, Turkish General Staff has been attempting to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish state in which two local Kurdish parties would have the ruling power and to delimit PKK activities by the help of the USA. Upon Turkish demands, the Chief of US Genaral Staff, General Myers declared that US would deactivate and demilitarize PKK, for this reason, there is no need for Turkish General Staff to send soldiers to northern Iraq. However, just after the mentioned explanation, US-PKK contacts continued and even the member of Kurdish parliament Mahmut Osman, a PKK supporter, has become one of the 25 members of Temporary Council, which was founded in transition period until the new regime in Iraq would be established in the future. Accordingly, PKK attacks began in Turkey, which have not been active since the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.
Currently, whether PKK would be protected by the local Kurds, two Kurdish parties in northern Iraq and the USA, and remain in northern Iraq, reinforce its status there, and intensify its attacks against Turkey or deactivated, demilitarized (as US officials promised), and would have to seek for other shelters in other states in the region is a huge question mark since nothing is clear under today's condition.
Depending on the explanations above it can be said that in the post-Cold War period PKK, the separatist Kurdish movement, has been occupying one of the most crucial security threat for Turkish national security as in the Cold War period.
Although the problems with Greece over territorial waters, delimitation of the continental shelf, militarization of the eastern Aegean islands, Aegean air space still continue in the post-Cold War period, the Cyprus issue has appeared as the most important dispute between Greece and Turkey at the begining of 1990s along with the Greek Cypriot administration's application to the EC for full membership on 3 July 1990. After the application, the Council passed the mentioned application to the Commission for the 'opinion' preparation. On 30 June 1993, the Commission explained its opinion and considered 'Cyprus' as eligible for membership, which meant that EC recognised Greek Cyprus as the legitimate representative of the entire Cyprus island disregarding Turkish Cypriots. After EU's official declaration both Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey opposed this decision depending on a. Cypriot constitutional law b. Greece's threat c. the formula reached by the UN Security Council. In order to understand illegitimacy of EU's recognition of Greek Cyprus as the representative of entire Cyprus we will explain those three items.
Depending on the explanations above, it can be assumed that the settlement of the Cyprus dispute would rather take more time than expected. At that point it sould be noted that Cyprus island not only represents an important dispute both for international community, for Turkish and Greek governments and for Turkish and Greek Cypriots currently; it might also cause serious security concerns for Republic of Turkey in those ways:
First of all, along with the accession of Cyprus into the EU, Turkey might lose its authority both on Cypriot Turks and in Eastern Mediterranean, and might become much more sensitive towards probable threats from the south.
Secondly, Greece, through paving EU membership way for the Greek Cypriots, might appear more powerful against Turkey in international platforms. This might also lead Greece to find solution to Aegean-related problems in favour of itself through gaining international support.
Thirdly, upon the entry of Greek Cypriots into the EU on behalf of the entire Cyprus by the help of Greece, Turkey might face double veto against itself, Greece and Cyprus vetoes,[47] which would obviously cause a delay in Turkey's EU full membership.
Seperatist Kurdish movements, encouraged by the accession of Cyprus into the EU, might seek for the ways of enlarging international support for an independent Kurdish state which would be a direct threat for Turkish national security.
Those are the probable but not speculative security threats that Turkey might deal with along with the accession of Cyprus into the EU. So, it can be said that Cyprus issue constitutes one of the two important security concerns for Turkish governments in the post-Cold War period.
The basic aim of this article has been to explain security concerns of Turkey in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, including the determination of Turkish constant security concerns which have represented continuity in all security environments. The factors which have shape(d) Turkish national security policy in genaral, in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and in what ways those factors threaten(ed) Turkish national security have been investigated.
Since 1923 Turkish Republic has felt several security concerns in different periods. Strategic geographic location, having borders with several or problematic and powerful states, being regarded as the center of attractivity by the foreign powers, facing radical systemic changes in the states surrounding it, having deep-rooted disputes with its neighbours might all be the main reasons which led Turkey to deal with several security concerns. The most interesting is that those security concerns of Turkey are not periodic but constant. In other words, Turkish officials face those security concerns in all security environments, under all circumstances. For instance, Kurdish issue, Turkish Straits, Aegean-related matters, Cyprus problem, disputes with the Middle Eastern states have always occupied Turkish security policy agenda since the establishment of modern Turkey but not appeared in certain periods and lost their importance after those periods.
