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The Eurasian Politician - July 2004
by David Storobin, July 14, 2004
In the 19th century, the Russian Empire began to expand, and spread into Central Asia. The "Great Game" period is generally regarded as running from approximately 1813 to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 a second less intensive phase followed. At the start of the 19th century there were some 2000 miles separating British India and the outlying regions of the Tsarist Russia. Much of the land in between was unmapped. [1]
By the beginning turn of the century, Central Asia was firmly in the hands of Russia and despite some early resistance to Bolsheviks, Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia became a part of the Soviet Union.
On September 1, 1991, Uzbekistan reluctantly declared independence. While the Baltic States led the fight for independence, Central Asian states were afraid of it. "The centrifugal forces pulling the Union apart were weakest in Central Asia. Well after the August 1991 coup attempt, all Central Asian leaders believed that the Union might somehow be preserved," wrote Michael McFaul in "Russia's Unfinished Revolution". [2]
Islam Karimov became the first, and so far the only President of Uzbekistan.
It is impossible to understand a nation without at least a cursory knowledge of its religious traditions. After all, how different would Chechnya be if it was still Christian? How different would Pakistan be if it was Hindu? Chances are that neither Pakistanis nor Chechens would demand independence had they not embraced Islam, and even if they did, it is highly unlikely that these nations would be flooded by foreign Islamic extremists.
Almost all Uzbeks belong to either the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam or to Sufi Islam. Both Hanafi and Sufi are known for their peacefulness. Of the 4 major schools (madhahibs) of law within Sunni Islam, Hanafi has a reputation as the most moderate and open to modernization.
Sufism overlaps the Sunni and Shi'ite traditions. It is a name for the mystical, philosophical and usually localized schools. The central concept of Sufism is love. A large body of literature came out of the Sufi tradition, including "1001 Arabian Nights."
Uzbekistan and parts of Tajikistan, which at one point was part of Uzbekistan, are historically closely connected with Sufism. The most popular of the Sufi orders (known as tariqqa) is the Naqshbandiyya, which originated in Bukhara in the fourteenth century. The second largest, the Qaddiriyya order, is also popular in the region. [3] Both orders occur throughout the Islamic world.
Nevertheless, Islamic practice and education has been stifled in Central Asia and the rest of the Soviet Union for 70 years, and as a result, few Moslems in the former Soviet Union are even aware what the words Hanafi and Sufi even mean. Many follow Hanafi and Sufi traditions not out of knowledge, but because they remember their grandparents doing the same. This lack of knowledge leaves the population open to brainwashing by those claiming expertise. In the land of the blind, the one-eyed is the King.
The government of Islam Karimov is horrified at the thought of the word Islam and does not allow much local religious freedom or publication of Islamic literature other than the officially controlled Muslim publications. A religious leader in Uzbekistan complained: "People go on the Haj and they get given this literature for free. Since there is no good literature here in Uzbekistan, they naturally find it interesting and read it." [4]
Outside Central Asia, there is also little moderate Islamic literature available, as modern Islamic religious teachings have been dominated by the and fundamentalists that sprung from the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt, Wahhabis that came out of Saudi Arabia, as well as the Salafi puritans.
Today, Uzbekistan is the second poorest former Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) with its GDP standing at $2,600. While under the Soviet rule, over-production of cotton and grain led to overuse of agrochemicals and the depletion of water supplies, leaving the land poisoned, and the Aral Sea and some rivers half dry. Since gaining independence, Uzbekistan tried to reduce its dependence on agriculture, while developing its mineral and petroleum reserves. Primary political development concerns include violence by Islamist terrorists, and lack of human rights or democracy. [5]
In discussing the economy and politics of Uzbekistan, one must remember that President Islam Karimov has been a hardened Communist all his life and is being forced against his will into the free-market, democratic system. Both free market and democracy are foreign and unnatural to him.
