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Eurasian Politician
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The Eurasian Politician - Issue 4 (August 2001)

THREE APPEALS FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE BALKANS.

By Patrick Moore
Source: RFE/RL Balkan Report, 1 May 2001, Volume 5, Number 32

Many in the international community seem to have developed a sort of phobia regarding the continuing unraveling of Tito’s former Yugoslavia and the ongoing decolonization process in the western Balkans. Three articles have just appeared that argue that such an attitude ignores the democratic aspirations of the people in the region and is likely to lead to more trouble, not less.

One need not look too far lately to find statements by prominent Western leaders and other observers to the effect that independence for Montenegro would set off a chain reaction leading to an independent Kosova, the breakup of Macedonia, the dissolution of Bosnia, the emergence of a Greater Albania out of the ruins of several neighboring states, and perhaps even a general Balkan conflagration involving Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.

Nor are these views confined to Washington or Brussels. There are people in the region with an interest in preserving the status quo. Such people have tried their best to frighten Western leaders, Macedonian politicians, Montenegrin voters, and others into thinking that any change in the political map will lead to a modern-day Balkan Armageddon.

The three articles under review argue that such thinking is likely to lead to further tensions in the region because it ignores the democratic aspirations of the people involved. Like the fabled King Canute, some political leaders or observers seem to want to hold back an inevitable tide of change manifested democratically at the ballot box (see below).

This attitude is perplexing to some, including Alush Gashi, who is an adviser to moderate Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova. In an article published by Reuters, he said in Washington on 26 April that "we will do our best to be a good neighbor but there is no way we can be forced to accept Belgrade’s rule any more." Gashi stressed that independence is the only alternative: "Even if [the UN’s Hans Haekkerup says] no, we don’t take no for no. We have to push through a democratic process to change all existing no’s on a referendum…. We have to have first of all a timetable for [Kosova’s] final status…. We will offer arguments on a daily basis until we achieve our democratic goal (see "RFE/RL Balkan Report," 23 February 2001)." Gashi added: "We are a little bit surprised that democratic countries are reluctant to accept the will of the people, so we will continue to work on this issue."

In the second article under consideration, the "Financial Times" of 27 April reviewed a new study by the International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled "After Milosevic." The article summarizes the study as saying that "attempts to freeze the status quo risk provoking more tensions because they ignore local conditions."

Presenting the report, Gareth Evans, who is ICG president and former Australian foreign minister, said: "Arguing that there are already too many states in the Balkans is not an appropriate response to the situation in Kosovo and Montenegro," the "Financial Times" noted.

The study goes on to say: "Hopes that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can be reconstituted – on a transitional or permanent basis – as a loose federation or confederation with little or no power vested in central authorities, appear painfully detached from political reality." Fears that Montenegrin independence would lead to conflicts elsewhere in a domino fashion "have all been overstated." The study recommends talks between Podgorica and Belgrade as the best way of defusing the tensions.

Turning to Kosova, the ICG argues that foot-dragging over settling the province’s final status is in itself a cause of instability and tension. The study proposes autonomy for Kosova, followed by a negotiated form of "conditional independence" during which the UN will continue to exercise limited control over Kosova’s sovereignty.

It might be added that, through that process, the Kosovars will gain valuable skills in self-government. They will also have the opportunity to prove that they are indeed capable of controlling crime and violence and of treating their minorities fairly. In any event, it is worth recalling that Haekkerup was in no hurry to hold elections in Kosova when he took over from Bernard Kouchner just a few months ago. Within a short time, however, he realized the importance of holding elections in 2001, just as Kouchner did.

The third and final article appeared in London’s "The Guardian" on 27 April. In it, veteran correspondent Jonathan Steele argues that the process of unraveling the former Yugoslavia continues, and that attempts to halt or reverse that development are futile.

Looking at Montenegro, Steele argues that Western officials and observers are wrong in focusing on the domino theory. He suggests that the West remain neutral in the debate among Montenegrins about their country’s future and let the Montenegrins decide things themselves. The danger that Steele sees is not one of a conflict between Belgrade and Podgorica but the risk of "violence within Montenegro itself, which could be provoked from either side: by a pro-independence majority which feels unfairly denied, just as much as by a pro-Yugoslav minority which wants to hang on to the status quo. The danger of bloodshed is small, but Western policy would do better to concentrate on this rather than the false strategic problems for the region which it claims to see."

Steele is somewhat more optimistic about Western policy toward Kosova, noting that Haekkerup and others have come to see the need for elections. Steele adds that "Haekkerup or his UN successor will have the final say in the most sensitive areas of policy, just as his internationally appointed counterpart [Wolfgang Petritsch] does in Bosnia, even though Bosnia is a nominally independent state. These two Balkan protectorates are doomed to last for a long time."

The Kosovar Albanians, Steele notes, will not have independence handed to them outright. "But Kosovo will get the symbols of sovereignty, and these matter as an incentive to responsible self-government. They also imply that the territory can never be part of Serbia again – a de facto guarantee of what every Kosovo Albanian wants."

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Copyright (c) 2000. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org


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