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The Eurasian Politician - July 2004
Christian Jokinen, 13 July 2004: christianjokinen @ yahoo.com
One hundred years ago, on June 16, 1904, the day was beautiful and the summer's gentle sun was shining to the central Senate Square of Helsinki. It was exactly eleven o'clock when the Russian plenipotentiary ruler of Finland, General-Governor Nikolai Bobrikov, arrived at the main entrance of the House of the Senate. He sent away his party to fulfil their own duties, and stepped alone into the half-dusky hallway. The general-governor was dressed in military overcoat and he had a briefcase with him. With slow steps, he started ascending the Senate stairway, and the echo of his walking-stick could be heard around the quiet stairway.
Eugen Schauman, Junior Chief Accountant of the Supreme Board of Education and son of an esteemed Swedish-speaking Finnish family of civil servants, had been waiting for the general-governor's arrival at the window of upstairs, and now headed to descend the stairs, to meet the general-governor. At the same moment when Bobrikov stepped to the stone floor of the middle stair terrace and turned left towards the assembly hall of the Economic Division, he met his assassin. No word was exchanged. Schauman shot three bullets into Bobrikov, with less than a second between them. After Bobrikov had been lethally wounded, Schauman turned the pistol to his chest and shot twice.
Very soon, a group of policemen rushed over the square from the police station to the House of the Senate. The Senate Square was quickly filling up with curious crowds of Helsinki inhabitants. At first, a rumor told that a senator had been shot. Various rumors were distributed and the voices of increasing crowds formed a strange background noise. Then a journalist rushed there, shouting to the crowd: "Bobrikov has been shot!" A lady who was present, fainted. So describes the events of that day the author of Schauman's biography, Bernhard Estlander.
Most of the Finns received the news of Bobrikov's assassination with a strong mixture of defiant joy and anxious fear. At the time, Finland was an autonomous grand-duchy under the Russian Empire, which had annexed Finland in 1809 after a war against the Swedish Kingdom, in which Finland constituted a part before that. Bobrikov was a hated tyrant - even to those who were otherwise prepared to be loyal to the tsar, like the Schauman family. Towards the end of the 19th century, the might of the Russian Empire was trembling down, and instead of reforms the empire resorted to increased oppression against "elements threatening Russia's imperial unity". In Finland, Bobrikov had become symbol of everything that was evil and repressive in the empire. So, most people welcomed his death. However, at the same time most of the ordinary people felt deep fear for what kind of fierce revenge the empire would now launch against the nation. Killing the tsar's direct representative was an act of extreme impunity, and it was feared that Russia would inevitably retaliate with hardest possible measures.
The period of 1899-1905 is known in the history of Finland as the I Period of Oppression. The international context of the Period of Oppression was Russian competition with other great powers, an extension of the so-called "Great Game" from Central Asia to the Turkish Straits, Persia, Manchuria and the European Front. In 1904 Russia was humiliated by Japan in the struggle for domination over Manchuria. That inspired a Finnish song of the time, where the Russian Empire appears pompous but rotten and miserable, while Japan is seen as youthful and persistent. (The repeated refrain has been left out of the translation as it would be impossible to translate):
The year one-nine-zero-four [1904],
the Japanese kicked Russki Nick's ass [Tsar Nicholas II].
When the cherries were just blooming in Japan,
the Toko boy was blocking the straits with his ships.
When Japan sailed with its ships to [Port]
Arthur,
they blocked the onion and cabbage road for
Russkies.
Bobrikoff is taking up collection around the
land,
everything's collected, whatever can be taken.
Toko boy is jumping and busy on his ships,
Makaroff [the Russian admiral], on his own, shot a
bit off.
But Toko boy doesn't care, he attacks,
soon lies Makaroff dead at the sea bottom.
When the Japanese sunk his Varyag [the flagship],
it's told that even cabbies were crying in [St.]
Petersburg.
A new fashion was imported to Finland, too, from Japan:
Here, the Finnish bullet hit Bobrikoff!
