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The Eurasian Politician - July 2004
by Christian
Jokinen* 31.5.2004;
Published originally in Turkish Policy Quarterly, June 2004, http://www.turkishpolicy.com.
Anti-Americanism has became fashionable and is now a threat to the transatlantic cooperation. The risks of anti-Americanism are numerous and severe. Protests against "American imperialism" connected with almost all recent international summits recall the year 1968 and the wave of radicalism and terrorism in the 60s and 70s. A significant part of anti-American rhetoric is aimed at undermining the "legitimacy" of the hegemonic position of the US. The result of this could be that the key-player of world security may turn to neo-isolationism and turn its back to Europe. The old continent lacks the "power-political" resources to take the lead in world politics. Europe lacks the means to challenge the US in political influence, economic power or military might in the foreseeable future. If America is criticized in an irrational and emotional way, the outcome will be a US disengagement from the transatlantic pact and Europe's marginalization in global politics. it is desirable for Europe to balance the disparity of power between the US and Europe, but it would be most irresponsible and inconsiderate for Europe to choose a path leading to multipolarism and confrontation with the US, instead of co-operation.
The defeat and collapse of state communism and of the Soviet Union left the United States as the sole world superpower. As America's leadership of the West and the "New World Order" or "Pax Americana" became more obvious, a side effect was that the US also became a target for various forms of dissatisfaction, jealousy and resistance to the existing status quo. This has had an effect on transatlantic relations. The Atlantic seems to be wider than it has been for a long time, and the mantra that America and Europe share the same values, often repeated on both sides of the ocean, often sounds rather hollow.
There seemed to be a temporary break in the vicious cycle on 12 September 2001, when the French newspaper Le Monde went into mourning on its front page and declared: "We are all Americans," but the groundswell of sympathy soon turned into a backlash of anti-Americanism. Even before September 11 and the war in Iraq, the Bush administration trampled on European sensitivities by rejecting the Kyoto protocol and the war crimes tribunal in the Hague, and by insisting on missile defense and steel quotas. For many Europeans, these were clear evidence that the US exercised double standards in its foreign policy.
The newly popular anti-Americanism in Europe has a certain intellectual tradition, extending from Oswald Spengler through Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre to the present-day critics of the US. Although very different in the articulation of their accusations against the US, they all share a negative attitude towards America: for them the United States represents a civilization "without culture," "materialistic" and "artificial," technologically complex, but at the same time "soulless." Another, and in the long run perhaps even more relevant source of anti-Americanism, has been that of the geopolitical traditions - first and foremost those of Germany and Russia, including different variations on the Heartland theory of Sir Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer's Geopolitik, and the Eurasianist anti-Atlanticism of Russian geopolitics throughout imperial, Soviet and contemporary times.[1]
Anti-Americanism is not merely criticism of particular policies or of a particular US president. It has become a sort of radical view that the USA is both wrong in principle and wrong in practice. It has become a generic, overt attack on America and on American standards, values and approaches, everywhere and in everything. It seems that people get obsessed about the United States for various reasons but first and foremost because of its immense wealth and power. It has became fashionable to be anti-American and the anti-American rhetoric has almost become a parody of the postmodern world: a radical youth of today can wear jeans and Nike's sneakers and drink Coca Cola, while wearing a Che Guevara T-shirt and preaching against the US and "globalization." Yet it is exactly this culture of radicalism that is truly global in nature: the same symbols are displayed and the same slogans cried out in France, Germany, Palestine, India, Indonesia or Brazil. Everywhere, the accusations against the US are essentially the same: accusations regarding imperialism and capitalism, hegemonic influence, arrogance, disregard of supposed local interests or sensitivities.[2]
In a recent discussion on the topic, a colleague of mine made the following conclusion about the situation, stating that "while in the 19th and early 20th centuries the Europeans could always blame the Jews and their greed for gold, today we can always blame the Americans and believe that all conflicts are just about oil." The scenery of riots and violent protests against "globalization," "capitalism" and "American imperialism" connected with almost all recent international summits recalls the year 1968 and the wave of radicalism and terrorism in the 60s and 70s. The elements for such a "cultural conflict" seem to be surprisingly similar: a young generation willing to revise the prevalent values of the society; an unpopular war receiving the attention of the world's media; frustration about an unpredictable world, and alienation from the guiding structures of an increasingly global economy and politics.