Restrictions on currency convertibility and other attempts to control economic activity, including the implementation of severe import restrictions and closure of Uzbekistan's borders with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have constrained economic growth, at times to the point of paralysis, and led international lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits. [6]
However, the flow of commerce, investment, and communication in Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia is changing. Formerly dependent on Russia, the region is trying to look to the rest of the world. With increasing prices of commodities, there should be a rapid and transforming process which is going to change the nature and character of the area, making it much more dynamic. Currently, railroads between Turkmenistan and Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and China, and highways between these countries and China, Pakistan, and India, are being constructed. The volume of telephone calls and first-class mail from Central Asia to Russia is dropping drastically, while contacts with the U.S., the EU states, Turkey, Iran, China, Japan, and Korea are growing. To efficiently develop the East- West Silk Roadѕ, a transportation corridor from the Chinese border to Western Europe and the Middle Eastѕ the cooperation of not only the Central Asian states, but also the countries of the Caucasus, such as Azerbaijan and Georgia, will be needed. New railroads connecting to trans-Caspian and cross-Black Sea ferries, and in the future pipelines to China, Korea, and Japan, will have to be constructed at a great cost. [7]
Another ambitious project under consideration is the gas pipeline from Eastern Turkmenistan to the Pacific Coast of China. If built, this would be the longest pipeline in the world (3,700 miles). It is being considered by a consortium which includes Esso China (Exxon), Mitsubishi (Japan), and China National Petroleum Co. An oil pipeline from Western Kazakstan is also being considered. [8]
Turkey is interested in diversifying its sources of natural gas away from Russia, which currently supplies 85 percent of its fast-growing needs. Turkey would like to import 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas over 23 years from Iran. However, the pipeline for this project has neither been constructed nor financed. Turkmenistan could have been an alternative for Iranian gas if a cross-Caspian pipeline, possibly along the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Ceyhan route, is built. [9]
Uzbekistan is now the world's second-largest cotton exporter, a large producer of gold and oil, and a regionally significant producer of chemicals and machinery. [10]
After gaining independence, the Karimov administration sought to prop up its Soviet-style command economy with subsidies and tight controls on production and prices. Uzbekistan responded to economic crises in Russia and Asia by tightening exports and emphasizing currency controls within its closed economy. Rather than liberalize the economy and allow locals and foreigners to invest, the government of Uzbekistan is increasing government controls over business decisions. While the administration used inequality as an excuse for its policies, inequality only increased as a result of its policies, hurting the lower classes the most. [11]
For Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia to recover from the economic rut in which the region finds itself, economic and democratic reforms are required. Rather than the current neo-feudalist system where an elite few benefit, while the rest suffer, capitalist reforms are required to ensure that neo-feudalist monopolies do not siphon away state assets and foreign investment from the population in favor of the criminal elite.
Although Uzbekistan has significantly narrowed the gap between the black market and official exchange rate, it has not achieved full currency convertibity because of its opposition to free market economics and, as a result, foreign investment has decreased to just a trickle. Uzbekistan engaged in the most restrictive trade measures of any Central Asian or former Soviet nation, thus crippling the local economy. Particularly harmful, almost to the point of paralysis, has been the severe import restrictions and closure of Uzbekistan's borders with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The policies of Karimov led international lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits. Liberalization of the trade regime, however, is a prerequisite for Uzbekistan to proceed to an IMF-financed program. [12]
As a result of tariffs and government control of local business, Uzbekistan experienced 50% annual inflation in 2002.
Additionally, Uzbekistan is one of the few countries in the world that lacks copyright protection laws.
The above policies are particularly regrettable because Uzbekistan has a vast potential to develop into a liberal democracy with a strong economy. Literacy in Uzbekistan is almost universal, and workers are generally well-trained. International corporations with affiliates in the country report that Uzbeks learn quickly and work efficiently. Younger workers, untainted by the Soviet system, work especially well at all levels. [13]
It should be noted that the Karimov administration has done a good job maintaining a near-balanced budget. Annual Uzbek GDP is over $66 billion, and the country owes only $4.6 billion. [14] That compares favorably with the United States and Europe, who have debt equal to 50%-100% of the nations' annual GDP, and even more favorably with most of the Third World where some countries owe a sum 5-10 times greater than their annual GDP.
For capitalism to replace neo-feudalism, Uzbekistan needs the rule of law and political stability.
Neither is possible under the current circumstances because of interference from terrorist groups interested in fomenting Islamist-inspired instability in Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia.
The threat that Uzbekistan will be conquered by a Taliban-like group is a primary reason for the lack of democratic reforms in the country. That most Uzbeks subscribe to moderate Islam is not a guarantee against a radical Islamist government coming to power and imposing a theocracy. In countries like Indonesia and Pakistan, up to 70-75% of madrasas (Islamic religious schools) are controlled and funded by the Saudi Wahhabis and other Islamic extremists, despite the fact that 80-90% of the population in these countries subscribe to the Barelvi Islam and other non-violent sects. [15] It is these same madrasas and Arab funding that led the anti-colonialist Deobandi Islam [Islamic Puritanism that originated in India] to become violent. The Taliban is a part of the Deobandi movement, which is today almost indistinguishable from Wahhabism [Wahhabis are mostly Arabs who subscribe to the Hanbali legal code, while Deobandis are mostly Southeast Asians who subscribe to the Hanafi legal code]. Just like radicals came to power to Afghanistan, where most people did not subscribe to extremist ideologies, same can happen in Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia.