Like in the final highlight of the song the Finns were conscious that their own resistance was connected with other persistent obstacles to Russian expansionism as far away as in Manchuria and Japan, also the Russians saw Finland in the context of a wider Russian "geopolitical situation". Up to Tsar Nicholas II, the Russian elite was convinced that only a strongly unified Russia could thwart off the other great powers, which were thought to penetrate the Russian sphere of dominion through the margins of the empire, and also, only national unity would enable Russia to further expand its empire, which process had been halted by resistance at all directions.
The aspirations of the empire called for the policy of Russification, and all separatist tendencies of the non-Russian subjects of the empire had to be crushed in the beginning, using both political and cultural means. Ethnic disunity was a real problem for the Russian Empire, because majority of the empire's 130 million inhabitants were non-Russian, but yet the empire was never genuinely and sincerely tolerant and multinational, like for example the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires. Most of the non-Russian subject nations constantly had to fear for their existence, as warned by genocide policies in Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia throughout the 19th century, as well as pogroms, massacres and deportations throughout the empire. Resistance campaigns and rebellions were regular, and Russia usually responded with excessive violence and destruction.
Tsar Nicholas II consciously adopted the policy of Russification, in order to Russify the populations of other nationality. Besides of the supposedly increased unity, Russification was hoped to redirect attention away from the worsening social problems of the empire, which the Russian government considered too difficult to solve.
However, compared with many other subjected nations, Finland was spared of the policy of Russification for an exceptionally long time, and it was the last to be targeted, only after Poland, the Baltic countries and the Caucasus had already experienced the launch of oppression campaigns. On the other hand, in Finland active resistance had been lesser than in the other regions. It was and it is still subject to disputes between the "Activists" (supporters of active resistance) and "Men of Compliance" (those who preferred yielding reforms by pleasing the tsar) as well as later between the different schools of Finnish historians, whether calm in Finland was a result of the wide autonomy (exceptional in the Russian circumstances), or whether the moderation of Russian policy was a result of the compliance of the Finnish subjects.
In today's rhetoric, the pro-independence Activists would probably be called "radical separatists", "rebels" or "terrorists", while the compliance-minded would be called "moderates". However, unlike claimed by some, the Activists were Finnish nationalist patriots and had nothing to do with the nihilist and anarchist terrorists of Russia in the same period.
General-Governor Bobrikov had become a symbol of the policy of oppression in the eyes of the contemporaries, and so he easily made it the top of the black list of the Activists. Several plots to assassinate the general-governor were simultaneously planned in various Activist circles. The motives for murdering Bobrikov included certain characteristics of terrorism: revenge and catching attention.
A primary motivation was to lay revenge for the policy of oppression upon its primary executor, the general-governor. The Activists as well as moderate patriots known as the "Men of Legality" considered the policy of oppression as illegal, besides of being ethically wrong. It violated the treaties limiting the sovereign rights of the tsar in regard to the autonomous grand-duchy. The consensus that Bobrikov was the very man who was guilty to the illegal and anti-constitutional violation of Finland's autonomous rights, was overwhelming in the society. In addition to revenge, it was hoped that the assassination of the general-governor would force the officials and the tsar to pay attention on the Finnish affairs in the hope that the tsar would cancel the illegal (from the Finnish point of view) legislation violating the Finnish autonomy.
There prevailed a surprising and sincere belief that the monarch himself was good, but merely misinformed by evil advisors and vassals like Bobrikov. This idea, which may have been naïve hopeful thinking, however separated the Activists and other conservative resistance from the radical movements such as the nihilists, who saw the monarchy per se as the source of the problems. The activists preferred to seek inspiration in the Antiquity, where the justification - both ethical and legal - for tyrannicide was well embedded in the ancient Greek heritage. According to the Greek tradition, it was "legal" to overthrow or eliminate a cruel and worthless tyrant. The Finnish Activists knew well a modern classic of tyrannicide - the story of the Swiss national hero Wilhelm Tell, immortalized by Friedrich Schiller, whose work had recently been translated into Finnish by the famous poet Eino Leino. Also in Schiller's "Wilhelm Tell", the distinction is made between the justified tyrannicide, which was to protect Tell's family, nation and faith, and the condemned assassination of Emperor Albrecht by nihilists.
