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The Eurasian Politician - Issue 4 (August 2001)

From Neo-Eurasianism to National Paranoia:
Renaissance of Geopolitics in Russia

By: Anssi Kullberg, May 2001

For the course: Venemaa välispoliitika.
Professor Kaido Jaanson,
University of Tartu, Fac. of Social Sciences, Dpt. of Politology.

Geopolitics is in a vast rise in Russia. It is partly bound to the old tradition of Russian imperialist thinking, but partly gets new forms under the "verticality" doctrine of Vladimir Putin. There are three main traditions of Russian geopolitical thinking: the Zapadnik, the Slavophile/Panslavist, and the Eurasianist. All these tend to seek imperialist mission for Russia and thus, expansion. Russia has traditionally mirrorred the West and reacted to all those geopolitical models that have risen into publicity in the West. Thus, there is no reason to expect that the present Western geopolitical constructions, like those of Samuel Huntington and Zbigniew Brzezinski, would not strongly influence Russian geopolitics towards both her Western (Baltic) and Southern (Caucasian and Central Asian) fronts. Andrei Kozyrev stated barely a month after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that "we rapidly come to understand that geopolitics ... is replacing [the communist] ideology".

Brzezinski classifies the Russian schools of geopolitical thought after the Cold War into three groups – which resemble the trinity of Zapadniks, Slavophiles and Eurasianists in Professor Jaanson’s division. For Brzezinski, they are: "1) Priority for ‘the mature strategic partnership’ with America, which for some of its adherents was actually a code term for a global condominium. [Zapadnik approach.] 2) Emphasis on the ‘near abroad’ as Russia’s central concern, with some advocating a form of Moscow-dominated economic integration but with others also expecting an eventual restoration of some measure of imperial control, thereby creating a power more capable of balancing America and Europe. [Slavophile, nationalist, imperialist approach.] 3) A counteralliance, involving some sort of Eurasian anti-U.S. coalition designed to reduce the American preponderance in Eurasia. [Eurasianist approach.]"

For the Western powers, it has been a traditional goal to strengthen the "pro-Western", Zapadnik, element of Russian geopolitical thought. This was recently well and ironically described in a column by Keijo Korhonen [translation mine]: "The solid basis of good Russo-American relations is the Americans’ general positively romantic image of eternal Russia. Nothing can break that image. ... But even more important is that the United States and Russia have never fought against each other. Russians have never been considered as enemies in the U.S. ... After the collapse of Soviet socialism, Russia became for the Americans a prodigal son who returned from his wrong paths. All mistakes are forgiven, disappointments swallowed. Calfs of dozens of billions of dollars are slaughtered for Russia again and again, however badly Russia behaved. ... Have a look upon what’s happening all the time in Chechnya, which is a conquered imperial dominion for Russia as well as Finland was up until 1917. ... NATO is not planning an intervention and is not going to bomb Moscow. Russia has her own permission, licence to kill. ... The United States will always ‘understand’ Russia, its problems and its goals. Russia’s voice is heard in Washington, and listened to."

Maksimenko and the Concern over Russia’s Underbelly

Russian geopoliticians, however, do not share the American optimism and fatherly caring. Their exponents still consider America, the NATO, the West, and so on, as the supreme enemy. Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and senior researcher of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, Vladimir Maksimenko, criticises Brzezinski and "American imperialism" in tones that call for Russian counteractions on the field of Eurasian geopolitics. Brzezinski’s geostrategic construction of the Grand Chessboard, "the Eurasian Balkans", covers the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as those areas within the present Russian Federation which used to belong to the Crimean and Astrakhan khanates. Maksimenko hints that the meaning of Brzezinski’s construction is to extend the playground of American game activity into the areas that used to be Russian imperial dominions during the late czarist and Cold War periods. Russians generally consider those areas that have once been parts of the empire as "legitimate" interest sphere and subject to desired reconquest.

Columnist and security expert Jukka Tarkka wrote in May, commenting President Koivisto’s book on "Russian Idea": "At least from the 1400s up until the Soviet times, Russia has had nationalist-mysticist desire for expansion and aggression. … All those areas are understood as belonging to Russia, which it has once conquered, or where Russian blood has been spilled. That makes also Finland part of Russia. … The relationship of present Russia with CIS countries, Baltic republics and Chechnya does not support the claim that the Korean War or even the collapse of the Soviet Union would have changed at all the Russian idea described by Koivisto."