To understand the external blocks to Uzbekistan's political development, one must take a broad look at what has been happening throughout the Islamic world in modern years.
While the issue of, say, Palestinians may seem unrelated to Uzbekistan, the recent wave of terrorist attack in Uzbekistan has been committed by a Palestinian-run, international Hizb ut-Tahrir which operates in over 40 countries. Thus, it is important to understand Islamic extremist in the broader sense, not just inside Uzbekistan.
For more than four centuries prior to World War I, the most dominant power in the Moslem world was the Ottoman Empire, which subscribed to the moderate Hanafi book. The Caliph was based in Turkey and fed off of the moderate Turkish-style Islam. As a result, Islam was a moderate force, which protected Jews during the Inquisition, did not persecute minorities and was generally very progressive compared to the rest of the world.
After the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I, secular, West-oriented Young Turks came to power under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. In 1924, Ataturk abolished the Caliphate, thus ending a 1,292-year-old tradition. [16] Turkey also passed various legislation separating mosque and state in the most extreme degree. Politically, modern Turkey is a more secular state than most Western nations, including the United States.
Turkey's secularization and abolishment of the Caliphate left a vacuum of leadership in Islam. This vacuum was quickly filled by the Wahhabis.
Wahhabis are followers of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (1703-87), who rejected the most restrictive traditional Sunni book, the Hanbali, and instead created his own form of Islam, which forbade gold, ornaments, jewelry, silk, dancing, music, poetry, etc. [17]
In 1924, just as the Turks were abolishing the Caliphate, Ibn Saud, a direct descendant of Abdul Wahhab, colluded with the British to attack and seize Mecca. In early October of that year, he surrounded the city and the local ruler, Shariff Hussein Hashemi (who subscribed to the moderate Hanafi book) fled without a battle. A year later, Medina was conquered by Ibn Saud. By the end of the 1920's, Ibn Saud was in control of over 80% of the Arabian Peninsula. [18]
Meanwhile, Haj-Amin al-Husseini violently seized power in Jerusalem and appointed himself the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Al-Husseini was a proponent of militant Islamic nationalism, a previously unknown concept. Once he was in power, he began a campaign of terror and intimidation against anyone opposed to his rule and policies. He killed Jews at every opportunity, but also eliminated Arabs who did not support his campaign of violence. Al-Husseini was a fascist who allied himself with Nazi Germany during WWII. In 1941, he organized a short-lived Fascist revolution in Iraq, thus becoming the man Most Wanted by Great Britain in the Middle East during World War II. He also organized the 13th and 21st all-Moslem divisions of the Nazi SS, which slaughtered over 90% of Bosnian Jewry, as well as hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Croats and Kosovar Moslems. [19]
Al-Husseini's nephew, Yassir Arafat (real last name is also al-Husseini), a supposed secular, emerged as a student leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, while he was a student at the Cairo University. Muslim Brotherhood was a pro-fascist organization with an extremist interpretation of Islam. Founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood gave rise to many other fundamentalist organizations, including Hizb ut-Tahrir.
As a wave of terrorist attacks swept Uzbekistan in spring 2004, the government of Uzbekistan immediately blamed "Wahhabis" and in particular, the clandestine Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HUT), or Party of Islamic Liberation, whose avowed aim is to create a worldwide Islamic caliphate. [20] HUT does not subscribe to Wahhabiyya, but the term Wahhabi has become the catch-all term for all Islamic extremists in Central Asia or even regular Uzbek opposition.
HUT has 5,000-10,000 hard-core members, and many more supporters in former Soviet Central. Over 10,000 members are active in Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and Indonesia. At least 500 are already behind bars in Uzbekistan alone, and hundreds are in custody in the Middle East. [21] However, the majority of Hizb ut-Tahrir members are located in the Arab Middle East, as well as in Western Europe.