However consciously the Activists distinguished their righteous motivations from the "senseless and barbaric" terrorism of nihilists and anarchists, they were influenced by the latter on the tactical level. Several plots against Bobrikov contained tactical similarities with Russian revolutionaries, including a certain amateurish flavor. A sea captain was waiting for the general-governor on Tähtitorninmäki (Observatory Hill) with a bomb; a student was lurking for him with a pistol in Kaivopuisto (a large park in Helsinki), and so on.
Eugen Schauman's plan was exceptional in many senses. He was in contact with many Activists, but from the beginning, he was consciously acting alone, in order not to draw others to troubles with him. Although he once or twice hinted at some secret plan to some of his friends, he refused to participate in a wider conspiracy. According to the historian Seppo Zetterberg, Schauman was confident that Bobrikov's death would slow down the process of Russification. Besides, Schauman reasoned, although the general-governor's murder would fail to stop the policy of oppression, it would at least be a shocking reminder of the dissatisfaction of the Finns, which the tsar would have to take into consideration.
Schauman had decided that he would also take his own life at the attempt to kill Bobrikov, regardless of whether the assassination would succeed or fail. He thought that by expiate his crime with his own life he would make people better accept his deed. Besides, he wrote a letter to the tsar himself, apologizing for what he was about to do, and asking the tsar to find out himself, what was happening in Finland, the Baltic countries, and Poland. Again, a good sign of how the Finnish Activists were fully conscious of the international dimensions of their resistance. The letter was found in his pocket, and it also assured that Schauman had acted alone, and took all responsibility of the act.
Indeed, Schauman succeeded probably better than he ever hoped himself, in manipulating the Finnish general opinion. After the immediate controversy between joy and fear at the Senate Square, he was soon to be celebrated as a national hero among the Finnish population. Schauman also succeeded in raising international attention. While the Russian media and Russian officials harshly overreacted with thirst for blood and revenge, the Western media as well as newspapers as far as in Turkey and South America paid lots of attention on Bobrikov's assassination, and they were predominantly positive and sympathetic to Schauman.
Schauman's deed also influenced intellectuals and artists world-wide. For example, the Irish writer James Joyce mentions Bobrikov's murder in his novel "Ulysses". In Finland, the intellectuals were overwhelmingly unanimous in considering Schauman as a national hero. Bobrikov's murder inspired Eino Leino and the famous composer Jean Sibelius to produce the song "Ristilukki" (Cross Spider), which tells about an evil cross spider (a huge spider species), which is twisting its webs in the night and lurking for prey, killing those who are flying freely, until a righteous and courageous soul sacrifices himself by going into the spider's web. At the end of the song the words go:
The spider is always twisting its webs,
but one soul will not give up.
That soul will go free throughout the times,
it will be preserved for the heroes to inherit.
And it will bring them fame and strength,
but never shall it give them peace and rest.
That's a hero, who, to the death,
can fight against the webs of the spider.
As that's how they all will fall.
The evil spider, of course, was Bobrikov, and the webs symbolize the intrigues as well as the Russian system based on the use of secret police lurking for those who spoke or acted too freely. And the soul of the hero, Schauman, is told to inspire future generations of heroes to come.
Schauman was almost unanimously seen as a martyr killed in fighting the enemy - which is understandable, as his suicide was a difficult ethical question for the often devotedly Protestant Activists. Only much later, when Finland had been independent for decades, did anyone pay attention on issues like for example Schauman's unfortunate love affair that was later seen as part of his motivation, in later Finnish self-critical revisionism on the Activists.
It could be asked, however, whether it would have made any difference for better if Schauman would have surrendered to be punished, or if he would have tried to escape. Most probably in both cases the result would have been for worse: There would have been a massive persecution campaign targeting his friends, contacts and relatives, there would have been fabricated "confessions" of conspiracy. In case of flight, his reputation would have been seriously damaged in the eyes of his countrymen, as happened with the later assassin, Lennart Hohenthal, who shot the Finnish pro-tsarist official, Procurator Eliel Soisalon-Soininen, the next year in 1905. Hohenthal's crime was surely inspired by Schauman, and the Activists in general had experienced that direct action yielded more benefits than compliance even if it meant violence. However, in the case of Soisalon-Soininen's assassination, the Finnish audience condemned the act, primarily because Soisalon-Soininen was a Finn, and not clearly a symbol of the Russian oppression. Hohenthal's flight seemed to confirm that he was just a murderer and not a national hero and martyr like Schauman.