Since the source and the target of the risk was more predictable in the Cold War period, Turkish governments could determine security policies which could overcome Turkey's security concerns more easily in that period. However, after the Cold War period, the increase in risk factors in the regions surrounding Turkey has made Turkey's security much more sensitive. The very often changes in the balance of power has resulted in two important developments in the post-Cold War period. Firstly, Turkey's security concerns have increased immensily and secondly, Turkish officials have become unable to set up reasonable security policies.
When the prevailing chaos is taken into consideration, it can be claimed that Turkey's security would be full of risks in the future. Depending on these reasons, it can be said that Turkish officials, bearing the negative experiences that Turkish Republic had in the past in mind, should develop the most reasonable security policies which would bring the maximum benefit for Turkey's national interests.
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[1] The Ministry of Defense White Book-Defense, 1998, pp.9-11.
[2] Bir, Çevik and T. Joseph Lopez, "Turkey: From Nato's Southeastern Flank to the New Frontline", http//www.csis.org, taken 25.10.1999.
[3] Bir and Lopez, ibid, p.12.
[4] Bir and Lopez, ibid, p.13.
[5] Davutoğlu, Ahmet, Stratejik Derinlik-Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth-International Position of Turkey), 9th Ed., Küre Press, 2002, pp.65-74.
[6] Fuller, Graham, "Turkey in the New International Security Environment". Foreign Policy (Ankara), vol.XVI, nos.3-4, 1992, p.30.
[7] Ziemke, Caroline F., Philippe Loustaunau and Amy Alrich, Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence, Institute For Defense Analyses- IDA Document D-2537, November 2000, p.2.
[8] see Ergil, Doğu, Secularism in Turkey Past and Present, Foreign Policy Institute (Ankara), pp.57-62.
[9] Berkes, Niyazi, Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma (Modernization in Turkey), Doğu-Batı Press, 1978, p.544.
[10] Mughisuddin, Oya Akgönenç, Turkey and the Middle East: Systemic and Subsystemic Determinants of Foreign Policy 1960-1975, Foreign Policy Institute (Ankara), 1993, p.69.
[11] Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer, Development of Turkish-Arab Relations a Historical Appraisal, in Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (Eds), Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance, Foreign Policy Institute (Ankara), 1987, pp.9-10.
[12] Most, Benjamin A.and Harvey Star, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics and the Spread of War". The American Political Science Review, December 1980, vol.74, no.4, 1980, pp.932-936.
[13] Uçarol, Rifat, Değişmekte Olan Dünyada Türk Boğazları'nın Önemi ve Geleceği (Importance and Future of Turkish Straits in Changing World), in Sabahattin Şen (Ed.), Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye (The New World Order and Turkey), Bağlam Press, 1992, pp.165,197.
[14] Köni, Hasan, "Soğuk Savaş ve Sonuçları" ("The Cold War and The Outputs"), Avrasya Dosyası (Eurasian File) (Ankara), vol. V, no.4, 1999, pp.78-79.
[15] Mütercimler, Erol, "Değişen Güvenlik Kavramı ve Global Stratejiler"
("Changing Defense Concept and Global Strategies"), Savunma ve Strateji, Mayıs 2001, sayı 97 (Defence and Strategy, May 2001, no.97), İstanbul, 2001, p.18.[16] Langlois, George, Jean Boismenu, Luc Lefebvre, Partice Regimbald, 20. Yüzyıl Tarihi (20th Century History), Nehir Medya Press, 2000, p.277.
[17] Turan, İlter, "Mediterranean Security in the Light of Turkish Concerns", Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, June-August 1998, vol.III, no.2., Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Center for Strategic Research) (Ankara),1998, p.29.
[18] Özveren, Eyüp, "Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends and Prospects", Perceptions Journal of International Affairs, December 2002-February 2003, vol.VII, no.4, Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Center for Strategic Research) (Ankara), 2003, p.35.
[19] Evcil, Cumhur, Yavru Vatan Kıbrıs'ta Zafer'in Hikayesi (The Story of Zafer in Cyprus), Genel Kurmay Yayınları (Turkish General Staff Press),1999, p.1.
[20] Kütük, Zeki, Turkey's Integration into the European Union The Dynamics and Determinants of a Dilemmatic Relationship, Turun Yliopisto, 2003, p.105.
[21] Taşkıran, Cemalettin, On İki Ada'nın Dünü ve Bugünü (Past and Present of Dodecanese Islands), Genel Kurmay Yayınları (Turkish General Staff Press), 1996, pp.116-117.
[22] Kütük, ibid, p.107.