HUT explicitly rejects democracy and its head published a book entitled "Democracy: The Law of Infidels." [22]
Since its inception in 1952 in Jordanian-occupied East Jerusalem, Hizb ut-Tahrir has gained tens of thousands of followers from London to Lahore. From its beginning, an-Nabhani's organization was influenced by the rabid anti-Semitism propagated by self-proclaimed Nazi Sheikh Haj Amin Al-Husseini. [23]
An-Nabhani was an associate and contemporary of Haj Amin's. Khaled Hassan, one of the founders of the Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was also among the founders of Hizb ut-Tahrir, as was Sheikh Asaad Tahmimi, who became Islamic Jihad's spiritual leader. [24]
An-Nabhani is a former member of the extremist Islamic Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan al-Muslimeen), a secretive international fundamentalist organization founded in Egypt in 1928, which spread throughout the Islamic world and preaches the establishment of an extremist Caliphate that will rule the world as Vatican ruled Europe during the Dark Ages. While states may exist under the Caliphate, they may not be nation-states, but rather promoters of religion. The primary goal of countries under the Caliphate shall be spreading Islam. "Din wa Dawla" – the inseparability of religion and government is one of the main fundamentalist teachings.
An-Nabhani joined the Brotherhood while studying in Cairo's Al-Azhar University but later left the Brotherhood because he considered it too soft. "It is likely that Hizb [ut-Tahrir] was supported initially by the Saudi-based radical Islamist Wahhabi movement, although the extent to which that support continues today is unclear," wrote Dr. Ariel Cohen. [25]
HUT functions under the Leninist model of critical mass. It seeks to establish a "critical mass" of sleeper terrorist cells in a country and then rises up at once in an attempt to overthrow a nation. It is highly likely that the attacks in Uzbekistan in the spring of 2004 were part of the Hizb's attempt at an Islamist revolution in the country. "When a critical mass of cells is achieved, according to its doctrine, Hizb [ut-Tahrir] may move to take over a country in preparation for the establishment of the Caliphate. Such a takeover would likely be bloody and violent," wrote Dr. Cohen. [26]
Hizb ut-Tahrir operates clandestinely in over 40 countries around the world, with members organized in cells of five to eight members each. Only a cell commander knows the next level of leadership, ensuring operational security. "Representatives" in Great Britain and Pakistan claim to speak for the organization but have no official address or legal office. Leadership for large regions (e.g., the former Soviet Union), countries, and local areas is kept secret.
Some members of Central Asian elite are part of HUT. "Observers in the region have reported successes in penetrating the Parliament in Kyrgyzstan, the media in Kazakhstan, and customs offices in Uzbekistan," wrote Dr. Cohen. [27]
Upon his death, an-Nabhani was succeeded by Sheikh Abd-el Qadim Zaloom, another Palestinian cleric, who died on April 29, 2003. Zaloom ruled Hizb ut-Tahrir for 50 years and died on April 29, 2003. The current leader of HUT is also unknown, as are the identities of the senior officers. [28]
The group had close links to the Taliban and many of its fighters died along-side Mullah Omar's forces. The government of Uzbekistan tried to make peace with the Islamic Movement, but peace attempts ended in February when Tahir Yuldash, the head of Justice Party (closely linked with the Islamic Movement), organized an attempt to assassinate President Karimov.
The Islamic Movement began as a small organization in the early 1990's, but by 1999 was staging attacks on Tajikistan and Kyrgystan's Batken province, not just parts of Uzbekistan. It had at least 2,000 fighters training in Afghanistan until the fall of the Taliban. [29] The links between the IMU and the Taliban go back to two things: At first, when the ethnic Uzbek generals in Afghanistan, Dostum and Malik, broke up, the Uzbek contingents under Gen. Malik, although former communists, defected to the Taliban. This brought a large amount of ethnic Uzbeks to the Taliban's rows. These Uzbeks were a good contact group for the IMU fighters who fled from the Fergana Valley over the border to Afghanistan during the clashes with Uzbekistan's security bodies. This, in turn, led the mysterious IMU leader Juma Namangani to get in contact with al-Qaida leaders, and Usama bin Ladin gave the "international brigade" (Brigade 055) in Afghanistan to Namangani's command. Namangani and a large part of this contingent was killed in the bombings of Kunduz when the war on terrorism in Afghanistan broke out.
After suffering tremendous losses in Afghanistan while fighting the United States, the IMU has taken a backseat to Hizb ut-Tahrir as the main terrorist organization in Uzbekistan. It has also suffered because it lost its main backer – the Taliban. However, it has recently been making a comeback, fighting the United States in Pakistan. The "'high-value al Qaeda target'" may have been Tahir Yuldash, the IMU's political leader, who was reportedly wounded," wrote Peter Brookes. [30]
Because of the terror network that has been established by the Taliban, Saudis, Egyptian and Palestinian fundamentalists, as well as others in Uzbekistan, the government cannot move towards democratic liberalization. Rather than building up its political institutions and economic system, Uzbekistan is stuck trying to fight terrorist organizations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – and any other Islamist terrorist organization that chooses to set up bases in the country.