Maksimenko is concerned of Brzezinski’s "plot", which is expressed "as clearly as it could be" in Brzezinski’s foreword: "Hence, the issue of how a globally engaged America copes with the complex Eurasian power relationships – and particularly whether it prevents the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power – remains central to America’s capacity to exercise global primacy." Maksimenko, like most Russian geopoliticians, clearly show identification to a Russian imperial mission – essence as the "dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power" – since otherwise it should not be a threat to "Russian interests" if the U.S. is suggested to counteract such a power from taking over in Eurasia. Hence, when Russian geopolitics is concerned of the "expansion of NATO", the "Islamic threat" and "Russian security", they do not actually speak about Russia proper, but about the future’s once again Greater Russia. This is the "Russian idea", which is recognised to be imperialistic and expansionistic even by the former president of Finland, Mauno Koivisto, who is well known of his sympathy for the great neighbour.

Another sign of the special character of Russian interpretation of "threats" is Maksimenko’s obvious horror for Brzezinski’s appeal in 1994 in his article "The Premature Partnership". Brzezinski argued that it was important to prevent such international relations that would ‘dilute the Euro-Atlantic alliance while permitting a regionally hegemonic Russia to become again the strongest power in Eurasia’. According to Brzezinski, this would deprive the West of the fruits of its victory in the Cold War. In the same year, Brzezinski prescribed the United States a strategy aimed at "the consolidation of geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union". Thus, the "terrible threat" against "Russian interests" is described as "geopolitical pluralism" within the dominion of the former empire. Yet Russian geopoliticians argue for "multipolarism" in world order. The term "multipolarism" usually refers to the idea that denies the right of sole supremacy of the United States or the West. They generally criticise the U.S. For them, Brzezinski’s call for pluralism is a nasty plot directed against Russia – as "the Euro-Atlantic alliance’s aim in Eurasia" is recognised as "total geopolitical control over the world’s largest continental space rather than ideological or humanitarian goals". This is rather interesting an interpretation of Brzezinski’s expression "geopolitical pluralism".

Maksimenko goes on into Russian geopolitical paranoia by warning that Brzezinski’s goal of "geopolitical pluralism" would means "Balkanization of the Caucasian, Central Asian and neighbouring areas". He also claims – very interestingly for an eminent academician – that "during the second Chechen war of 1999-2000 the West demonstrated its support of the Chechen leaders and their separatist and expansionist designs". This shows rather well the parallel reality of how Russian geopolitics mirror the Western ones, yet failing to adopt even those objective criteria that are used in Western analysis. Quite correctly, Eiki Berg argues that geopolitics is not an objective science but vehemently bound to national interests.

Dugin and the Return of Eurasianism

In autumn 2000 the attraction of Vladimir Putin towards Eurasianist thinking was shown in his search for ideological basis for the direction of rising Russian imperialism from the thoughts of the well-known Russian nationalist and dissident, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Now Putin is getting much more dangerous schools of Eurasianist thought behind his back. The Russian ultra-nationalist and geopolitician Aleksandr Dugin founded on 21^st April the "Eurasianist Movement", which advocates an empire of all Eurasia, dominated by Russia. Dugin is considered as Greater-Russian and passionate agitator of crusader mentality against "Islamic threat". Dugin has also attacked against the Baltic countries, Poland, Turkey and other frontier nations around Russia. He has strong contacts to Western European extreme right, among others, to the French Front National and Belgian Vlaams Blok. The Synergon network of European extreme right that spreads hatred against the United States, Turkey, Israel as well as the moderate Muslims of the Balkans and Caucasus, and defends Russian and Serbian policies, openly admires Dugin and translates his texts into European languages.

Dugin is not constructing the new applicant ideology for "Russian mission" alone. A pro-Moscow Islamic mufti Farid Salman praised Dugin’s movement and stated that "Eurasianism represents a suitable answer against the supporters of Satanic Wahhabism, who have penetrated Russia". "Wahhabism" is a myth created by KGB, and used widely in Soviet and later Russian propaganda to brand any Islamic opposition movement. In fact, Wahhabism is a puritan Sunnite school, which enjoys the official religious status in Saudi Arabia. It is absolutely against the moderate Sufi traditions of Islam, represented for example by Chechens and Albanians.

