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The Eurasian Politician - November 2002
By Roman Khalilov (Feb. 2002)
Your definition of a problem can determine how you solve it. There has not been a lack of definitions, however, for the present conflict in Chechnya. Depending on political convenience they have varied from "a restoration of the constitutional order and territorial integrity" of the Russian Federation to a "campaign against international terrorism." However, the present war in Chechnya is better understood as the continuation of a centuries-long Russian-Chechen conflict which has never been truly resolved.
The underlying cause of the conflict is Russia’s refusal to accept Chechnya’s demands for independence. Different excuses have been made to justify this refusal at different times, but the core problem has remained unchanged - Chechnya demands statehood and Russia refuses. A hope, however slim, emerged with President Putin's statement on 18 June 2001 at a press-conference in the Kremplin. Although offering the usual justifications for the Russian military campaign, Putin stated that "today the question of Chechnya's dependence on, or independence from, Russia is of absolutely no fundamental importance.'' Putin argued that "What is of fundamental importance to us is just one issue. We will not allow this territory to be used any longer as a bridgehead for an attack on Russia. We will not allow it!"*
It follows, according to the Russian President, that the only issue of fundamental importance to Russia is security. If that is so, the conflict can be resolved by 1) eliminating alleged threats to Russia's security, and by 2) transforming Chechnya into a genuinely peaceful and democratic state, acceptable to the international community. The approach advocated in this paper is bold and will guarantee criticism from all sides, but it is far from impossible and may turn out to be the only way to resolve the poblem, as opposed to simply changing the status of the conflict.
Dealing with seccessionist conflicts - at a time when the international community finds itself more comfortable with the existing political map - suggests the option of accomodating the seccessionist entities within different formulas of the territorial integrity of the metropolitan states. These formulas vary on the degree of autonomy granted to the secessionist entity by the metropolitan state.
The success of such formulas largely depends on the willingness of the opposing groups to coexist and eventually rebuild political, economic and social relations within the framework of one state. However, where the conflict has already escalated to the level of full-scale war, the willingness of the opposing sides to coexist is largely eliminated. Thus the more intense and violent the conflict gets, the greater is the polarization of the opposing sides and the fewer the chances for reconciliation.
In the present case, two key factors indicate that no formula of accommodation of Chechnya within the Russian Federation is likely to succeed. First, the fact that Chechnya has lost an estimated 20 % of its population in the course of the last two wars - during less than eight years - virtually eliminates whatever willingness there might have been to remain a part of Russia, since almost every Chechen family has lost at least one of its members.
Second, communal integration also depends on the individual characteristics of the communities in question. While there is no known formula to calculate a community's ability to integrate with others, the number of intercommunal marriages is arguably the best indicator. In Chechnya’s case, even the long Soviet rule with all its emphasis on class unity has failed to produce any substantial number of such marriages. Fundamentally, Chechen society is highly autonomous.
Moreover, it is inconceivable that the Chechen side would agree to any such proposal. The Chechen resistance may be divided over their choice of tactics but they are all united by the ultimate goal of independence. The fact that after two years of total war the Chechen resistance is far from defeated, and that its numbers increase with every new atrocity committed by the Russian troops against the local population, gives the Chechen leadership confidence that sooner or later they will able to force Russian troops to withdraw from Chechnya. Thus, without any substantial grounds to win the support of either the Chechen people or the Chechen resistance, any proposal of autonomy would remain purely theoretical.
The Russian-Chechen conflict, therefore, can only be resolved by giving the Chechen side prospects of a de jure-recognised independent state. This has to be done with full consideration of Russian security interests in the region, since no de jure recognition for Chechnya can be brought about against the will of Moscow - though the question of a de facto Chechen independence may fall beyond Russia's power again, as it has done in the past.
There are strong arguments in favor of an urgent resolution to the war in Chechnya. War is a dangerous enterprise for all parties and requires expensive sacrifices, particularly in the great human costs and the suffering involved. More than a decade after the dissolution of the former USSR, the future of Russia is still in doubt. While the Eurasian school in Russia seems to be loosing grounds to the Europeanists, much of Russia's foreign policy is still that of a revisionist state, particularly in relation to the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions.
Since Russia's foreign policy, as that of any other state, is a continuation of its internal politics, the war in Chechnya plays a significant role in determining the direction that Russia will go. This is most evident in the attacks on media freedom. No state can afford freedom of the press when its troops are committing war crimes - nor can it become a true democracy without freedom of expression.
The war in Chechnya has radicalized and will continue to radicalize Russian society by increasing the influence of the Russian security services and the military. Also, the longer the war goes on the greater are the atrocities committed by these institutions. This in turn increases the cost of peace for the Russian military and security service elites, since it increases their chances of being indicted for war crimes.
This does not necessarily require a setting up of an international tribunal, which depends on the political will of world powers and is therefore unlikely to happen. The laws of Belgium, for instance, already permit the trial of any individual, including a foreign head of state, for crimes against humanity, as the case of Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has shown.
Finally, the war in Chechnya is an expensive enterprise which requires substantial government expenditure, diverting resources from the already weak Russian economy. While the true economic burdens imposed on it may never be known, it is self-evident that two years of war with the deployment of no less than 80,000 troops is a heavy burden, which does not help Russian economic reforms and therefore democratization.