In the case of Schauman, everything was different. His father, Waldemar Schauman, when returning to Helsinki, met thousands of people at the railway station of Helsinki, greeting him as the father of a hero. The crowds started singing what was to become the Finnish national anthem, and the home of the Schauman family in Katajanokka had been filled with flowers coming from unknown people.
Shooting Bobrikov was not an act of terrorism in the actual meaning of the word, because although the act was politically motivated violence, it did not target innocent civilians, but the very representative of the hated tyranny. The assassination of Bobrikov rather belonged to another tradition of political violence, the so-called tyrannicide. Schauman's contemporaries connected Schauman's crime immediately with Wilhelm Tell, which was, of course a match consciously advocated by intellectuals like Eino Leino, who was not just poet but a prominent journalist, too.
Bobrikov's murder also lacked the most significant characteristic of terrorism: it did not aim at sowing fear among civilian population. It did not target Russians in general, but a certain individual, who was widely considered as the perpetrator of the opposed oppression. Schauman's letter to the tsar provided a clear explanation of his crime, as well as connected it with the general concern towards the policies of the Russian Empire against the minorities. Schauman's sacrifice made people generally view his act as something righteous and respectable. He was never considered as an ordinary criminal or terrorist, but a national hero.
In our days, it is hard to avoid comparing Bobrikov's murder with the recent killing of the Chechen puppet president Ahmed Kadyrov by a bomb by Chechen activists in the Victory Day parade of the Russians. Also Kadyrov was a hated tyrant, and removing him could be seen as a heroic tyrannicide by Chechens who lived under the harsh oppression and daily terror of his regime that was considered illegitimate by the local population. Like Bobrikov, Kadyrov was a representative of the foreign occupation and oppression that the freedom-minded resistance opposed. Like Bobrikov, also Kadyrov had become a symbol of the terror, disappearing of people, kidnappings, and of a web of intrigues and violence.
However, the bomb that killed Kadyrov, also killed many others, some of them innocent civilians - something Schauman was careful to avoid. For Schauman, it was a special concern that innocent people would not suffer, and when planning Bobrikov's assassination, Schauman did his best to undermine any chances for the oppressive regime to use his crime to justify general persecution and hunt for conspirators.
The reaction of Tsar Nicholas II to Bobrikov's murder was indifferent. The day after the murder, he wrote to his diary:
"In the morning I got to know, to my sorrow, that Bobrikov died to his wounds at one o'clock in the night. The weather was warm. After the presentation I received 86 officers of the Nikolayev General Staff Academy in the halls, and after the breakfast, the Spanish emissary. Uncle Vladimir drank tea with us. I read a lot. I bicycled, and I shot two ravens, one yesterday. We ate dinner at the terrace. In the evening it was cooler."
Unlike the indifferent tsar, the Russian publicity - officials as well as the state-controlled media - adopted a similar kind of bloodthirsty attitude to Bobrikov's murder and the Finnish Activist activities, as it takes today to Kadyrov's murder and other acts of the Chechen activists. They saw conspiracies behind everything, and demanded immediate retaliation and collective punishment against the Finns, total abolition of Finland's autonomy, deportation of Finnish intellectuals to Siberia, and so on. The Russian regime refused to accept the existence of a causal relationship between the policy of oppression and the resistance actions.
In practice, the examples of both Finland in the early 20th century and Chechnya of the early 21st century show that imposing even harsher oppression has not helped to subdue resistance. As long as there are able men (and women), they continue to "fight against the webs of the spider", and fall in that way. Finland's example actually shows that the policy of oppression drove even a previously relatively calm and passive part of the empire to the path leading to uncompromising separatism, and eventually to independence.
* * *
Christian Jokinen, both a Finn and a German, is a researcher of the Research Unit for Conflicts and Terrorism at the University of Turku. A shorter version of the article was published in Finnish in several Finnish newspapers on June 11, 2004, before the centennial anniversary of Bobrikov's assassination. The same theme is continued in Part II: The Case of Claus von Stauffenberg.
The article was translated from Finnish by Anssi Kullberg.