The fanatic anti-American Dugin expectedly admires Putin, and demands "total support" for the leader of Russia, the empire designed to dominate Eurasia. Dugin’s movement has been completed with loyalist nomenclature representatives of various faiths, including the foreign affairs secretary of the Patriarchate, Vsevolod Chaplin, an Islamic mufti Talgut Tadzhuddin, a Jewish rabbi Avram Shmulevich, and a Buddhist leader Did-Khabalam. Following the Soviet tradition, loyalist religious leaders usually share background in the KGB. The goals of the Eurasianist movement are to rise Russia into Eurasian hegemony and to unite the different religions of Eurasia against the "great Satan", the United States. The Western European Synergon network, which unites anti-American rightist powers, supports the Eurasianists. The Synergon’s leader Robert Steuckers recently gave an interview in support for Dugin in a Georgian newspaper "Free Eurasia".

Eurasianism, influencing in Russia in the czarist times already, always carried nationalist character, and had as its cornerstones fanatic hatred against the West, originally especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and emphasis on Greater Russian imperialism. Originally, the Eurasianists demanded Russia’s complete divorce from the "corrupted" Europe, and redirecting herself towards Eurasia. The great names of Eurasianism included Count Nikolai Trubetskoi (1890-1938) who was active in the 1920s. His followers were the economic geographicist Pyotr Savitsky (1895-1965), the jurist and philologist Nikolai Alekseyev (1879-1964), the religious philosopher, cultural historian and medievalist Lev Karsavin (1882-1952) and the well-known historian Georgy Vernadsky (1887-1973). During the Cold War, in the 1960s, the leading star of Eurasianism was the historian Lev Gumilyov, who supported Greater Russian imperialism, gained strange influences from fascism, and created singular epoch theories of the rise, expansion and fall of great nations.

In the Soviet times, Eurasianism was especially popular among KGB, the Red Army, and Alpha troops. Dugin is himself son of a KGB officer, besides being an historian. In the 1980s he appeared as a fanatic anti-Semitist who demanded the expelling of all Jews from Russia. In the 1990s he, together with Eduard Limonov and their network, translated and spread the texts of German and Italian fascists in Russia. At the same time, they spread their own texts and Russian geopolitics to the West through the networks of the "new right", including Synergon. Nowadays, Dugin acts as an advisor to the communist leader Gennady Seleznyov and is spreading propaganda against Turkey and Caucasian nations.

According to Dugin, it is the duty of Russia to destroy the West. He thinks that the "ocean powers" Great Britain and U.S. represent "evil" in the universe. For Russian geopoliticians it has always been characteristics to adopt the ideas of Western geopoliticians, but to mirror them into opposite. This has also been Dugin’s method. He has adopted the classical geopolitical theories of Mackinder, Mahan, Ratzel, Haushofer and even the Nazi geopolitician Carl Schmidt.

According to Dugin and his European supporters, Eurasia must be organised in Russian leadership into a continental geopolitical power, which shall reach hegemony and global dominance, and thereby overcome the Anglo-Saxon "evil". Russia can gain "military, ideological and geoeconomical hegemony", "geopolitical dominance", which is directed against the United States, by subjecting all Eurasia under Moscow’s power. This must happen "in union with Europe". To achieve these goals, "Russia must take control over all strategic transport routes from East to West and from North to South". According to Victor Yasmann, Putin has stated identical ideas.

Eurasianism has been transformed, for example in its relationship to religious questions (first fanatically Christian, then atheist, then presenting itself as multi-confessional), ideological questions (first czarist, then communist, now Russian nationalist), and its relationship to Europe (first fanatically anti-European, while now seeking European-Russian alliance against America). However, it has maintained certain characteristiques all the way: 1) Imperialism and expansionism. 2) Seeing Russia in the leading role. 3) Unconditional antagonism and conflict in regard to the "West", which is seen as the absolute enemy. 4) Tendency to Messianic thinking. According to Dugin, "in the conflict between Eurasia and the West there is no peaceful solution – it can only end in the victory of one and destruction of the other".

According to Dugin’s own words, his goal is not to rise into leadership in the empire, but only to aim at "ideological power" – making his own Eurasianist visions the state ideology of the Kremlin. Putin has adopted frighteningly positive attitude at Dugin’s ideas, and Dugin’s network has reached a lot of popularity also elsewhere among the nomenclature of former Soviet Union. An example has been the Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has openly praised Eurasianism. In the new capital of Kazakhstan, Astana (former Aqmola), the "Eurasian University" has been named after Lev Gumilyov, and when Putin recently visited Kazakhstan, the walls of the university were decorated with Dugin’s slogans.