The overall result is that fighting a war in Chechnya and democraticizing Russia are two mutually exclusive policies. This has far reaching implications for peace and stability in Europe. No truly secure or united Europe can emerge if Russia fails to become a democratic state. There can be no true partnership between Russia and the E.U. or between the U.S. and Russia, unless Russia undergoes decisive modernization and adopts Western values. With this war and its attendant atrocities in Chechnya, there is a little ground for such shared values. Behaving as if civilised in relation to the West while remaining barbaric in relation to Chechnya simply can not go together.
There is a way to resolve the conflict, to which international involvement is key. Such international involvement, however, can only happen with Russia's consent, though both the E.U. and the U.S. have the means to change the numbers in the Kremlin's calculations using political, diplomatic and economic leverage. Such involvement must help Chechnya to become a truly democratic and peaceful state, thereby eliminating whatever threats to Russian security it might pose. Incentives are necessary, and the prospect of a de jure recognition of Chechnya will be a strong incentive for Chechnya to undergo decisive democratizaion and demilitarization. The idea is simple: statehood in return for democracy.
This idea can be implemented through the United Nations Trusteeship system under Chapters XII and XIII of the U.N. Charter. Since this can only be done with the agreement of Russia, and since Russia is a member of the Security Council, she will have a decisive say in the terms under which Chechnya will be governed for the period, and in the designation of the administering authority. This could make Russia feel more comfortable with the idea, which needs to be a Russian-initiated proposal to succeed.
The terms of the trusteeship will also have to be acceptable to the Chechen side, since without the Chechen side’s voluntary consent no such system can be implemented. The prospect of a recognition of Chechnya, together with help in reconstruction and an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops, are likely to secure Chechnya's consent.
The European Union might be a good choice for the role of administering authority, since the E.U. is seen in Moscow not as a threat to Russian interests but as an opportunity. The administering authority has to be charged with the speedy and effective implementation of democratization procedures at all levels in Chechnya, with the aim of preparing Chechnya to assume the responsibilities of a recognised independent state. Economic reconstruction, demilitarization and the training of civil servants and police will have to be given priority. The E.U. has acquired much experience in this field in the Balkans.
Chechens, along with the other ethnic groups that have lived in Chechnya since before the first war, should be offered a choice whether to stay or relocate. Those that desire to relocate to or from Chechnya should be given the necessary economic and legal support for their transportation and resettlement.
Since virtually everyone in Chechnya owns some kind of weapon, a sophisticated scheme for demilitarizing the country must be worked out, taking account of local idiosyncrasies. The most effective way to collect weapons would be to offer market-price compensation. This will succeed if the inflow of weapons from outside is prevented, which will require an effective border control.
The only non-Russian border Chechnya has is with Georgia. OSCE observers, together with the Georgian border forces, are already monitoring this border. In future, they can and should be joined by Chechen border guards.
For the sake of peace, amnesty can be given to all war crimes and atrocities committed during the last two conflicts. Such amnesty can reduce the Russian military and security services’ fears of prosecution and therefore increase the chance of peace.
This scheme has advantages for all parties. Russia will free itself from the constant problem of Chechnya. The relocation of the Chechens who chose to do so would mean that Russia would be freed from its hostile population - a problem that Russia has been trying to solve for centuries (the 1944 deportation of Chechens is an obvious example). Russia would also free itself from the burden of the economic reconstruction of Chechnya, as well as stop wasting already limited resources on this unwinnable war. Moreover, acceptable adjustments can be made to the Russian-Chechen borber in the north-west of Chechnya, thereby making the idea more attractive to Russia's public. In addition, the E.U. could compensate Russia by increasing economic aid, particularly to southern Russian republics.
The E.U. will also be a winner. Today it might be a "reluctant empire," but as it undergoes deepening and expansion it is bound to play a more assertive role externally. Its very presence guarantees its actorness. While Russia may never become a member, it will become more and more important to the E.U. due to its proximity. By resolving the Russian-Chechen conflict, the E.U. will benefit from the increased chance of a future democratic and stable Russia, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated. The enormous economic resources that will be required to administer and reconstruct Chechnya may not be too high a price to pay for the stability of Europe. Moreover, a substantial part of this expenditure can be covered by using Chechnya's own natural resources.
The benefits to Chechnya are self-evident. It will get what it has always strived for - a state of its own. However, even if independence were to come to Chechnya today, there would not be much to celebrate since the last two wars have had such tremendous human, economic, and social costs. Chechnya alone is not likely to be able to succeed in addressing the huge and difficult post-war challenges that it would have to face. The trusteeship system will guarantee reconstruction and economic aid from outside and, by democratizing Chechnya, will help it to get rid of those who have hijacked the Chechen cause for their own goals. In short, Chechnya will benefit from all angles.
To sum up, if Chechnya's status is not of fundamental importance to Russia, as President Putin has argued, then the Russian-Chechen conflict can be resolved by transforming Chechnya into a truly peaceful democratic state, since no formula of autonomy within the Russian Federation is likely to succeed due to the history of the Russian-Chechen conflict and particularities of the Chechen people.
The idea proposed in this paper is "statehood in return for democracy." This scheme can be implemented through the U.N. trusteeship system, where Russia would play a substantial role, thereby satisfying its pride. This proposal offers good grounds to make the resolution of the Russian-Chechen conflict a win-win situation for all sides. This will, however, require a paradigm shift in the minds of Russia's policy makers as well as a strong political will and commitment on the side of the international community, and particularly of the E.U..
*
(1). " Putin's interview with US journalists", (Chechnya part), Johnson's Russia List #5312, posted on Chechnya short-list 20 June 2001,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/chechnya-sl/message/16844
The full transcript of the interview in Russian is available on the official site of the Russian President at the following internet adress: http://president.kremlin.ru/events/242.html