One regularly expressed accusation is that the US is basically unilateral in its approach to foreign policy, preferring bilateral agreements over multilateral ones. Although at first glance these accusations may seem to be based on Europe's own true desires for multilateralism, in fact, this is not the case. The profound issue lays in the question of "legitimacy." A significant part of anti-American rhetoric is aimed at undermining the "legitimacy" of the hegemonic position of the US. As Robert Kagan has pointed out in his landmark book Paradise and Power, the European assaults on the legitimacy of American actions and American power "may be an effective if unconventional way of constraining and controlling the American superpower."[3] He tracks these European ambitions to Europe's "strategy of weakness." In Mr. Kagan's words, the fundamental difference between the US and Europe is highlighted by their different approaches to a perceived threat. Due to Europe's military weakness, Europe has to rely on diplomacy and "soft-power" tools like economic influence. The consequence of this is that Europe has a greater tolerance for today's threats and at times a greater risk for denial, as Mr. Kagan quite vividly shows. On the other hand the US has the power and the capacity to try to "fix" these problems. These differences are grounded in a practical reality that is another consequence of the disparity of power and the structure of the present international order.
In the past, anti-Western, anti-British, and anti-American currents in continental European thought stemmed from the geopolitical theories of the 19th century. In his writings, the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder advocated the idea that a continental Heartland power would constitute the main threat to Western coastal and insular powers. Thus, the potential threats were Russian and German imperialism, which also challenged "Western values" based on liberty and the rule of law with their traditions of autocracy and despotism.[4] The responses by German and Russian geopoliticians were a direct confirmation of Mackinder's warnings, manifested in the Russo-British "Great Game" over Eurasia as well as in both the world wars. The torch of Western liberty was formally passed over the Atlantic on 21 February 1947, when Britain told the US that it would give up the protection of Greece and Turkey within 38 days, and when consequently, the US assumed this duty on 22 May 1947. This also meant the shifting of Western leadership from Britain to the US.[5]
Throughout the Cold War, the world was still essentially dominated by a geopolitical rivalry, although now more evidently between two diametrically opposed ideological blocks. US attention was still tied to territorial aspects, especially along the Iron Curtain running across Europe. The US was the source of Western regional power in Europe. When the Cold War ended and the Soviet empire collapsed, the world came under the global hegemony of the US. At the same time, the European front became secondary in the global sense, when US attention gradually shifted to the Asia-Pacific region on one hand, and to the Middle East and Central Asia on the other. The most rapidly expanding markets of consumption as well as production are in the Asia-Pacific, while the essential new energy resources coincide with supposed future "instability" (i.e. geopolitical rivalry over the spheres of interest) in the "Muslim Crescent".
This coincides with the general trend, which has been for the dynamic of civilization to move westwards, as has been marvelously studied by the historian Felipe Fernández-Armesto in Millennium.[6] After Europe lost its dynamic edge at the end of the world wars, it was first shifted to the East Coast of the USA, while at the end of the Cold War this dynamic of both economical and innovative initiative had further shifted to California (home to the Silicon Valley) and East Asia (home to the supposed next economic motor of the world). European intellectuals quite correctly observed that with the liberation of Eastern Europe in 1989-1992, Europe had been given a new chance to take over the initiative, but in many senses, Europe was simply unprepared to "seize the day." It took 14 years for the EU to finally realize the first enlargement of its club to include former socialist countries (with the exception of East Germany), and the ambitious Lisbon Declaration, which promised to make the EU "the most competitive knowledge-based society of the world" by 2010, has failed in practically all of its mid-term goals.
It cannot be argued, however, that the US approach to the world is essentially different from Europe's in the sense that the US has a global approach while Europe has a regional one. Europe is deeply interested in global affairs, and does not seem to be prepared to accept the role of a regional player only. On the other hand, Europe, although an economic superpower, lacks the muscle in military and consequently to some extent the political muscle to influence the rest of the world. Besides, Europe has not succeeded very well in the regional role either, as its conduct in conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Cyprus imbroglio, as well as the failures of political policy in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia, demonstrate. It seems that it is not so much the role of the US that is the core problem, but the role of Europe.
Indeed, the catastrophes of Bosnia and Kosovo alarmed the Europeans to slowly start a process of meeting the needs of the security responsibilities in their home continent and the chance that America might not be there forever. Vested in the efforts to form "autonomous European security policy", especially advocated by France and manifested with the Artémis operation in the Congolese "Heart of Darkness", there is a genuine and sincere process of constructing a credible European defence. The question is whether this process can speed up to meet the process of shifting American attention. It is also important to which extent the Western European reduction in defence capacity (though with simultaneous investment in rapid reaction forces to meet the "new threats" far away from the traditional European fronts, as favored by Britain) will be compensated by better employment of the more traditional defence concepts on Europe's eastern flank, where the strong defence of Finland and Turkey might need to be completed with strengthening Polish and Romanian defence.