[23] Vanlı, İsmet Şerif, "Dünden Bugüne Kürt Sorunu ve Geleceğe Dönük Bazı Çıkarsamalar" ("Kurdish Issue From the Past until Present and Some Assumptions"), Özgür Üniversite Forumu (Free University Forum), vol.I, no.4, 1998, p.102.
[24] Kütük, ibid, pp.132-134.
[25] Kutschera, Chris,"Büyük Devletler ve Kürtler" ("Big States and the Kurds"), Özgür Üniversite Forumu (Free University Forum), vol.I, no.4, 1998, p.104.
[26] Chase, Robert, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy (eds.), Eksen Ülkeler Gelişen Dünyada ABD Politikasının Yeni Hatları (The Pivotal States: A new framework for U.S. policy in the developing world) (Tr. Belkıs Ç. Dişbudak), second ed., Sabah Press, 1999, p.117.
[27] Torumtay, Necip, Değişen Stratejilerin Odağında Türkiye (Turkey In the Center of Changing Strategies), second ed., Milliyet Press, 1997, p.233.
[28] Köker, Levent, Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi (Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy), second ed., İletişim Press, 1993, p.153.
[29] Köker, ibid, p.161.
[30] Perlmutter, Amos, "Wishful Thinking about Islamic Fundamentalism", Washington Post, January 19, 1992.
[31] see Bağış, Ali İhsan (Ed.), Water As An Element of Cooperation And Development In the Middle East, Ankara, 1994.
[32] Kocaoğlu, Mehmet, Petro Strateji, Ankara, 1996, p.183.
[33] Jawad, Haifaa A. (Ed.), The Middle East in the New World Order, second edition, London-MacMillan Press Ltd.1997, p.102.
[34] see Pena, Charles V., "Axis of Evil: Threat or Chimera?", Mediterranean Quarterly, vol.13, no.3, Summer 2002.
[35] Mortimer, Edward J., "New Fault-lines: Is a North-South Confrontation Inevitable in Security Terms?", IISS Adelphi Papers 266, Winter 1991/92, pp.74-86.
[36] Özcan, Gencer, Doksanlı Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Değişen Güvenlik Ortamı (Changing Security Environment of Turkey in 1990s), in Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut (Eds), Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar - En Uzun Onyıl (Turkish Security and Foreign Policy Agenda in the 1990s - The Longest Ten Years), Boyut Press, 1998, pp.18-19.
[37] Özdağ, Ümit, "Kuzey Irak ve PKK" ("Northern Iraq and PKK"), Avrasya Dosyası (Eurasian File) (Ankara), vol.III, no.1, 1996, pp.88-89.
[38] Kessing's Archives, 38357, 38361, 38450, Dispatch, 1991, p.379.
[39] Kurubaş, Erol, "Kuzey Irak'ta Olası Bir 'Ayrılma'nın Gerçekleşebilirliği" ("Realization of a Probable 'Separation' in Northern Iraq"), Stratejik Analiz (Strategic Analysis) (Ankara), February 2003, vol.III, no.34, p.20.
[40] Cordesman, Anthony H., "The Gulf and Transition-US Policy Ten Years After the Gulf-Policy Issues on the Periphery", http//www.csis.org, taken 30.10.2000.
[41] Güven, Fatih, "KADEK (PKK) Terör Örgütünün Orta Doğu'da Güç Değerlendirmesi" ("Power Evaluation of KADEK (PKK) Terrorist Organization in the Middle East"), Stratejik Analiz (Strategic Analysis) (Ankara), vol.IV, no.38, 2003, p.47.
[42] Hasan, Mazin, "Savaş Sonrası Irak Kürtlerinin Tutumu ve Türkiye" ("The Stand of Iraqi Kurds after the War and Turkey"), Stratejik Analiz (Strategic Analysis) (Ankara), vol.IV, no.38, 2003, p.45.
[43] Güven, ibid, p.49.
[44] see Özkan, Ayşe, "Uluslararası Hukuk ve Kıbrıs Sorunu" ("International Law and The Cyprus Issue"), Stratejik Analiz (Strategic Analysis) (Ankara), vol.III, no.33, 2003, pp.58-60.
[45] Kütük, ibid, p.148.
[46] Kuloğlu, Armağan and Ayşe Özkan, "Avrupa Birliği'ne Üyelik Sürecinde Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikası" ("Cyprus Policy of Turkey in the Process of EU Membership"), Stratejik Analiz (Strategic Analysis) (Ankara), vol.IV, no.39, 2003, p.28.
[47] Kütük, ibid, p.152.