In December 2000, the Kazakhstani ambassador in Moscow, Tair Mansurov, wrote in Moscow News about Nazarbayev’s intentions to advocate "multipolar world" – that is, world order where Russia and China would rise to challenge the U.S. supremacy as rival superpowers. Like traditionally, Eurasianism again mirrors the West: Nazarbayev’s initiatives include for example "Eurasian Union" and "Eurasian Economic Community", founded in Astana in October 2000. The OSCE process is in turn imitated by creation of an "Asian Conference of Co-operation, Friendship and Mutual Aid".

Conclusions

In the Russian context, we do not observe only theoreticians tending towards paranoia and messianic mysticism. The most pragmatic powers of Russia share the opinions of geopolitical thinkers in most touching consensus. Putin’s personal friend and close ally, former KGB spy and newly appointed Russian defence minister Sergei Ivanov, stated that "NATO’s expansion towards East" is even more dangerous a threat to the Russian interests than "international terrorism that is splitting Russia". He vowed that Russia would force the neighbouring countries to "respect our national interests". Later in May, 2001, Ivanov openly sympathised with Colonel Yuri Budanov, who is, besides his protégé, the so far only Russian officer accused for war crimes against civilians in the Chechen War. He kidnapped, raped and murdered a Chechen girl, Elza Kungayeva, in most cruel way, and "destroyed evidence" by driving over the girl’s body with an armoured vehicle.

As Professor Vahur Made, vice-chairman of the Estonian School of Diplomacy, pointed out during a seminar in Tartu, August 2000, the history of the interwar period shows well how little the Western countries have after all cared about the Baltic countries, let alone about the Caucasus. Thus, it is rather fallacious for the present Baltic politicians to support the ideas of those Western geopoliticians who most fervently support the idea of Russian Zapadnik imperialism – for example Huntington.

However, it seems that the main direction of Russian imperial aspirations is again directed towards the traditional southern front, and thus Russia is again becoming increasingly "Mongol" and "Asiatic" in her imperial behaviour. Russia has traditionally been most concerned of Western "conspiracies" threatening the southern front, which Winston Churchill described as the "soft underbelly of Russia". In present Russian geopolitical thought, the ideas of Western conspiracy have been accompanied by strong anti-Islamic bias, yet the West, Turkey and Israel are regularly connected to this "Islamic conspiracy" threatening Russia, as seen in Maksimenko and Dugin’s contributions. This does not, however, mean safety for the Western front. Poland, Romania, Finland and the Baltic states are still under constant threat to be swallowed into the Russian sphere of hegemony, as witnessed this year in Moldova and Ukraine. It should be no surprise for Estonian politicians that the leading Russian geopoliticians are fervently attacking Brzezinski but stay entirely satisfied of Huntington.

The present Russian spy hysteria is also getting geopolitical dimensions that may touch both the Baltic and the Caucasian regions in the near future, in a much more serious way than any single scandal like that of Valeri Ojamäe. The Russian intelligence has started a special campaign against Turkey. Aleksandr Khinstein, well-known of his FSB contacts, accused the Turkish intelligence MIT of participation in the hijacking of Sufyan Arsayev and Co. as well as of spreading "influence" among the Turkic republics of former Soviet Union. According to the FSB spokesman Aleksandr Zdanovich, Russia suffers of an increasing danger that "foreign spies" are trying to gain information and analyse the Chechen war. The FSB will set actions for this. The main attack is directed against Turkey, by accusations that Turkish spies have "tried to found associations for Kurds, Circassians and Meskhetians in the territory of the Russian Federation". Later the FSB announced that the teachers of Turkish language usually come to Russia "to spread Wahhabism" and that they are spies.

These phenomena witness of the ongoing southern emphasis of Russian imperial geopolitics. As expectable, Russia’s main targets are those southern nations that can block its potential expansion of hegemony: Turkey and Pakistan. Caucasians and Russian Turks – being the "soft underbelly" – thus form the main target of Russian hegemonic efforts. When Russia turns her eyes towards the Western front, too – as has happened in Ukraine and Moldova already – it is expected that similar "news" and outbursts of Russian officials start to appear ever more regularly about Baltic countries, Romania, Poland and Finland. Partly the symptoms are already there.

AKK

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