Yet, the government has not done a good job even in the sphere where it has the opportunity to implement changes. The Central Asian nation is stuck in a Soviet-style economy that has failed everywhere and is currently failing miserably in Uzbekistan, leading to wide-spread poverty. While the Baltic nations have achieved economic growth through free market reforms that allowed them to join the European Union, Central Asia, in general, and Uzbekistan, in particular, has been regressing, rather than developing.
Comrade Karimov has been running one of the most repressive regimes in the world today. It is partially justified since he needs to fight terrorists who are out to kill him and destroy Uzbekistan. However, his claims that economic reforms could destabilize the country are false and, indeed, failure to implement capitalist reforms will lead to economic breakdown (as it did everywhere else). And we all know that there is nothing that feels more like "home" to terrorists than a failed state.
One of the main problems has been Karimov's approach to fighting terrorism. His regime labels any opposition as terrorists – starting with the nationalist and secular democratic movement Erk ("Freedom"), which was the main Uzbek democracy movement in the early 1990s. Its leader Muhammed Salih now lives in Norway. One of the first necessary steps to correctly assess the terrorist threat in Central Asia would be to stop the massive disinformation and hysterical terrorism talk, and to clearly distinguish actual terrorists (as they also exist) from genuine and justified opposition, Islamic conservatives and other innocent Muslims. As long as Karimov's regime sends thousands of people into Soviet-styled prison camps for having a beard or possessing Islamic literature, radical Islamist terrorism in Uzbekistan will only gain strength.
1. Wikipedia, Online Encyclopedia. Cited on May 10, 2004. URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Game
2. Michael McFaul, "Russia's Unfinished Revolution," pg. 131
3. International Crisis Group, "Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia," Cited May 1, 2004. URL:http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/asia/072_ca_is_radical_islam_inevitable.pdf
4. International Crisis Group, "Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia," Cited May 1, 2004. URL:http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/asia/072_ca_is_radical_islam_inevitable.pdf
5. CIA Factbook, Cited 5/12/04. URL: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html
6. Wikipedia, Online Encyclopedia. Cited on 5/10/04. URL:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Game
7. Dr. Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., "US Interests in Central Asia," March 17, 1999. Cited online on 5/9/2004, URL:http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/Test031799.cfm
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. CIA Factbook. Cited 5/10/ 04. URL:http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html
11. Ibid.
12. Nation Master Encyclopedia, Cited Online on 5/8/04 URL:http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Economy-of-Uzbekistan
13. Ibid.
14. CIA Factbook: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html
15. Andrew Coulson, "Education and Indoctrination in the Moslem World," Cited Online on 5/9/2004. URL: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa511.pdf
16. Dilip Hiro, "War Without End", p. 54
17. Hiro, pg. 39
18. Hiro, pg. 118
19. "Arab/Nazi Connection," Cited online on 5/1/04. URL:http://www.cdn-friends-icej.ca/antiholo/arabnazi.html
20. Paul Quinn-Judge, "Terror Comes to Tashkent," Time Europe, Cited online May 1, 2004. URL:http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901040412-607769,00.html]
21. Dr. Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Heritage Foundation,"Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia," March 30, 2003. Cited online on 5/9/2004, URL: http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. "Karimov Fights Back," Economist (UK), March 31, 2004. URL: http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2551988
30. Ibid.
1. Michael McFaul, "Russia's Unfinished Revolution."
2. Peter Brookes, "A New Terror Central," Heritage Foundation. Cited Online 5/10/04. URL: http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed040504a.cfm
3. Dilip Hiro, "War Without End"
4. Dr. Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Heritage Foundation, "US Interests in Central Asia," March 17, 1999. Cited online on 5/9/2004, URL:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/Test031799.cfm
5. Nation Master Encyclopedia, Cited Online on 5/8/04
URL:http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Economy-of-Uzbekistan
6. CIA Factbook: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html
7. Andrew Coulson, "Education and Indoctrination in the Moslem World," Cited Online on 5/9/2004. URL: http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa511.pdf
8. Jewish Virtual Library, Cited Online 5/1/2004. URL: http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Terrorism/Fatah.html
9. Paul Quinn-Judge, "Terror Comes to Tashkent," Time Europe, Cited online May 1, 2004. URL:http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901040412-607769,00.html
10. Dr. Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Heritage Foundation,"Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia," March 30, 2003. Cited online on 5/9/2004, URL:http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm
11. "Karimov Fights Back," Economist (UK), March 31, 2004. Cited Online 5/1/2004 URL:http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2551988