Besides Europe, the current American supremacy is opposed by the other would-be hegemonic powers of Eurasia: especially Russia, China, India and Iran, all four of which share traditions and geopolitical ideas with imperial ambitions. All of them share a negative attitude towards Western hegemony, towards the advocacy of "Western forms" of democracy, human rights and the market economy, and all of them explicitly advocate "a multipolar world order" in their global strategies. Among them, China is gaining strength with the fastest speed, while Russia, too, still possesses very strong political influence worldwide.
In the long run, the US core interest is related to the question of whether or not it is capable of maintaining its supremacy and a positive hegemony, Pax Americana, in world politics, or whether it will have to give in to a multipolar system, where the world will be divided into spheres of interest between the emerging rival hegemonies. Such a world would probably resemble Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" much more than the present world.[7] This is also a crucial question for Europe's destiny, because ultimately it is Europe that will have to decide whether it will share the Western hegemony with the US, or break it, pushing the world towards a multipolar system.
There are reasons to believe, though, that if Europe chooses the multipolar system, it will be on the losing side. Why is this so? First, the internal tensions within Europe can barely compete with Iran and India, and much less so with the highly centralized poles of the US, Russia and China. An alarming piece of evidence suggesting this is the nature of European diplomacy, which continues to be dominated by ad hoc reactive policies instead of proactive or long-term strategic unity. Secondly, Europe seems to lack continuity in its foreign policy. The US has been often criticized for short-sightedness in its foreign policy, resulting from the four-year cycle in presidential elections. In fact, the European cycle is far shorter, because the Union chairmanship rotates on a half year basis, in the addition to all the national elections in the member states. Thirdly, in a crisis situation Europe still lacks military muscle and firm command, as witnessed in the recent Balkan wars.
These weaknesses of Europe do not, of course, predestine Europe's fate forever, since there has in fact been movement towards solutions in all the identified problem areas. However, Europe is still clearly unprepared to drive the world towards a multipolar system. For the time being, tt is in Europe's best interest to contribute to a US-led world order, however "unipolar" it may be. In the long run it may be in Europe's interest to seek more influence and thereby equality with the US, but as the US generally has only a positive attitude towards such strengthening of Europe's position (i.e. European ability to stand for itself), such emancipation of Europe as an equal player to the US should not be performed through a confrontation with the US.
The "West," as a power bloc, has moved further west and it seems that the "West" is today essentially a synonym for the US and its current supporters. This has given rise to a new possibility for continental Europe to assume an opposing role. Some Europeans indeed have shown willingness to adopt such a role, but solemn will is not enough: The Europeans lack the means to challenge the US in political influence, economic power or military might in the foreseeable future.
Turning against America would leave Europe without strategic US protection in the event that Europe should have need of it again. Russia may not be a serious threat to Europe today, except indirectly, but, to its neighbors, especially in the Caucasus region, Russia still poses a threat. Indirectly, Russia has been trying to stop the advance of NATO and the EU in its "backyard," and there are many signals that Russia would try once again to expand its sphere of influence as soon as it has gained back its previous strength. Besides the southern front in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, the threat may reappear also on the Western front, concerning especially those states which have remained outside the Atlantic structures, i.e. Finland, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and the South Caucasus. However, in the event that NATO loses significance due to disputes, or degenerates into a mere discussion forum, the threat may again encompass all the countries between "the Old Europe" and Russia, from Finland to Turkey.
Continued anti-Americanism could also result in the US disengaging from the rest of the world, in a neo-isolationistic way, which could lead to dangerous, even catastrophic consequences. Anti-Americanism is deeply corrosive to a relationship that is critically important for the overall security of the world. If America is criticized in an irrational and emotional way, the outcome will be a US disengagement from the transatlantic pact and Europe's marginalization in global politics. In the long run, US isolationism could be more dangerous to everybody than American involvement or interventionism.
One way to avoid the most devastating effects of such a development to European security, while trying to answer the basic reasons behind the anti-American mood, might be a strategy of truly reforming European conceptions of security cooperation and revision of the role of the NATO. NATO actually ceased to be "North Atlantic" a long time ago. Meanwhile, the US interests increasingly lie outside of the northeastern coasts of the Atlantic. Rival blocks which cannot be expected to accept American hegemony, will most probably emerge under the leadership of China and Russia, while "new threats" of instability will be concentrated in the crescent from North Africa through the Middle East to South Asia.[8]
This would call for a three-pillar security structure for the support of a Western supremacy, extended from a Pax Americana to a Pax Occidentalis. The American pillar would be Pan-American, consisting of the US, Canada and Latin America. The Western Eurasian pillar would essentially consist of a European common security policy (based on NATO), with an increasing emphasis on the eastern and Mediterranean flanks of Europe - highlighting the role played by countries such as Spain, Turkey, Romania, Poland and Finland. The Pacific pillar would balance the growing Chinese power in the Pacific rimlands of eastern and southeastern Asia, from Japan to Thailand, Indonesia and Australia. Furthermore, the US would probably need to develop a southern dimension of this global security structure, linking Turkey and Europe, through Muslim allies (like Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Pakistan) with India and the southeastern Asia. Obviously, a fundamental reform in Iran would be about the best thing that could happen for a stable Pax to become a reality.
