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The Eurasian Politician - April 2003

Turkey's Self-Emasculation

by Antero Leitzinger, April 10, 2003

Under the new Islamist government, Turkey.s foreign policy has been a complete disaster, unrivalled in the country.s long and proud history. Few other countries in the world have ever managed to depart from their traditional foreign policies so rapidly while voluntarily missing so obvious chances for achieving great victories. Instead of participating in the liberation of Iraq, to which Turkey was invited by the USA, its closest ally, Turkey prostrated to France - to the very same country that just recently condemned Turkey for the Armenian genocide, and opposed NATO guarantees for Turkey.s security. Instead of having the Turkish Army parading in Kirkuk as the protector of Iraqi Turks and Kurds, Turkey not only choose to side with the Arab Socialist Baath Party dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, but even went on expressing publicly concerns on Kirkuk.s security on April 10th, the very day its inhabitants were celebrating their liberation by Kurdish freedom-fighters.

Turkey.s disastrous choices and perverted image campaign in order to appeal to traditionally anti-Turkish left-wing peace activists and Arabic radicals, can no more be explained by the lack of experience of its new government, leading AK Party, and foreign minister Abdullah Gül. The only rational explanation must lie in Turkey.s political self-emasculation. Apparently, it will present its application for EU membership as a political eunuch for Europe - as a harmless country without real military capabilities (not even a show of force beyond Cyprus, for over 80 years), and without an independent agenda to integrate its Kurdish minority. Instead of having a grateful Kurdish protectorate, or a friendly Iraqi government as its south-eastern neighbour, Turkey will be bordered by independent-minded Kurds who will have a leading role in shaping the foreign policy of Free Iraq.

The consequences of Turkish total failure in spring 2003 will be studied and regretted by scholars of military strategy and diplomacy for decades to come. The frustration felt in the Turkish Army and intelligence services, will boil for a long time. When the media will realize, that Turkey lost a unique chance to secure a role in forming future Iraqi policy, and to present its military force as the guarantor of peace and prosperity for the whole Kurdish people, added with the realization of being betrayed by the French and the disappointment of being left outside the EU anyway, the popularity of the current AK Party administration will fall to low bottom. How much humiliation can a government take? Since the party has a majority in the parliament, a crisis of Turkish democracy will be inevitable. A military coup would not be the worst possible result.

Just when Turkey was on the brink of becoming the leading country of the region, and a trusted pillar of the Free World, Turkish politicians and journalists failed to follow the example of Kemal Atatürk, who had led his country with convincing strength and vision. Instead of winning the top prize in the three weeks. war, Turkey became the worst casualty of the whole process, irresponsibly degenerating into a third-class power, and a destabilizing factor in the Middle East. The contrast can not be exaggerated. Consequences will be felt also in the Caucasus and Cyprus, where Turkey lost critical credibility and authority.

Imagine the Turkish Army having returned from a glorious march through Mosul and Kirkuk to Baghdad. There would have been many military decorations and promotions, valuable experience, some martyrs to be commemorated, and plenty of deserved self-assurance. The Turkish people as a whole would have felt a new sense of unity and pride. Turkey as the main Muslim member of the international coalition would have been remembered and loved in the USA, in Britain, and in several other courageous EU member states. The economy would have gained both through immediate US aid and Iraqi contracts. The Greek, Armenians, Syrians, and Iranians, would have respected Turkish concerns and taken Turkey.s requests into account.

But this all did not materialize. The sole responsibility lies on the Turkish government, and all attempts to make any late recovery by attempts to bully the Kurds, to occupy Northern Iraq, or to act as an interested party to the reconstruction of Iraq, are vain, will be ridiculed, and only serve to emphasize Turkish confusion. It is sad, but the heavy work of generations of skilled Turkish diplomats, analysts, public relations officers, and private friends of Turkey, was wasted in a few weeks. Honour is hard to earn, shame even harder to loose.

Some years ago, foreign policy analysts wondered, "Who lost Russia", but today, the question is, "How did Turkey loose itself?"

Antero Leitzinger


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