Many may argue that such a global security framework might seriously alarm the obvious rivals, Russia and China. However, the fundamental difference between such a unipolar Western hegemony with some elements of genuine multipolarism is that in the former system the Western economic, political and military supremacy efficiently contains aggressive efforts by rivals to disrupt the order, while in a genuinely multipolar system there would be an endless power struggle between the poles, plaguing all the frontier zones, "fault lines" and the edges of the spheres of interest with continuous instability, externally fed subversion and terrorism.
As with any problem, the finding of a solution starts with the recognition that there is a problem. Europe and the US have been drifting apart since the Cold war was won. It took a while for both continents to recognize this. The wars in the Balkans, the war in Afghanistan and finally the war in Iraq have shown this clearly.
The transatlantic drift seems to cause more trouble in Europe than in the US. It is a problem for Europe if the US no longer considers it necessary to listen to what Europe has to say. America is acting globally, and it may be nowadays more interested in China, Russia or Pakistan than in some issues that are important for Western Europeans. In conclusion, it is desirable for Europe to balance the disparity of power between the US and Europe, but it would be most irresponsible and inconsiderate for Europe to choose a path leading to multipolarism and confrontation with the US, instead of co-operation.
In fact, the bilateral relations with the US of such European statesmen as Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Tony Blair have shown that Europeans can actually influence America. For the first time, Finland has also explicated the necessity of maintaining a friendly and effective transatlantic relationship in the government program of Matti Vanhanen's government. Other European governments have been moving in the same direction. Moderate statesmen like Fogh Rasmussen and Blair can greatly contribute to improving the transatlantic relations, but in the long run, the model they have shown in bilateral relations should be extended to the common European foreign and security policy, since only with a united voice can Europe be strong and be heard and respected in the way it actually wants.
Summa summarum, what should be done now is the following:
1) Recognize that there is a drift.
2) Recognize that Europe would not be what
it is without the American contribution.
3) Actively challenge anti-American stands;
remind the audience of the cultural and ideological roots that America stands
for, so that values such as liberty are not considered empty slogans in Europe,
and such absurd statements as "America has no culture" are not taken
as seriously.
4) Stop to look at the whole picture from a
distance in order to form a consistent, balanced and objective view of the
world, with some recognition of the proportions.
When Sir Winston Churchill had to resign due to his weakened health in 1955, he gave his ministers two pieces of advice: "Man is spirit," and "Never be separated from the Americans."[9] This is good advice, indeed.
* * *
* Mr. Jokinen (christian.jokinen @ utu.fi), Master of Science, is a researcher within the Research Unit for Conflicts and Terrorism at the University of Turku, Finland. His colleague, Mr. Anssi Kullberg, Master of Science, has contributed to the article.
[1] Anssi Kullberg: Kaukasia geopoliittisen toiminnan näyttämönä. Kaukasian alueen geopoliittista tarkastelua läntisten, venäläisten, turkkilaisten ja iranilaisten intressien ristipaineessa. University of Jyväskylä, 17 Jan. 2003, p. 33-41, 60-61, 155-160, 174-195.
[2] Jean-François Revel: La obsesión antiamericana: Dinámica, causas e incongruencias. Barcelona, Tendencias, 2003. See also Samuel Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996, p. 56-59.
[3] Robert Kagan: Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. London, Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 27-42, 113-121.
[4]Sir Halford Mackinder: The Geographical Pivot of History, Geographical Journal, 23, 1904; Geoffrey Sloan: Sir Halford Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now, in Colin S. Gray & Geoffrey Sloan (eds.): Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy. Frank Cass Publishers, Chippenham, 1999.
[5] Antero Leitzinger: Lännen lyhyt historia, 4/5, Vapaasana.net, 13 Oct. 2003.
[6] Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Millennium. Toinen vuosituhat. WSOY, Porvoo 1996, see especially p. 771-803, 864-865.
[7] Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations, 1996.
[8] Pekka Visuri: Maailmanpolitiikan muutos: Arvio syksyn 2001 terrori-iskujen vaikutuksista. EVA, Vantaa, 2002, p. 109-113.
[9] Martin Gilbert: Winston S. Churchill, Bungway, London, 1988.